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THE LIMITS OF LOCALISM 
Richard C. Schragger* 
"I am thankful for boundaries. I am fond of having the lines drawn 
around me."1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chicago v. Morales,2 the Supreme Court struck down Chicago's 
Gang Congregation Ordinance, which barred "criminal street gang 
members from loitering with one another or with other persons in any 
public place."3 The stated purpose of the ordinance was to wrest con­
trol of public areas from gang members who, simply by their presence, 
intimidated the public and established control over identifiable areas 
of the city, namely certain inner-city streets, sidewalks, and corners.4 
The ordinance required that police officers determine whether at least 
one of two or more persons present in a public place were members of 
a criminal street gang and whether these persons were loitering. Loi­
tering was defined as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent 
purpose."5 According to the Supreme Court, "the [Chicago] police is­
sued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people for 
violating the ordinance" in a three-year period.6 
The ordinance's defeat was, in some ways, preordained. Over 
twenty-five years earlier the Supreme Court had struck down similarly 
broad local vagrancy and loitering statutes as void for vagueness in a 
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1. SAUL BELLOW, RA VELSTEIN 185 (2000). 
2. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
3. Id. at 45-46. 
4. See id. at 46-47. 
5. Id. at 47 & n.2 
6. Id. at 49. 
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series of opinions culminating in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.7 
These decisions, combined with the earlier constitutionalization of 
"street law" by the Warren Court, dramatically curtailed police 
authority to "move along" undesirables and informally discipline dis­
orderly conduct.8 
Indeed, the ordinance at issue in Morales appears to be a straight­
forward case of police overreaching, an uncontroversial case for Court 
intervention. At least according to proponents, however, the Gang 
Congregation Ordinance had significant support in the minority, high­
crime, inner-city neighborhoods in which it was implemented. Advo­
cates argue that these communities should have substantial autonomy 
to adopt norms that are responsive to local conditions. State and fed­
eral courts should defer to such norms, even when they deviate from 
constitutional guarantees, because local residents are in a better posi­
tion to balance liberty and order in light of local circumstances. 
The case has thus generated an examination of the role of rights in 
minority communities, and of the conflict between individual rights 
7. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Those decisions include Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 
(1971), Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), and Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
Relying on these precedents, Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, held that the term 
"loitering" as defined by Chicago's ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it vio­
lated the " 'requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law en­
forcement.' " 527 U.S. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)). Noting 
that the ordinance could be applied to all kinds of harmless activity, Stevens found that the 
standards for enforcement of the ordinance were inherently subjective and thus failed to 
cabin police discretion in any meaningful way. In addition, two Justices - Souter and 
Ginsburg - agreed with Justice Stevens that the statute did not provide adequate notice so 
as "to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law," id. at 58, be­
cause the definition of loitering as remaining in one place for "no apparent purpose" and the 
standards for obeying an order "to disperse and remove [one]sel(f] from the area," "were 
impossible to obey." Id. at 60. Three Justices - Breyer, O'Connor, and Kennedy - con­
curred in the judgment, leaving open the notice issue addressed in Part IV of Stevens's plu­
rality opinion. Kennedy also did not join in Part IV of Stevens's opinion, but in his short 
concurrence he expressed "many of the same concerns (Stevens] expresses in Part IV with 
respect to the sufficiency of notice under the ordinance." Id. at 69. Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressed concern for the "consequences of gang 
violence," and indicated that a statute that defined "loiter" to mean "to remain in any one 
place with no apparent purpose than to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimi­
date others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities" would "avoid the 
vagueness problems of the ordinance." See id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In February 
2000, the Chicago City Council passed a new antigang loitering ordinance following 
O'Connor's suggestion that required that loiterers "remove themselves from within sight 
and hearing" of a designated spot for at least three hours. See Dirk Johnson, Chicago Coun­
cil Tries Anew with Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A14. 
8. See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhan­
dlers, Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1202-19 (1996) (hereinafter 
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct] (discussing history of street disorder and the 
constitutional revolution of street law); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality 
of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 
606-07 (1997) (discussing the historical context leading up to the Court's decision in 
Papachristou, and its impact on policing). 
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and community norms - a conversation that often seems to flounder 
on competing definitions of rights.9 The discussion surrounding 
Morales echoes other debates that appear to pit community-specific 
needs against constitutional norms. 10 This debate is structured as a 
clash between a (minority) community's efforts to solve pressing local 
problems and the liberal abstractions of due process imposed by (ma­
jority) outsiders, as a choice between community autonomy and pa­
ternalism. The conventional story has only two possible endings: either 
the wider political community respects the decisions of local people to 
adopt laws that are responsive to local conditions or it imposes a norm 
by force that the affected community does not share. The alternatives 
- respect or force - do not provide much of a choice. 
This Article challenges the structure of a debate that presents only 
the alternatives of respect or force, autonomy or paternalism, by ex­
amining the coherence of the concept of community on which argu­
ments on behalf of local autonomy are based. In this way, the Article 
reflects local government law scholarship's preoccupation with how 
local governance comes into being.1 1  Localism depends on the creation 
and maintenance of smaller-than-state associations marked off in geo­
graphical space by a definable (and often, defensible) perimeter. Yet, 
while boundaries create citizens (or aspire to do so), they must also, by 
definition, create noncitizens, and therefore they are invariably de­
structive of the ideal of a wider community. Localism tends to sacrifice 
9. The debate has taken place in a number of forums. See Albert W. Alschuler & 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors 
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, 
White, and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 245-47 
[hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Black, White, and Gray]; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, 
The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 197 [hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking] . The de­
bate also found its way into the Boston Review with an article by Tracey Meares and Dan 
Kahan entitled When Rights Are Wrong, with responses by Alan M. Dershowitz, Jean Be­
thke Elshtain, Joel F. Handler, Carol S. Steiker, Wesley G. Skogan, Margaret Burnham, 
Franklin Zimring, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard E. Harcourt, Anthony Paul Farley, and 
Richard H. Pildes. See URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY 
COMMUNITIES (Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan eds., 1994) [hereinafter URGENT 
TIMES] , available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR24.2/Meares.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2001) .  
10 .  The debate over single-sex African-American schools i s  one example. See, e.g. , John 
A. Powell, Black Immersion Schools, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 669 (1995) (dis­
cussing all-male black academies and arguing for an interpretation of constitutional prece­
dents to allow African-American communities to opt out of an integrationist, colorblind, or 
gender-neutral norm). 
1 1 .  Questions concerning the scope and nature of local power are at the heart of local 
government law. See, e.g. , Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self­
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 
(1977). 
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inclusion for the possibilities of citizenship. This "boundary problem"12 
of local government law can be stated as follows: The creation of a 
place for meaningful self-government (in space and in politics) for 
those inside the (metaphorical and sometimes literal) gates always af­
fects (and often injures) those who are outside the gates.'3 The bound­
ary problem in local government law thus is the problem of pluralism. 
A central thesis of this Article is that in deciding whether a par­
ticular community's norm is entitled to respect, we are deciding both 
whether the community exists and who gets to be included within it. In 
other words, localism does not just happen. Before one can assert local 
autonomy in the name of community, one needs a theory of insiders 
and outsiders that justifies the exercise of autonomy in its name. This 
Article tells an alternative story of Morales: a story about how local 
autonomy - and the corresponding rhetoric of community - is de­
ployed to instantiate a politically and geographically entitled localism 
in the first place. 
I argue that this "boundary-creating" role of local norms can be 
understood by conceiving of the Gang Congregation Ordinance at is­
sue in Morales as a form of zoning. Zoning, prosaically understood, is 
the primary tool of land use, a mechanism by which local governments 
regulate the placement and distribution of the components of our built 
environment. Zoning is a means by which groups can encourage uses 
of physical spaces that they like and discourage uses they do not like, a 
powerful instrument for instituting and transmitting norms of behavior 
spatially. Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance can be understood 
as a form of exclusionary zoning: a mechanism for discouraging uses of 
the public street (loitering by gang members and their associates) that 
many (though not all) Chicagoans apparently did not like. 
Approaching Morales as a zoning case brings together two dispa­
rate bodies of legal scholarship - criminal procedure and local gov­
ernment law - both of which point toward the decentralization of 
norms "down" the chain of governance to neighborhoods and other 
local institutions. Indeed, a burgeoning call for the radical decentrali­
zation of constitutional norms down to the city, neighborhood, and 
even block level increasingly asserts the rights of small-scale, territori-
12. See Richard Briffault, Surveying Law and Borders: The Local Government Bound­
ary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996) (employing the terminol­
ogy, though not this formulation). 
13. Gregory Alexander offers a comparable account of the "inside/outside" problem, as 
do other scholars. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential 
Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990); see also Clayton P. Gillette, 
Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (1994); Martha Minow, 
The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1995); Glen O. Robinson, 
Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269 (1997); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That 
Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). 
November 2001] Limits of Localism 375 
ally defined jurisdictions to govern themselves. Thus, proponents of 
the Gang Congregation Ordinance support Chicago's inner-city 
neighborhoods' decision to defend themselves as do many wealthy, 
suburban neighborhoods: by excluding (through zoning or otherwise) 
undesirable uses of space, and, by extension, undesirables. The theo­
retical bases for local autonomy that ground the inner-city residents' 
claims to govern are similar to those that ground the "rights" of sub­
urban municipalities, gated communities, homeowners associations, 
and business improvement districts to exclude, police, and regulate 
themselves. 
This Article objects to grounding local autonomy in the rhetoric of 
community. Local norms cannot be understood outside the context of 
a dynamic between localities, between neighborhoods within a city, 
and between city and suburb. I argue for a shift from a discourse of lo­
calism, which takes territorially defined communities as a given, to a 
discourse of alternative localisms, which understands communities as 
products of contested political norms, arising simultaneously with the 
borders that define them. Instead of a refuge of like-minded individu­
als bound in a collective pursuit of the good life, community is an ex­
plicitly political body that exists in relation to (and to the exclusion of) 
other, equally plausible alternative communities. Instead of asking 
whether particular residents should be permitted to waive constitu­
tional rights to respond to the exigencies of "their" community, we 
need to ask whether a particular zoning regime is a justifiable (and de­
sirable) means for creating a community - with all the normative 
force that term implies - out of a collection of people who live next 
door to one another. 
My intention is to undermine the naturalness with which we char­
acterize the places where people happen to live as communities, and 
to question the legal power and implications of that assumption. In 
doing so, I want to shift the legal focus from issues about the relation­
ship between the center and the periphery to issues about the relation­
ship between neighboring and alternative localisms - from questions 
concerning the proper exercise of vertical power, authority, and re­
sponsibility to questions concerning the proper exercise of horizontal 
power, authority, and responsibility. 
Part I begins by placing Morales in the context of two streams of 
legal thought: a criminal justice literature that emphasizes the role of 
informal norms of behavior in controlling criminality and a local gov­
ernment literature that champions decentralized lawmaking in 
smaller-than-state settings. It then develops three accounts of commu­
nity - contractarian, deep, and dualist - that provide the most com­
mon theoretical grounds for the robust localism that emerges at the 
confluence of these two streams. 
Part II critically considers these accounts using Morales and three 
other cases reimagined in zoning terms. I argue that the Gang Con-
376 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:371 
gregation Ordinance is based on a land use model of controlling devi­
ance that is prevalent throughout our metropolitan areas. The fact of 
zoned space introduces a spatial dimension to the generation of local 
norms, a dimension that localism arguments often overlook. Local 
norms are literally and legally boundary creating; norms are not sim­
ply the product of pre-existing communities, but are instead constitu­
tive of them. The rules governing the terms of inclusion in and exclu­
sion from a community form a normative wall between "us" and 
"them" by marking us in legal, social, and literal space as insiders or 
outsiders, members or nonmembers, shareholders or nonshareholders, 
citizens or noncitizens.14 This definitional work is often invisible be­
cause we see ourselves and "our community" from only one side; the 
"shape" of the normative world "differs depending on which side of 
the wall our narrative places us on. "15 Any celebration of the local 
must account for the contingency of community, the effect on "who 
we are" of a robust localism that relies on building high normative 
walls in demarcated space. 
Part III returns to the dichotomy between respect and force that 
characterizes arguments urging deference to local norms. I argue that 
this dichotomy is a false one; the difficult choices are not vertical -
between respect for the local or the force of a competing higher-level 
norm - but horizontal - between the force of alternative localisms. 
Expanding on Part II, Part III explores how law institutes one par­
ticular version of the local to the exclusion of multiple possible alter­
natives. These alternatives often come in the form of a plaintiff's 
"claim of belonging" masked as a (usually poorly fitting) assertion of 
constitutional right. This Part addresses the limitations of rights talk in 
articulating these kinds of claims of belonging and suggests ways in 
which such claims turn on how local government law defines insiders 
and outsiders. I conclude with a brief discussion of how it may be pos­
sible to imagine alternative localisms, returning to the Morales case 
with some final observations about the relationship between bounda­
ries and a substantive conception of local citizenship. 
I. NEIGHBORHOOD CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
Chicago v. Morales sits at the intersection of two large-scale struc­
tural developments in law and public policy. The first development is 
14. On this account, law is constitutive of both social relations and social space. See 
David Delaney et al., Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER xiii­
xxi (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2000); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Ju­
risdiction), 97 MICH. L REV. 843, 846-55 (1999); cf Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 (1984) (discussing constitutive nature of legal relations). 
15. Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (1983). 
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the ascendancy of a new approach to policing and criminology that 
emphasizes informal norms of behavior as opposed to formal sanc­
tions in controlling criminal behavior. Advocates of this approach to 
criminal justice emphasize the law enforcement potential of social 
norms and champion policies that attempt to encourage the transmis­
sion of such norms through the informal channels of the street, the 
neighborhood, and the community.16 The second development is the 
popularity of more decentralized forms of political organization, and 
the migration of government "down" to increasingly local institutions. 
This form of localism constitutes both an approach to specific prob­
lems of government policy and a political theory informed by a desire 
to decentralize political and social power.17 
This Part describes how these two movements coalesce in Morales, 
and more widely in an emerging legal scholarship that advocates the 
devolution of fundamental constitutional norms to the neighborhood 
level. This is an admittedly unusual approach to Morales; most com­
mentators read Morales from "inside" the criminal procedure litera­
ture without emphasizing its devolutionary implications. For ease of 
discussion, I call this general devolutionary impulse "neighborhood 
constitutionalism." Grounded in theories of local autonomy, neigh­
borhood constitutionalism looks to decentralized institutions as sites 
for norm generation in general, and for constitutional norm genera­
tion in particular. This Part then sketches three accounts of commu­
nity that ground arguments for local autonomy. Together, they suggest 
a picture of a beneficent localism that provides a powerful justification 
for . permitting neighborhoods to depart from background constitu­
tional norms. In the next Part, I will challenge that portrait. 
A. The New Policing and the New Devolution 
The first large�scale structural trend at work in Morales is a new 
policing geared toward fostering norms of order in public spaces. The 
16. See, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8; Dan Kahan, So­
cial Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, 
Social Influence]; Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning]; Livingston, supra note 8; 
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
191 (1998). 
17. Decentralization has been defined as "a form of political organization that permits 
local units to exercise wide discretion over what they do or how they do that which is re­
quired of a higher authority." Royce Hanson, Toward a New Urban Democracy: Metropoli­
tan Consolidation and Decentralization, 58 GEO. L.J. 863, 893 n.79 (1970). This common­
sense definition tells us little about the possible forms and purposes of decentralization. Cf 
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 254-55 (1993) (questioning 
the "liberal" conception of decentralization as modeling local power on a "centered sense of 
the [local] self"). This definition also assumes that the "local unit" is easily defined and iden­
tified, a view that this Article seeks to problematize. 
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new policing has developed primarily in response to crime and the 
breakdown of public order in urban neighborhoods and the concomi­
tant failure of traditional policing methods to affect it. Led by cities 
like New York and Chicago, localities have adopted law enforcement 
measures aimed at the quality of life in the city in general and order in 
public spaces more specifically. The ordinance at issue in Morales is 
one of a genus of policing tools directed toward controlling low-level 
misconduct in public spaces by enforcing norms of behavior and civil­
ity rather than by attempting to police specific criminal acts. In an ef­
fort to address what are often described as "quality of life" crimes, 
many local governments have either passed or increased enforcement 
of antiloitering ordinances, juvenile curfews, and ordinances prohibit­
ing panhandling, unlicensed street vending, public drunkenness, urina­
tion in public places, graffiti, and sleeping on public benches or in 
parks.18 Cities have also sought judicial remedies against street gangs 
as public nuisances, obtaining, in some cases, injunctive relief institut­
ing adult curfews and forbidding conduct as varied as loitering in 
abandoned buildings, carrying a baseball bat in a public place, climb­
ing over fences, or standing on rooftops.19 
These approaches to policing the urban "commons"20 reflect the 
ascendancy of a new theory of crime control based in large part on 
variations of the popular "broken windows" thesis.21 This thesis asserts 
18. See NATIONAL LAW Cm. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, No HOMELESS 
PEOPLE ALLOWED (1994) (describing measures); Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Miscon­
duct, supra note 8, at 1 168, 1217-19 (same); Dirk Johnson, Chicago Council Tries Anew with 
Anti-Gang Ordinance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A14 (reporting that Annapolis, Md., has 
approved a measure that bars convicted drug dealers from loitering in designated areas, and 
Grand Prairie, Tex., has adopted an ordinance that allows the police to scatter loiterers if 
officers suspect drug dealing); Steve Miletich, Sidewalk Law is Posted, SEATTLE POST­
INTELLIGENCER, May 19, 1994, at Al (discussing Seattle camping and public urination ordi­
nances); Michael Ybarra, Don't Ask, Don't Beg, Don't Sit, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 4, at 
5 (reporting that cities throughout the country have put limits on where panhandlers can 
beg). The Ohio Supreme Court recently struck down a Cincinnati ordinance that mandated 
the "civil banishment" from "drug exclusion zones" of any person arrested or taken into cus­
tody for any drug abuse-related activity. See Ohio v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 858-60 (Ohio 
2001). 
19. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public Nui­
sance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 415 (1999); 
see also Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony 
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2264 (1998); Stephanie Smith, Note, 
Civil Banishment of Gang Members: Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (2000). In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), the 
California Supreme Court held that the state's public nuisance law permits courts to enjoin 
gang activities that constitute a "public nuisance." 
20. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 173. 
21. See William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement 
of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447, 448-50 (1995); James Q. Wilson & George A. 
Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1982, at 29, 31-32; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 
(1999) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] ("The 'Broken Windows' thesis is that crime is most 
effectively combated when the police can address signs of visible disorder - including loi-
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that low-level public disorder left unchecked (such as an unrepaired 
broken window) can disrupt a neighborhood's social fabric. The com­
bined effects of minor misconduct contribute to the deterioration of 
community norms generally and thus to increased criminal activity of 
a more serious nature.22 A persistent theme sounded by proponents of 
the broken windows thesis is that the preservation of accessible, open, 
safe, and inviting public spaces is essential to the ongoing viability of 
urban neighborhoods and the liberty and security of their residents.23 
What is common to these types of quality of life ordinances is that 
they seek to control the aggregate effects of small individual acts of 
misbehavior in order to effect an overall change in the way certain ur­
ban spaces are used and viewed. The individual panhandler is not, in 
and of himself, a danger to the community. According to proponents 
of quality of life measures, however, repeated aggressive panhandling 
by a number of individuals can soon make the street unpleasant, and, 
more important, create an image of disorder that is threatening to law­
abiding people.24 The strategy is to project a sense of orderliness and 
cleanliness on the street. Orderliness will invite law-abiding people to 
use the street more often, which will make the street still safer by in­
creasing the number of informal "eyes" on the street and the sense 
that it can and should be used.25 More important, law-abiding people 
will come to see the street as orderly and expect it to be so, contribut­
ing to further enforcement of the informal norms of civil street be-
tering - that destabilize commumhes and stimulate the commission of more serious 
crimes."). For a discussion of the "broken windows" thesis, see Livingston, supra note 8, at 
578-91. 
22. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 16, at 370-76; Wilson & Kelling, supra note 
21, at 32. 
23. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 174 ("Rules of 
proper street behavior are not an impediment to freedom, but a foundation of it."); Peti­
tioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 14 ("[B]y moving gang members along, police officers can 
restore order to the streetscape and stop crime before it occurs . . . .  And by enabling the po­
lice to demonstrate control over the streetscape and the most lawless elements in the com­
munity, loitering laws make people feel safer, thereby invigorating neighborhoods."); see 
also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76-167 (1997) (arguing that order 
maintenance policing often protects minority residents who are disproportionately victims of 
minority lawbreaking). 
24. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF 
DECA y IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 48 (1990) ("Visible physical and social disruption 
is a signal that the mechanisms by which healthy neighborhoods maintain themselves have 
broken down. If an area loses its capacity to solve even seemingly minor problems, its char­
acter becomes suspect."). 
25. Jane Jacobs's THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 24-34, 29-1 12 
(1961) offers the original "eyes on the street" thesis. Her work is often cited by proponents 
of order maintenance policing, see, e.g., Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra 
note 8, at 1 171; Livingston, supra note 8, at 558-59, despite her professed wariness of man­
aged public spaces, see JACOBS, supra, at 41. 
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havior.26 As stated by the City of Chicago in its brief defending the 
Gang Congregation Ordinance: " 'Norms of order are critical to 
keeping social influence pointed away from, rather than toward crimi­
nality; the spectacle of open gang activity, vandalism, aggressive pan­
handling, and other forms of disorder transmits signals that cause both 
lawbreakers and law-abiders to behave in ways conducive to crime. '  "27 
The individual panhandler is thus more dangerous than he might ini­
tially seem because he represents the first in a cascade of broken win­
dows.28 
The second large-scale structural trend at work in Morales, though 
less directly, is the increasing insistence on and institutionalization of 
local control over local environments. Like the new policing, this lo­
calism has been precipitated in part as a response to urban disorder 
and the problems of urban governance generally. In addition, the last 
decade saw a reinvigorated suspicion of centralized government, or at 
least the political harnessing of a dissatisfaction with its workings, as 
well as a renewed call for decentralizing power to increasingly local 
institutions.29 These broader calls for decentralization have been ac-
26. Sociologists note that anxiety of disorder itself may lead to a breakdown of social 
control mechanisms that can prevent crime regardless of whether the anxiety is realistic. "In 
response to fear, people avoid one another, weakening [social] controls." Wilson & Kelling, 
supra note 21, at 33. 
27. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 15 (quoting Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 
16, at 391); see Livingston, supra note 8, at 580 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 21, at 
32) ("[S]igns of disorder - abandoned property, accumulating litter, inebriates slumped on 
the sidewalk, and teenagers loitering or fighting in front of the corner store - prompt fear­
ful residents to use the street less often and avoid involvement in matters that occur there. 
' . . .  Though it is not inevitable, it is more likely that here, rather than in places where people 
are confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, drugs will change 
hands, prostitutes will solicit, and cars will be stripped.' "). 
28. For critiques of what has variously been called "order maintenance policing," "norm 
enforcing policing," "quality of life policing," and the "new discretion," see David Cole, Dis­
cretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholar­
ship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1083-87 (1999); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on Subject: A Cri­
tique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and 
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Toni Massaro, 
The Gang's Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 25 (1998); Dorothy Roberts, Foreword: Race, 
Vagueness, and the Social Order of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 775, 790-99 (1999). 
29. See, e.g., NEWf GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995) (" 'Closer is better' 
should be the rule of thumb for our decision making; less power in Washington and more 
back home, our consistent theme."). The devolutionary impulse is not new. See Harry N. 
Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism - An American Tradition: Modern 
Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 239-40 (1996) (describing 
the "federalism creed" of the late nineteenth century when "most American political leaders 
regularly paid lip service to the idea that smaller government was better than larger" and 
that power should reside in the states). Indeed, the ideology of localism is deeply embedded 
in the intellectual, cultural, and constitutional history of the United States, though not al­
ways politically emergent. Thomas Jefferson was the " 'first and also the foremost, advocate 
of local self government.' " Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American 
Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 105-
06 (quoting A. SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 38 
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companied by the proliferation of sublocal governmental or quasi­
governmental institutions that replace or supplement the existing ar­
ray of local governments.30 These institutions, which include residen­
tial community associations (commonly known as homeowners asso­
ciations), downtown business improvement districts, and special 
districts, often provide those services that traditional local govern­
ments either do not normally undertake or cannot undertake because 
they are overwhelmed, incompetent, unresponsive, or all of these.31 
The arguments on behalf of decentralized local governance are 
various and overlapping, but some highlights can be noted here.32 Ad­
vocates of decentralization to the neighborhood level argue that local 
governments are more responsive to the specific needs of unique 
communities and that local institutions can provide better and in­
creased services. Neighborhood-level governments can tailor their 
policies and allocate resources more efficiently than can larger gov­
ernments.33 They also provide increased opportunities for political par-
(1966)). Jefferson advocated the division of counties into "wards," each of which would 
function as a "little republic." Jefferson conceived of these wards as places in which the 
yeoman farmer would play a personal part in the administration of public affairs. See id. 
Alexis de Tocqueville similarly argued that small-scale municipal institutions allow citizens 
to "practice the art of government in the small sphere within . . .  (their) reach." ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, at 61, 68 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945) (1835). 
The Jeffersonian legacy can be found in contemporary articulations of the civic republican 
tradition. See, e.g. , MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH 
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 202 (1996). 
30. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 503, 521-33, 534 (1997) (discussing the development of sublocal structures 
like business improvement districts, enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, and 
special zoning districts, and noting that though these institutions may lead to improved mu­
nicipal service provision, they may also exacerbate intralocal service inequalities). 
31. See id. at 508-24; Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (hereinafter Ellickson, Cities] (arguing that homeowners associa­
tions can provide local public goods more efficiently than municipalities in many cases); 
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 79-89 (1998) 
[hereinafter Ellickson, New Institutions] (proposing that cities create new block improve­
ment districts ("BLIDs") modeled on the homeowners association and the business im­
provement district in order to provide block-level goods). 
32. The strands of localism tend to cut across traditional political and scholarly lines. For 
example, Richard Briffault observes that the arguments on behalf of local power are a 
"striking harmonization of the otherwise divergent values of the free market, civic republi­
canism and critical legal studies." Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part I - The Structure of 
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). Despite this convergence, there are 
serious disagreements among advocates of decentralization. For example, even those who 
agree that participation in collective governance in small-scale settings is a positive good of 
decentralization do not agree on the proper character of the institutions in which such gov­
ernance should take place, who gets to participate, or the structure of that participation. 
Compare Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31, at 1519-20, with Gerald Frug, Cities and Home­
owners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982). 
33. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31; Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 79-
89. The law and economics model of local government is primarily a legacy of Charles 
Tiebout's A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), which devel­
oped a marketplace theory of municipal competition in which "rivalry among local govern-
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ticipation and thus offer venues for individual engagement in collec­
tive governance, which is a positive good for the individual and for the 
wider political community.34 Indeed, neighborhoods may be our most 
central and resilient sites for civic involvement, the best loci of com­
munity and fellowship that we have in an increasingly fractured met­
ropolitan area and an increasingly globalized society.35 
The new policing and the reinvigorated localism end up in the 
same place. Scholars and policy-makers have increasingly advocated 
the proliferation of lawmaking authority down to the neighborhood 
and block level. A. burgeoning literature calls for deference to local 
decisions addressing the quality of life on streets and in particular 
neighborhoods, and suggests that norms of street (and other) behavior 
be set locally. Indeed, the strongest advocates of quality of life ordi­
nances, including Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, argue that 
to a significant degree " 'police activity on the street should be shaped, 
in important ways, by the standards of the neighborhood rather than 
by the rules of the state.' "36 This is a claim that communities - not at 
the level of the state, region, municipality, or even town, but at the 
level of the neighborhood - not only can but should effect basic 
changes in the fundamental rules that govern relations between the 
state and the individual, as well as among individuals. 
Neighborhood governance is not new to urban planners and local 
government scholars;37 however, advocacy of the power of neighbor-
ments (for residents] is analogous to rivalry among firms" in fostering efficiency in the provi­
sion of public goods. VINCENT OSTROM, ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 206 (1988). 
34. See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 84 & n.35 (arguing that block-level 
institutions are "well scaled to strengthen individual members' involvement and skills in 
collective governance"). The argument that localities are centrally important sites for collec­
tive self-governance, and therefore should be structured in order to promote participatory 
governance in small-scale settings, is most associated with Gerald E. Frug's influential arti­
cle, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). His recent book, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT WALLS 11 (1999) (hereinafter FRUG, CITY 
MAKING], expands on that project, developing an "ideal of city life" on which to base a lo­
calism premised on creating forums for collective governance among strangers. David 
Barron has recently joined those advocates of decentralized local government who argue 
that "our towns and cities are . . .  important political institutions that are directly responsible 
for shaping the contours of 'ordinary civic life in a free society.' " The Promise of Cooley's 
City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) (quoting Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)). 
35. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, THE 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, at 57, 72-74 (March 1996). For a cogent summary of "the case for lo­
calism," see Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (2000) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Localism and Regionalism].  
36. Livingston, supra note 8, at 560 (quoting Wilson & Kelling, supra note 21, at 34). 
37. See, e.g., HOWARD w. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT IN A 
METROPOLITAN SETTING 1 2  (1974) (advocating that "(n]eighborhood government should 
be established in the larger cities of the United States [as it] would contribute to improved 
urban governance"); DAVID MORRIS & KARL HESS, NEIGHBORHOOD POWER: THE NEW 
LOCALISM 5, 99 (1975) (discussing neighborhood governance). In Los Angeles, for instance, 
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hoods to generate fundamental (constitutional) norms is something 
more recently devised.38 Proponents of this devolutionary approach 
employ the language of community autonomy and democracy in de­
fending policies that would normally be considered violative of consti­
tutional guarantees. Proponents of community standards do not de­
fend these policies using the traditional language of rights. Instead, 
they mount a territory-based offensive grounded in a robust concep­
tion of community self-determination: territorially defined communi­
ties should be permitted to depart from background constitutional 
norms under certain circumstances. Neighborhood constitutionalism 
constitutes the devolution of norm creation down to the local and 
sublocal level, a constitutional rights discourse with localism at its cen­
ter. 
B. Three Accounts of Community 
A number of scholars have taken up the call for community stan­
dards, for the decentralization of norms down to the neighborhood 
calls for neighborhood governance have been a constant refrain. See Donald G. Hagman, 
Regionalized-Decentralism: A Mode for Rapprochement in Los Angeles, 58 GEO. L.J. 901, 
927-931 (1970) (suggesting a two-tier structure that simultaneously decentralizes city gov­
ernment to neighborhood-level "boroughs" while providing for a city-county revenue shar­
ing metropolitan area government). Hagman noted when he was writing thirty years ago that 
the "desire for a decentralized Los Angeles is not novel." Id. (describing history of decen­
tralization movements in Los Angeles, and citing proposals for neighborhood governance). 
Los Angeles's most recently enacted city charter institutionalizes neighborhood councils, 
though they operate in an advisory capacity only. See Los Angeles City Charter § 900 (July 
7, 2000). For a discussion of the debates concerning neighborhood governance in Los 
Angeles, and one City Charter Commissioner's change of heart concerning the powers of 
neighborhood councils, see Erwin Chemerinsky, On Being a Framer: The Los Angeles 
Charter Reform Commission, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 131 , 142-44 (1999) (describing how Professor 
Chemerinsky initially supported empowered neighborhood councils but changed his mind 
and eventually opposed granting councils strong governing powers, particularly any powers 
over land use). 
38. The distinction between neighborhood involvement in local governance and neigh­
borhood norm generation can be illustrated by the difference between community policing 
and order maintenance or quality of life policing. The former is an organizational strategy 
that seeks to improve the effectiveness of current law enforcement by decentralizing com­
mand structures and increasing local input into police priorities and practices. See WESLEY 
G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETI, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 5-9 (1997) 
(identifying four principles of community policing: (1) organizational decentralization; (2) a 
broadly focused, problem-oriented policing; (3) responsiveness to the public's setting of pri­
orities; and (4) a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems through their 
own local organizations). The latter refers to a policing based in a social norm theory of de­
viance and to those substantive legal regimes designed to prevent deviance by enforcing 
norms of civility and order. Though sometimes used interchangeably, community policing 
can be employed to enforce existing norms and need not be accompanied by the adoption of 
local order maintenance norms. Indeed, Chicago has instituted an extensive community po­
licing regime that has been used as a model of decentralized, community-centered policing. 
See id. at passim. Though the line between community norm generation and community in­
put can be fine, it is important to recognize the distinction between arguments in favor of a 
decentralized chain of command and arguments on behalf of neighborhood or local political 
sovereignty. 
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level. For example, Debra Livingston has argued that policing be tar­
geted to the norms and requirements of specific streets.39 Professor 
Livingston contends that courts should defer to community-set be­
havioral standards that "make a community's public life possible."40 
Robert Ellickson similarly suggests that cities use geographically spe­
cific norms to police what he calls "chronic street nuisances" in public 
places, like aggressive panhandling and bench squatting.41 He, too, ar­
gues for establishing community standards as the basis for police ac­
tion, defining a chronic street nuisance as persistent action in a public 
space that violates "prevailing community standards."42 Mark Rosen 
advocates an even broader decentralized constitutionalism, claiming 
that courts should permit "geographical variations of constitutional 
requirements in the aid of community."43 Professor Rosen argues that 
rights should be context sensitive: neighborhoods, like the residents of 
Chicago's public housing projects, should be able to adopt constitu­
tional norms that differ substantially from background norms where 
that adoption might be crucial to their survival.44 
Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have provided the most 
forceful argument in favor of constitutional nonuniformity. Indeed, 
they were the principal authors of an amicus brief submitted on behalf 
of a number of neighborhood organizations in support of Chicago's 
Gang Congregation Ordinance.45 Amici did not principally argue that 
the ordinance was constitutional as set against the Court's current doc­
trinal standards. Instead, they argued that courts "should adjust the 
level of constitutional scrutiny applied to a policing technique based 
on the breadth of its impact on liberty within the community."46 The 
amici claimed that the Court should defer to communal norms that 
limit individual freedom where those norms are generated by the 
39. Livingston, supra note 8, at 560-62. 
40. Id. at 562. 
41. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1 167-76. 
42. Id. at 1 185. 
43. Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Consti­
tutional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1 129, 1 130-39 (1999) 
("[T]he Illinois Supreme Court overlooked geographical non-uniformity in City of Chicago 
v. Morales, when it struck down a gang antiloitering law."). But cf Gerald L. Neuman, Ter­
ritorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 
264-65 (1987) (arguing that territorial discriminations should not be exempt from equal pro­
tection analysis and that deference should be limited to "truly exceptional" cases). 
44. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 1193-94. 
45. See Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in 
Support of Petitioner at 4, Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) [hereinafter Amicus 
Brief]. 
46. Id. 
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community and the "community itself is sharing in the burden that the 
law imposes on individual freedom."47 
Invoking this same shared burdens theory, Professors Kahan and 
Meares have defended the Chicago Housing Authority's policy 
authorizing warrantless searches of public housing apartments.48 After 
waves of shootings at the Robert Taylor Homes and the Stateway 
Gardens public housing projects, the Chicago Housing Authority 
adopted a policy of authorizing police to search public housing apart­
ments without first obtaining a warrant and in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. A federal district court in Chicago struck down the 
policy, despite the residents' apparent overwhelming support for the 
measure.49 Kahan and Meares have argued that the court should have 
considered the context of the policy, the purpose of its enactment, and 
the direction of its burdens before overriding the residents' decision. 
The building search policy, like the Gang Congregation Ordinance, 
"was enacted not to oppress the City's minority residents; rather it 
sprang from the grievances of those very citizens, who demanded ef­
fective action to rid their neighborhoods of drive-by shootings, fight­
ing, and open-air drug dealing."50 In both cases, "we think that the 
residents of Chicago's high-crime, minority neighborhoods . . .  are the 
citizens entitled to determine whether the . . .  law reasonably balances 
liberty and order. "51 
These scholars' call for community standards rests upon a powerful 
argument for community self-determination premised upon a concep­
tion of the individual as a normatively entitled person, a person whose 
judgment in "balanc[ing] liberty and order"52 is entitled to the wider 
political community's moral respect. For advocates of this form of de­
centralization, community autonomy is a normative imperative that 
vindicates the individual's freedom of choice and thus "allows for the 
fullest expression of self."53 But the idea that the neighborhood is a 
47. Id.; see Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 9, at 209-10. 
48. See Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 
1 .  
49. See Pratt v .  Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F.  Supp. 792 (N.D . Ill. 1994). 
50. Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 5. 
Erik Luna calls Kahan and Meares' shared burdens theory a "neo-political process theory of 
criminal procedure," because it requires that courts assess whether a given law is an instru­
ment for oppressing a traditionally insular minority or an instrument of political and social 
empowerment adopted by that minority. See Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 
DUKE L.J. 787, 812 (1999). This characterization is accurate, though I argue that there is an 
independent devolutionary impulse - an argument about the appropriate scale for decision­
making - that underlies the shared burdens theory as well. 
51.  Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, at 258-59. 
52. Id. at 258. 
53. Georgette Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 
U. PA. L. REV. 607, 622 (1997). 
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place that fosters individual freedom can be contrasted with a tradi­
tion that views the neighborhood as a threat to individual liberty. For 
James Madison writing in Federalist No. 10, the conventional wisdom 
that republican government required a circumscribed territory con­
taining a relatively small number of (like-thinking) citizens was mis­
taken.54 Indeed, such a republic would be more susceptible to the 
"mischiefs of faction" - the ready creation of oppressive majorities. 
In contrast, if you 
extend the sphere . . .  you make it less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; 
or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength and act in unison with each other.55 
Madison's community of heterogeneous citizens ranging over a 
wide territory contrasts with the neighborhood constitutionalists' 
community of homogeneous neighbors living in close quarters. And 
indeed, these two images map onto two compelling American political 
visions. On the one hand, the Madisonian vision is concerned with fac­
tions and tyranny, the political process gone awry. On the other hand, 
the pluralist vision that animates neighborhood constitutionalism is 
concerned with the moral worth that we as other actors in the political 
system attach to individuals engaged in collective decisionmaking. 
Thus, for Kahan and Meares, the "real questions" are: "Why can't we 
trust residents of the inner city to decide for themselves . . . ? 
Shouldn't these individuals be allowed to determine whether this is 
the most sensible way to improve their lives?"56 The question "Why 
don't we trust them?" is an implicit denunciation of perceived moral, 
intellectual, and political superiority, a charge that we are not treating 
"these" people and "their" community with equal concern and re­
spect. 
The question "Why don't we trust them?" also presumes a "them" 
- a community of entitled decisionmakers. Yet, though rarely ad­
dressed, how community is defined is a central and difficult issue. In 
the following sections, I separate out three accounts of community 
that are often invoked in parallel, taking advantage of political and le­
gal theory to help construct my own particular and stylized models. 
These models - I call them contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts 
of community - each provide different and often competing bases for 
identifying normatively entitled decisionmakers. I treat them in detail 
here in order to make explicit the foundations for the moral claims 
being asserted by advocates of decentralization on behalf of neighbor-
54. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 81-84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788). 
55. Id. at 83. 
56. Meares & Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 6 
(emphasis in original). 
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hood decisionmakers. Morales is a useful vehicle for this enterprise 
because it nicely illustrates how the rhetoric of community hides a set 
of overlapping (and oftentimes contradictory) understandings of what 
a community is. Indeed, it is quite striking how the language of com­
munity is deployed in legal rhetoric to take advantage of all three ac­
counts, despite the fundamental differences in how each account un­
derstands the nature of the individual and, in tum, the nature of 
community. 
These accounts of community are both descriptive and prescrip­
tive, at once describing who belongs in the community and accounting 
for the legitimacy of the community's lawmaking. This section illus­
trates how the descriptive and prescriptive are linked (and often con­
flated) when we talk about community, and particularly when we try 
to translate membership into legal authority. 
1 .  Contractarian 
The contractarian account of community derives collective auton­
omy from individual autonomy. On this account, community is a 
product of individual acts of voluntary association, an outcome of in­
dividuals who have consented to join in a group. The contractarian ac­
count of community represents a "liberal"57 theory of the group in that 
the group's authority to act on behalf of its members is understood as 
an extension of the individual's authority to act for herself by associ­
ating with others. Group autonomy is an instrument of individual 
autonomy. 
The foundational premise of the contractarian account is consent. 
At its simplest, we should defer to the Gang Congregation Ordinance 
and other kinds of local norms if and when those norms are freely cho­
sen by those who are affected by the norms' operation.58 When local 
norms are the product of choice and not either a product or an instru­
ment of oppression, they should be deemed legitimate. To consider 
such norms otherwise is to coerce individuals who do not share our 
values to abandon theirs. 
57. See ALEXANDER M. BICKLE, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3-6 (1975). The contrac­
tarianism of the liberal tradition begins with Locke and Rousseau, see generally SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU (1962), and has been refined more 
recently by John Rawls, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). This descriptive account does not suggest a norma­
tive theory of the just society premised on the heuristic of a "primal contract," but has the 
more modest goal of describing a model of association that is premised on individual auton­
omy. 
58. Of course, determining whether norms are "freely chosen" by "those affected" is no 
easy task, which is why contractarianism often relies on constitutions to do the work of de­
fining the relevant polity, determining how the polity will aggregate preferences, and de­
scribing what kinds of decisions will be out of bounds. See Sheldon Wolin, Fugitive Democ­
racy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 33-34 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
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A contractarian community may be narrowly drawn for instrumen­
tal purposes (the chess club) or it may embrace more comprehensive 
religious, political, and moral doctrines (the religious commune). The 
depth or quality of communal attachments is not important as long as 
the group is based in an uncoerced compact, which can take the form 
of either an explicit agreement setting the terms of membership or a 
tacit agreement to live by the membership's practices. The contrac­
tarian account of community does not distinguish among groups on 
the basis of substantive practices, beliefs, or purposes; it is, in the fa­
miliar parlance of political philosophers, "neutral" towards competing 
conceptions of the good life.59 Thus, the commune, the residential 
community association, and the neighborhood are all "communities" 
whose distinctive practices are deserving of respect when those prac­
tices arise out of an uncoerced agreement. 
The important distinction for contractarians is between associa­
tions and aggregates - that is, between groups formed out of the pur­
suit of a common goal or interest and individuals who happen to share 
a common characteristic.60 The former type of group can exercise le­
gitimate authority over its membership because it is grounded in con­
sent, while the latter's authority would constitute a highly question­
able exercise of coercion. 
Indeed, the legal treatment of groups that are understood as asso­
ciations of like minds differs substantially from the legal treatment of 
groups that are understood as aggregates of strangers. Judicial defer­
ence to the exercise of extra-property regulation by homeowners asso­
ciations stems from the fact that individual residents have entered into 
agreements to live there and be subject to the association's norms.61 
59. Michael Sandel, Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3-4 (Michael Sandel 
ed., 1984). 
60. Iris Young discusses the difference between aggregates and associations in JUSTICE 
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE ch.2 (1990). 
61. Courts tend to review the actions of boards of directors of homeowners associations 
(residential community associations) using a mixture of the business judgment rule and a 
reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Buckingham v. Weston Viii. Homeowners Ass'n, 571 
N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1997) (holding that, in general, decisions by boards of directors will be 
reviewed under the business judgment rule to ensure that those decisions are made in good 
faith and in furtherance of the legitimate interests of the condominium, and do not involve 
fraud, self-dealing, unconscionability, or other misconduct; however, actions adversely af­
fecting a minority of owners will be reviewed under a reasonableness standard whereby a 
court must consider: (1) whether the decision or rule is arbitrary; (2) whether the decision or 
rule is applied in an even-handed or discriminatory manner; and (3) whether the decision or 
rule was made in good faith for the common welfare of the owners and occupants of the 
condominium). 
Increasingly, courts have favored the fairly open-ended reasonableness standard because 
it protects "minorities from the tyranny of the majority." Id. at 844. For example, in 
California, reasonableness review is a statutory requirement: "The covenants and restric­
tions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and 
shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development." 
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1354 (West Supp. 1994). The reasonableness rule holds that, although the 
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Some commentators claim that courts should be even more deferential 
than they already are, arguing that homeowners associations accu­
rately reflect the preferences of their residents and that courts should 
allow for the most extensive exercise of private associational ordering 
possible.62 Deference to acts of private "constitution-making" reflects 
respect for individual autonomy.63 
Some might object that the homeowners association is "private" 
and thus entitled to enforce norms of behavior that "public" cities and 
neighborhoods would not be permitted to enforce. But the pri­
vate/public distinction fails to answer the question of what makes a 
homeowners association different from a neighborhood. Both home­
owners associations and neighborhoods contain spaces - streets, 
parks, sidewalks - set aside for the common use of their mem­
bers/citizens. Of course, in a homeowners association, the common 
spaces may be "owned" and governed by a private government; title 
of common areas may be in the collective or in a corporation governed 
by a coop board. In a city, the common spaces are owned and gov­
erned by a public government. But this definition is tautological: the 
condominium's governing body has broad authority to regulate the internal affairs of the 
development, this power is not unlimited, and any rule, regulation, or amendment to the 
declaration or bylaws must be reasonable. Under the reasonableness test, a rule that is un­
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious is invalid. See Worthington Condominium Unit Owners' 
Ass'n v. Brown 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); see also Ridgely Condominium 
Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 681 A.2d 494, 498 (Md. 1996); Scudder v. Greenbrier C. Condomin­
ium Ass'n, 663 So. 2d 1362, 1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Bluffs of Wildwood Homeown­
ers' Ass'n v. Dinkel, 644 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); O'Buck v. Cottonwood 
Viii. Condominium Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813, 817 (Alaska 1988); Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 
1313, 1317 (D.C. 1986). 
Some courts have sought to distinguish between restrictions contained in the governing 
documents of an association and subsequent board-passed regulations. For example, under 
Florida law, the former are akin to covenants that run with the land and "will not be invali­
dated absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of 
public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right." Hidden Har­
bour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 1981). Such restrictions are "clothed 
with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual 
unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed." Id. 
In contrast, board-passed rules are tested for reasonableness. See id. ; see also Pines of Boca 
Harwood Condominium Ass'n v. Cavouti, 605 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (de­
scribing the two standards of review and validating restriction on pets contained in associa­
tion's governing declaration). 
62. These scholars argue that "reasonableness review" is too broad a standard and en­
ables courts to override association actions far too readily. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 
31, at 1519-30; see also Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
906, 926 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he system of private governance on balance works pretty 
well," and that the doctrine of changed conditions should "not become the entering wedge 
of a large-scale system of judicial control over private homeowners' associations"); cf 
Gillette, supra note 13, 1441 (1994) (defending homeowners associations as a "mechanism 
for sorting that is no more invidious than we allow through the creation of more formal ju­
risdictions (municipal corporations) and that is more responsive than those institutions to 
the desires of residents"). 
63. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31 ,  at 1519-30; cf Epstein, supra note 62, at 907 (de­
scribing the mutual covenants in homeowners associations as "mini-constitutions"). 
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most useful difference that can be gleaned from this distinction is that 
private groups are governed by private governments and public groups 
are governed by public governments. 
Instead, in important ways, the private/public distinction on the 
contractarian account turns on whether a particular group of people is, 
in our view, an association of like minds or an aggregation of strang­
ers. The publicness of the city is a function of the fact that cities are 
"imperfectly voluntary" groups.64 A city's residents only partially 
choose with whom they want to live. In contrast to the aggregate of 
strangers, the homeowners association (or the religious commune) is 
understood as a perfectly voluntary group.65 These groups consist of 
residents/believers who contracted/covenanted to a certain way of life, 
and who could leave if they came to disagree with the governance of 
the community. The association's lawmaking - whether residential 
community association's or religious commune's - is deserving of 
deference because it is an expression of the individual's right to enter 
into and break contracts to join or dissolve a community. 
In other words, the whole (the community) is the sum of its parts 
(the individuals). The now-familiar model of municipal competition 
advanced by Charles Tiebout reflects this contractarian account of 
community.66 According to Tiebout, under ideal conditions, multiple, 
decentralized local government leads to competition between locali­
ties that results in better local service provision at a cheaper cost for 
all taxpayers and consumers of municipal services. Institutions with 
the attributes of government (whether "private" like homeowners as­
sociations or "public" like municipalities67) provide venues for the pur­
suit of various (and competing) bundles of municipal services and 
amenities. This competition allows individuals and firms to express 
their preferences among service packages by continually selecting 
where to locate. Consumer-voters register their preferences by "voting 
with their feet" - by moving into or out of the locality. Indeed, locali­
ties are best understood as mechanisms for distributing preferences in 
a municipal services market that disciplines poorly performing, nonre­
sponsive localities with the threat that unhappy residents or firms will 
exit in favor of a more responsive neighboring jurisdiction. This mar­
ket, absent barriers to entry and repaired for market flaws,68 results in 
64. Frank Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977). 
65. Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31, at 1522-23. 
66. See Tiebout, supra note 33, at 416. 
67. See Gillette, supra note 13, at 1388-402 (applying Tiebout's public goods model to 
homeowners associations). 
68. Tiebout assumed certain conditions, including perfect information, mobility, the ab­
sence of externalities, and substantial choice among localities. See Tiebout, supra note 33. 
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neighborhoods of voluntary association, freely chosen by those who 
share a preference to live there. 
The argument on behalf of local power is thus grounded in indi­
vidual choice. Decentralized government allows for a wider array of 
forms of association, thereby vindicating individual autonomy and the 
efficiency and responsiveness of government in general. In order for 
such a regime to function, localities must be able to dictate the terms 
and conditions of membership in the community, to exclude those who 
do not wish to abide by the community's terms, and to coerce rule­
breakers to conform. 
Thus, as one would expect, it was very important for advocates of 
the Gang Congregation Ordinance to emphasize that the residents of 
inner-city Chicago overwhelmingly favored the ordinance - that it 
was not imposed upon them as an instrument of oppression, but was 
instead a product of individual choice exercised through a legitimate, 
recognized, and open political process.69 The important point for these 
advocates is that the residents of high-crime Chicago neighborhoods 
expressed a preference for a norm that constrained their own behav­
ior. State intervention to override such local constitution-making is 
dangerous because it threatens individual autonomy. This intervention 
is particularly paternalistic when applied to minority and poor indi­
viduals whose autonomy is regularly discounted by the state. State in­
tervention is also inefficient because it effectively dismantles a power­
ful sorting mechanism for individual preferences, a mechanism that 
enhances overall social welfare by allowing residents to exercise their 
preference for certain amenities or norms by choosing where and how 
to live. On this account, the city of Chicago is losing the municipal 
service competition to the suburbs because Chicago cannot provide 
safe streets as part of its service package. By restricting Chicago's 
ability to do so, the Court ensures that the city will never be able to 
compete for residents, most of whom would prefer safe streets to vio­
lent ones. 
Of course, the contractarian does not ignore possible dissenters, in 
this case, presumably the gang members themselves. They too have 
preferences, which can be fulfilled in two ways. They can exercise their 
69. Proponents argued that the fact that the minority representatives of the minority 
residents of inner-city Chicago supported the measure differentiated it from measures that 
the Court struck down thirty years before when minorities did not have meaningful access to 
the political process. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5, 14-16 ("[T)he Ordinance is not a 
tool of repression being used by white majorities to reinforce the exclusion of minorities 
from the community's political and economic life . . . .  Unlike the public order provisions 
scrutinized by this Court in the 1960's, the Ordinance was not imposed on minorities by an 
alien political establishment. . . .  In short, any suggestion that the Ordinance was adopted as 
a cover for harassing minority youths is completely misguided."); see also Meares & Kahan, 
When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 8; Meares & Kahan, Black, 
White and Gray, supra note 9, at 251 .  
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option to exit7° the neighborhood (which is in part exactly what the 
ordinance intended), or they can challenge the ordinance by invoking 
a constitution to which the residents have previously bound them­
selves and to which they (residents and gang members alike) have ar­
guably also consented.71 Recourse to this latter option, however, needs 
to be balanced against the strong presumption that associational pref­
erences should be accommodated - if possible - through the former. 
Thus, though the contractarian does not ignore conflicting prefer­
ences, the usual solution to conflict inside a voluntary association is 
separation - the exiting of the dissenting member from the group. If 
you do not like the chess club's rules, you can leave and join another 
club. 
This is why describing Chicago's inner-city residents and their 
neighborhoods as "communities" is a useful rhetorical move. Commu­
nity implies an association of like minds collectively pursuing a com­
mon end - a voluntary association. The normative intuition is to 
lessen distrust of norms when those norms are characterized as the 
outcome of collective, voluntary decisionmaking by like-minded indi­
viduals. Associations of like minds are different from the Madisonian 
majorities that create and enforce community norms against minori­
ties. Associations govern through covenants that extend the individ­
ual's autonomy, allowing the individual to order relations with others 
of a similar persuasion in order to alter the terms of social life by 
joining together in a group. Aggregates govern through a politics lim­
ited by rights that protect individual autonomy from group encroach­
ment. In the former, the group enables a particular pursuit of the good 
life; in the latter, the group is a threat to a particular pursuit of the 
good life. By denying the effect of the Gang Congregation Ordinance, 
the Court essentially coerced residents of the inner city to live by 
norms with which they do not agree and from which they cannot es­
cape except by leaving the neighborhood. 
In short, the more the neighborhood looks like a homeowners as­
sociation or a commune (the more it looks like a product of choice), 
the more its norms are worthy of deference (because overriding such 
norms will increasingly look like coercion). Indeed, for some commen­
tators, local governance is only legitimate where it is premised on the 
contractarian foundation of consent. As Georgette Poindexter writes: 
70. For a discussion of the concept of "exit," see ALBERT o. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE 
& LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 22-25 
(1970). 
71 .  Such a constitution can take the form of a mythical contract, establishing the terms 
of the social order and the conditions of justice behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance" where we 
do not know if we are the gang members or the other residents of the neighborhood, see 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), or it can take the form of a set of rights codi­
fied in a historically bound text, such as a city charter, a state constitution, or the Constitu­
tion of the United States. 
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"The Lockean requirement of voluntary association· for a legitimate 
government when used as a premise for . . .  neighborhoods, will insure 
that . . .  all parties have consented by joining the final product."72 For 
Professor Poindexter, the standard for local government is whether it 
"validate[s] consumers' individualism and revealed choice by dissolv­
ing legal impediments to the full and free expression of their choice. "73 
The neighborhood is a tool for the realization of individual autonomy. 
Once legal structures that permit the "fullest expression of self"74 are 
put into place, communities (whether communes, homeowners asso­
ciations, neighborhoods, towns or cities) should be permitted to self­
govern because such local governance maximizes the individual's 
freedom of choice. 
2. Deep 
According to the deep75 account of community, describing the 
community as a voluntary association is too thin a characterization of 
human experience and an insufficient basis for local constitution­
making. The deep account of community reverses the direction of in­
dividual and community. It rejects the idea that the individual can ex­
ist or be sustained outside of, and prior to, his or her relationships with 
others, prior to a community that infuses individual choices and expe­
riences with meaning.76 Instead, the deep account of community con­
ceives of the individual as always operating "within the discursive 
forms of a community that engages its members in an integrated view 
of their place in the cosmos, their history, their culture, and the 
meaning of personal experiences."77 Human beings are never wholly 
stripped of their communal identities, nor can they be. As Michael 
Sandel writes: " [C]ommunity describes not just what they have as fel­
low citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as 
72. Poindexter, supra note 53, at 653. 
73. Id. at 609. 
74. Id. at 622. 
75. The term "deep" is borrowed from Seymour Mandelbaum, Open Moral Communi­
ties, in EXPLORATIONS IN PLANNING THEORY 86 (Mandelbaum et al. eds., 1996) (discussing 
the concept of "deep moral communities") [hereinafter Mandelbaum (1996)]. For an ex­
tended version of Mandelbaum's article, see SEYMOUR MANDELBAUM, OPEN MORAL 
COMMUNITIES chs. 3-5 (2000) [hereinafter MANDELBAUM (2000)]. 
76. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, supra note 59: For a summary of the legal and philosophi­
cal literature that reflects the "constitutive conception of the self," see FRUG, CITY MAKING, 
supra note 34, at ch.4. 
77. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 86. Others have used the term "affective 
communities" to describe "the reciprocal consciousness of a shared culture." ROBERT P. 
WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 187-92 (1968); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Pov­
erty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of Impartiality Toward Newcomers, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 277, 312-14 (defining "affective communities" as culturally homogeneous commu­
nities united by deep affective ties). 
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in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not 
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity."78 Group auton­
omy is thus required for the individual's realization of his or her own 
psychological and moral place in the world. 
The deep account of community asserts that, while some human 
associations are intentional, many of the most important ones are not. 
Family, church, neighborhood, and nation have aspects of intentional­
ity, but are oftentimes imposed.79 Indeed, voluntary association is a 
weak thread with which to stitch together community. Community in­
volves shared experiences, deep attachments, mutual affection, and a 
sense of belonging. While it may be created or maintained through 
contract, community cannot be reduced to the mere coming together 
for mutual advantage that the contractarian account implies. The con­
tract between self-seeking individuals at the heart of the contractarian 
account of community is at best an imperfect foundation on which to 
base a robust community; at worst, it destroys it. 
Foregoing the social contract, the deep account of community re­
lies instead on concepts of mutuality and reciprocity - a sense of con­
nection that inheres in social creatures. The amici who defended the 
Chicago ordinance call this "linked fate."80 According to the amicus 
brief submitted on behalf of area neighborhood organizations, sup­
porters of the Chicago ordinance are "the mothers and fathers, the sis­
ters and brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject 
to the law."81 The inner-city residents, argued proponents of the ordi­
nance, are linked by strong social and familial ties to the gang member 
against whom the ordinance is enacted, are members of "communities 
that individuals can create and maintain through social networks."82 
The residents' deep social connections and shared experiences situate 
them in a common narrative that gives their particularized constitu­
tion-making its authoritativeness.83 
78. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1982). 
79. Group affiliation "has the character of what Martin Heidigger calls 'throwness': one 
finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as always already having been." 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 43 (1990). 
80. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5, 16-17. 
81. Id. at 2-3. 
82. Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 669 n.1 (1998). 
Meares describes "linked fate" as "the empathy that people have with family and friends," 
though she argues that African Americans' experience with race in America also creates 
"critical bonds" between even African Americans who are strangers to one another. Id. at 
682-83. 
83. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5 ("The residents of those communities . . .  are 
linked by strong social and familiar ties to the gang members against whom the Ordinance is 
enforced. It is precisely because they care so deeply about the welfare of these persons that 
residents favor the relatively mild gang-loitering law as an alternative . . .  The pervasive 
sense of "linked fate" between the majority of these communities' residents and the youths 
affected by the Ordinance provides a compelling reasons to respect the community's deter-
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Unlike the contractarian account of community, the deep account 
does not turn on what Michael Walzer calls "the right of rupture or 
withdrawal."84 Community is not premised on the ability to exit, but 
on the presence and quality of social attachments. Indeed, the fact that 
the residents of Chicago's poor, minority, inner-city neighborhoods 
may not have made a meaningful choice to live there in the first place 
or may not easily exit lends their claims for autonomy additional force. 
The residents' normative authority stems in part from the reality that 
they - and not a federal judge - are faced with violence and crime 
everyday that they cannot meaningfully avoid. Unlike the contrac­
tarian account, in which the residents' authority to depart from consti­
tutional norms is grounded in individual consent, on the deep account, 
the residents' normative entitlement to balance liberty and order as 
they see fit is a function of their deep social and familial ties to the 
neighborhood and their personal experiences living there.85 The 
"linked fate" of the residents of the inner-city neighborhood tran­
scends the usual aggregate nature of a group of people who happen to 
live next door to one another.86 
The complex web of social and familial relations can make a 
neighborhood into something approaching a communal order - a 
constitutive community. Regardless of how the neighborhood initially 
came to be created, a neighborhood of friends, relatives, and neigh­
bors can adopt norms that are consistent with, or essential to, pre­
serving a certain "way of life" that constitutes their collective and in­
dividual identities. In contrast to the contractarian account, which sets 
the private/public line at the point of contract, the deep account sets 
the private/public line at the point of constitutiveness. We are wary of 
norms that aggregates of strangers impose on other aggregates of 
strangers. We are less wary of norms that "family" and "friends" im­
pose on each other. The intuition is that the former kind of rule­
making is "public" and needs to be tested against suspicions of bad 
faith and self-interest, while the latter is "private," and thus is medi­
ated by fellow-feeling.37 The description of supporters of the ordinance 
as family and friends is no mere rhetorical flourish. The measure of a 
mination that such measures enhance rather than detract from liberty in their communi­
ties."). 
84. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 21 
(1990). 
85. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 5 .  
86. See id. at 16 ("Nor can it  credibly be maintained that those citizens who supported 
the Ordinance did so to oppress minorities within their own neighborhoods . . . .  After all, 
those who were subject to the Ordinance were not 'outsiders'; they were the sons and daugh­
ters, brothers and sisters, and friends and neighbors of the community's own residents."). 
87. See id. ("Individuals in these communities tend to evaluate whether a policy benefits 
them individually by considering its impact not just on themselves but also on members of 
the groups to which they belong."). 
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neighborhood's autonomy is the thickness of its communal attach­
ments. 
The deep account of community sets the community in opposition 
to the state. On the contractarian account, the state threatens the indi­
vidual by its failure to recognize the individual's associational com­
mitments and defer to the individual's choices. The deep account con­
ceives of the state as a threat to community qua community. Deep 
communities are at risk from the monopolizing and centralizing ten­
dencies of the state apparatus and its universalizing norms. Wisconsin 
v. Yoder,88 which affirmed the right of a member of the Old Order 
Amish to refuse to send his fifteen-year-old daughter to school after 
she completed the eighth grade, is an example. In Yoder, the Court 
stated that the Amish way of life "is not merely a matter of personal 
preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organ­
ized group, and intimately related to daily living."89 Compulsory 
school attendance laws therefore carry with them "a very real threat of 
undermining the Amish community and religious practice."90 The 
Court's opinion reflects a deep account of community, specifically an 
account of the deep community as exceedingly fragile. 
It is not a surprise that Yoder involved children and their socializa­
tion into a particular way of life, a point of extreme vulnerability for a 
deep community. The deep community often can survive only through 
the intergenerational transmission of a specific normative and cultural 
tradition.91 At risk in Yoder, advocates claimed, is the very survival of 
88. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
89. 406 U.S. at 216. 
90. Id. at 218. 
91. This same claim of community and cultural self-defense was asserted (this time un­
successfully) in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994), by a Hasidic religious community that sought to establish a separate school district 
providing special education for Hasidic Jewish children. As in Yoder, the claim by the Kiryas 
Joel petitioners that they had a right to teach their children in a separate and protected envi­
ronment was asserted against the backdrop of a deep account of community. Robert Cover 
calls "paideic" a teleological community that shares a common body of precept and narra­
tive that is transmitted through a collective corpus. Cover, supra note 15, at 13-14. The risks 
to such communities are particularly visible in disputes over educational issues, because the 
public school curriculum invariably comes into conflict with the parents' transmission of 
paideic norms. Cf Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state 
should allow Amish children an opportunity to be heard before allowing their parents to 
keep them out of school because being kept out of school "forever bar[s] [the child] from 
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today . . . .  If he is harnessed 
to the Amish way of life . . .  his entire life may be stunted and deformed"). Another example 
is Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which 
fundamentalist parents charged that teaching their children diverse viewpoints in a tolerant 
and objective manner threatened the survival of their fundamentalist way of life. See id. 
(holding that school board was not required by the Free Exercise Clause to permit children 
of fundamentalist Christian parents to opt out selectively from reading certain texts or par­
ticipating in a certain offending "secular humanist" curriculum); Stolzenberg, supra note 13, 
at 627-28 (discussing Mozert and the tension between cultural pluralism and assimilation). 
For an argument that advances an assimilationist reading of the Constitution, see 
November 2001] Limits of Localism 397 
a particular community. Amici in Morales invoked similar arguments, 
asserting that the Gang Congregation Ordinance was intended to pro­
tect the community against a continuing cultural, social, and literal de­
cay (far worse, it could be argued, than the possibility of cultural ex­
tinction that faced the Amish in Yoder): the criminalization of entire 
ethnic neighborhoods, the incarceration or murder of generations of 
young African-American and Latino men, and the deterioration of 
inner-city, minority neighborhoods whose most robust members con­
tinue to abandon their streets and their homes.92 An alternative to the 
wholesale warehousing of young black men, argued amici, is a loiter­
ing ordinance that stems the drug and gang trade before it results in 
the death or long-term incarceration of its youngest members or in the 
abandonment of formerly thriving neighborhoods by the majority of 
its law-abiding residents.93 
The argument for allowing local deviation from constitutional 
norms is thus both an affirmative and a preservationist one. The con­
tinued existence of deep communities is a good in itself, both because 
our humanity is a function of our communal attachments and because 
the multiplicity and diversity of particularized normative communities 
is a distinct human and societal value.94 On the contractarian account, 
the empowered voluntary association extends individual autonomy 
and allows for individual preference formation. It thus reinforces the 
self-interested and instrumental nature of human interactions as op­
posed to emphasizing the human interconnectedness that true com­
munity provides. The deep account of community looks for ways to 
remove the impediments to connection and to provide groups spaces 
in which to create their own moral worlds. Local government law vin­
dicates the community (whether it be a commune, neighborhood, 
town, or city) by treating it as its own "extensive moral entity"95 and 
by requiring that political boundaries be drawn to ensure that the 
community has sufficient powers to define and to protect itself.96 
Christopher Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 87 
(1996). Eisgruber believes that Kiryas Joel was rightly decided by a Court concerned with 
cabining separatism. Abner Greene disagrees. See Abner Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two 
Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. l, 43-51 (1996). 
92. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 17-18. 
93. See id. at 20-24. 
94. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 31-34 (collecting arguments); see also Cover, supra 
note 15, at 68; Greene, supra note 91, at 15-17. 
95. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 87. 
96. Cf. WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 188-90 (1989) (ar­
guing that we should protect insular minority cultures by "redrawing the boundaries of po­
litical units, and redistributing powers between levels of government, so as to ensure that a 
minority culture controls a political unit which has sufficient powers to protect the commu­
nity"). 
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3. Dualist 
The deep account thus presents an organic notion of community 
that is very different from the highly intentional account offered by 
the contractarian. Yet, neither may be wholly sufficient to capture 
human experience. The thinness of the contract and the thickness of 
the constitutive community are two extremes; we sometimes do not 
recognize either as reflecting our experience of community as both 
chosen and unchosen. The third set of arguments that ground local 
autonomy, which I label "dualist," partakes of both the contractarian 
account's emphasis on the intentionality of group life and the deep ac­
count's emphasis on the constitutive qualities of community.97 The du­
alist account understands community formation as both highly inten­
tional and highly immanent in human relationships. On the dualist 
account, the self neither fully chooses community nor is it fully em­
bedded in it; it is - in the words of political theorists - neither fully 
atomistic nor fully situated. Community is instead always in the proc­
ess of being negotiated and renegotiated against a background of a 
"shifting and amorphous field"98 of social relations. Thus, the dualist 
account emphasizes the individual's engagement in a process of collec­
tive self-governance. The individual is constituted by his or her en­
gagement in the dialogue that occurs during acts of collective deci­
sionmaking. Group autonomy makes the exercise of deliberation that 
is essential to human flourishing and freedom a meaningful one. 
For dualists, " [g]enuine community requires dialogue, robust and 
continuous. "99 The dualist account rejects the bland impersonality of 
the contract and the fearful nomic insularity of the deep. Intentionality 
is expressed through participation: self-government occurs in face-to­
face settings. The ideal is a participatory practice whereby individuals 
arrive at shared values by engaging in dialogue with each other. The 
ongoing negotiation between and within groups for social space occurs 
in a consciously public sphere.100 This public sphere is understood as a 
97. Cf Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1217-18 (1994) (offering an account of the self based on 
social roles in an effort "to avoid both an individualistic and a collectivist reductionism" by 
treating "individuals and collectivities as equally primary and irreducible entities"). 
98. Mandelbaum (1996), supra note 75, at 89. 
99. Alexander, supra note 13, at 61. For that reason, some would call this community 
"dialogic." See WOLFF, supra note 77, at 192-93; see also JURGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY 
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 275-330 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). 
100. The Habermasian concept of the . "bourgeois public sphere" as an institutional 
space between state and economy that emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen­
turies is more disciplined than my more general use of the term here. See JURGEN 
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY 
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1993) 
(1 962). My use of the term is closer to Seyla Benhabib's. Selya Benhabib, Toward a Delib­
erative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, 
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place for conversation, in which individuals can engage in negotiation 
about the quality and reach of collective norms and, by extension, the 
individual's own commitments to his or her multiple, overlapping 
identities. Thus, the dualist account mediates the contractarian and 
deep accounts of community through a process of deliberation.101 
A central debate waged by those on either side of Chicago's Gang 
Congregation Ordinance concerned the quality of the political process 
that resulted in its passage.102 On one level, this debate was about 
whether the winners and the losers were fairly represented, that is, 
whether the system for picking winners and losers in a world where 
the majority wins actually worked. That question goes to the efficacy 
67-87 (discussing the idea of a "public sphere of deliberation about matters of mutual con­
cern" and a "public sphere of opinion-formation, debate, deliberation, and contestation 
among citizens, groups, movements, and organizations in a polity"). For a guide to Haber­
mas's concept of the public sphere, see CRAIG CALHOUN, Introduction, in HABERMAS AND 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 1 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1999) (noting that "bourgeois society produced a 
certain form of public sphere" separate from the state and from the private realm); William 
E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide and Critique, 23 LA w & Soc. 
INQUIRY 969, 981 (1998) (noting the emergence of "institutions of sociability" as a "social 
space in which the Enlightenment and liberal constitutionalism were forged"). 
101. Cf IRIS YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 4-10 (2000) (contrasting delibera­
tive democracy from aggregative democracy). According to Young, on the deliberative 
model, democracy is a form of practical reason: 
Democratic process is primarily a discussion of problems, conflicts, claims of need or inter­
est. Through dialogue others test and challenge these proposals and arguments. Because 
they have not stood up to dialogic examination, the deliberating public rejects or refines 
some proposals. Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have 
greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are 
supported by the best reasons. 
Id. at 10. 
Joshua Cohen, another theorists who writes in this tradition, describes the enterprise in 
these terms: 
Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on the deliberative view, is a framework of social 
and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among equal citizens - by pro­
viding favorable conditions for participation, association, and expression - and ties the 
authorization to exercise public power (and the exercise itself) to such discussion - by es­
tablishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and accountability of political power too 
it through regular competitive elections, conditions of publicity, legislative oversight, and so 
on. 
Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 99. 
The literature that arguably fits under the umbrella of deliberative democracy is varied 
and has been given a number of names, such as proceduralist-deliberative democracy, par­
ticipatory democracy, communicative democracy, and civic republicanism. A sampling in­
cludes: BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); JAMES BOHMAN, 
DELIBERATION AND DEMOCRACY (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND 
NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William 
Rehg trans., 1996); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R: 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). ' 
102. Compare Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 9, with 
Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra note 9, and Meares & Kahan, Black, White, and Gray, supra 
note 9. 
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of the democratic process as a mechanism for expressing individual 
preferences; it thus reflects a contractarian concern. The debate also 
reflects, however, a dualist concern about whether the residents of 
Chicago's inner-city, minority neighborhoods had an opportunity to 
engage in deliberation regardless of who won or lost. At stake is not 
only who engaged in the conversation but its quality - not merely 
whether the channels for political participation were open, but 
whether the participation that resulted was robust. On the dualist ac­
count, a norm is not legitimate merely because it is the outcome of a 
full and fair vote; that vote has to be accompanied by a true conversa­
tion among decisionmakers (ideally face-to-face) in a small enough 
setting to enable each stakeholder to be heard. A norm's bindingness 
is a function of its being the outcome of a deliberative process, the 
public formation of shared values. 
The argument for local governance in Morales can therefore be 
understood in dualist terms as an argument about the appropriate 
scale for the face-to-face interactions necessary for true political com­
munity. Proponents of the ordinance declared that the relevant deci­
sionmakers were the residents of the neighborhoods and specific 
blocks in which gang activity occurs every day. Opponents countered 
that the state (speaking through its courts) was the appropriate deci­
sionmaking unit or, alternatively, that the appropriate decisionmaker 
was "We, the People,'' speaking through constitutional guarantees. 
Implicit in the proponent's argument was the dualist notion that the 
kind of dialogue that occurs between neighbors is superior to the kind 
of dialogue that occurs between representatives at the state or federal 
level. This dialogue is superior because it allows individuals to "inter­
act with each other as concrete, not abstract, personalities,"103 and be­
cause it invigorates a wider democratic politics. Indeed, by respecting 
the norms of smaller scale decisionmakers - the neighbors across the 
fence - the wider polity fosters the kind of civic engagement that is 
both central to human flourishing and crucial for revitalizing civic life 
in the larger polity as well. 104 
The dualist account of community emphasizes the individual's 
public role as citizen: community involves participation in the deci­
sions of the day. Amici in favor of the Gang Congregation Ordinance 
invoked this image of the public-regarding citizen, portraying the resi­
dents of Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods as taking the reins of 
government after the police, the city, and the larger political commu­
nity had failed to repair - or had been unwilling to address - the 
103. Alexander, supra note 13, at 48. 
104. De Tocqueville is often invoked as the standard-bearer for this view. "A nation 
may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit 
of liberty." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 68; see SANDEL, supra note 29, at 202. 
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problems of inner-city gang violence.105 Residents would literally "take 
back" their streets. In this way, the dualist account provides not only a 
general justification for local self-government but a justification for 
the Gang Congregation Ordinance in particular. By freeing the public 
streets from the terrorizing effects of gang violence, the ordinance 
would foster the face-to-face interaction required for true collective 
decisionmaking. The ordinance would make the community's "public 
life possible"106 by securing the forums in which the interpersonal con­
nections necessary for public life transpire - namely the streets, 
parks, and corners where people meet, interact, and participate in 
public life.107 
On the dualist account, community does not just happen; it has to 
be fostered by appropriate policies in particular public environments. 
Unlike the contractarian and the deep accounts, which set the state in 
opposition to the individual and community respectively, the dualist 
account views the state as uniquely positioned to encourage civic at­
tachments in local settings through appropriate legal regimes. State in­
tervention can help to create the arenas and spaces in which collective 
action will more likely arise.108 The dualist account thus allows the 
government a more aggressive role in engaging in citizen-making ac­
tivities, activities that may sometimes clash with other kinds of com­
munity norms.109 
This sense that the government has to take active steps to define 
and defend a robust public life is implicit in the arguments made by 
advocates of the Gang Congregation Ordinance. The residents of 
inner-city Chicago wanted to govern themselves and to have the space 
in which to govern themselves into the future, to make their public life 
105. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 17-18. 
106. Livingston, supra note 8, at 562. 
107. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 25-26. 
108. See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 1 13 (advocating the creation of new "de­
liberative arenas" that can serve as "schools of deliberative democracy"). 
109. For example, the state may have an interest in promoting a public school curricu­
lum that emphasizes democratic values, such as tolerance, deliberation, and dialogue. This is 
the tenor of Judge Cornelia Kennedy's concurring opinion in Mozert v. Hawkins County 
Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which she rejected fundamentalist 
Christian claims for an opt-out from the public school curriculum on the basis that critical 
thinking is essential for "citizenship in a Republic," because it prepares students for "self­
government" and helps "avoid[ ] religious divisiveness." But cf W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that classroom-imposed, compulsory flag salute vio­
lated First Amendment rights of children of Jehovah's Witnesses). Both Cover and 
Stolzenberg have noted the fine line between a mandated curriculum and a mandated flag 
salute. See Cover, supra note 15, at 60-62; Stolzenberg, supra note 13, at 605-10, 642-43. The 
paradox of liberal education - illustrated by Justice Douglas's dissent in Yoder - is that it 
must champion tolerance, diversity, and accommodation, but its substantive program may 
put some (insular or intolerant) groups outside the bounds of tolerance, diversity, and ac­
commodation. 
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possible.1 10 The ordinance constitutes an example of the former and a 
means of ensuring the latter. Localism, on this account, rests on the 
thesis that civic engagement can only meaningfully take place within 
the contours of some form of a circumscribed jurisdiction, in forums 
where citizens can meet face-to-face. Local government law vindicates 
the community by providing venues for participation in small-scale 
democratic governance and by defending the spaces in which public 
reasoning can take place. 
The dualist account can therefore be characterized as a more 
"positive" account of state-group relations ("help us self-govern by 
making our streets safe") in contrast to the "defensive" stance taken 
by the deep account ("allow us to defend ourselves against cultural 
genocide") and the more "neutral" stance taken by the contractarian 
("leave us alone to make our own choices"). These respective postures 
correspond to different visions of group vulnerability. On the contrac­
tarian account, groups are only vulnerable to the extent that the indi­
vidual is vulnerable. The state's role is limited to creating a back­
ground regime in which individual choices can be honored and not 
suppressed, either by the government or by other groups. Once volun­
tariness is guaranteed, the state does not have any further role in de­
termining the substance of group life. In contrast, on the deep account, 
groups are always vulnerable to the force of state orthodoxy. The state 
must be mindful of its destructive capacities, which may require it to 
accommodate (or even sponsor) deep communities' alternative law­
making or risk their elimination. The state thus has a negative role (as 
representing the omnipresent threat of a norm that will hurt or destroy 
the group) in structuring group life. Finally, on the dualist account, the 
state can foster community by creating fora for self-government. 
Group life is vulnerable to an enforced individualism which the state 
can counteract by affirmatively supporting collective engagement. The 
creation of small-scale governments is thus a positive act that the state 
can perform: encouraging decentralization should be an affirmative 
state policy. 
On all three accounts, community is threatened by, on the one 
side, an enforced atomism and, on the other, an enforced statism. The 
wider polity should defer to those norms that are genuinely 
community-directed, that is, those norms chosen by individuals whose 
weighing of liberty and order are entitled to moral respect. The deci­
sions made by the shareholder of the residential association are enti­
tled to moral respect because she has entered into a contract by 
110. Livingston, supra note 8, at 667 (describing the void for vagueness doctrine as ap­
plied to local order maintenance policing as "democracy foreclosing" if used "in such a way 
as to prevent communities from regulating in a given sphere" and arguing that "[w]hen . . .  
public order laws do not appear aimed at the exclusion of some from full participation in a 
community's public life, but rather at the articulation of behavioral standards that may facili­
tate the common use of public spaces . . .  courts should not invalidate them for vagueness"). 
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choosing to live there. The decisions made by the neighbor living in 
the neighborhood of linked fate are entitled to moral respect because 
she is "one of us."  And the decisions by the citizen living in the neigh­
borhood as little republic are entitled to moral respect because they 
are a result of a reasoned deliberative dialogue. All three accounts 
thus contribute to a defense of local autonomy in the name of com­
munity. In the first, the community standard is self-imposed by legal 
operation. In the second, the community standard is self-imposed by 
sociological fact. In the third, the community standard is self-imposed 
because it is the outcome of a participatory process. 
II. INTERROGATING COMMUNITY 
Though the three accounts of community offer widely divergent ra­
tionales for deferring to local constitution-making - individual 
choice, community preservation, civic engagement - each shifts the 
burden of justifying encroachment on local norms to the encroacher. 
The rhetoric of community is an effective tool in this debate. No one 
can be against community. To the contrary, we seek to preserve it, 
build it, foster it. Indeed, the debate over local constitution-making is 
structured as a choice between community and coercion; all efforts are 
directed toward mediating the effects of higher-level or universalized 
norms on lower-level or particularized communities. From this van­
tage, our choice is either respect for a local norm or the force of a su­
perior authority. 
This Part argues that the choice between respect and force is a 
false one. I show that community itself is a result of forceful acts of lit­
eral and figurative boundary creation, the drawing of lines between 
insiders and outsiders. Robert Cover's description of how law consti­
tutes an "integrated world of obligation and reality"1 1 1  from which the 
rest of the world is perceived, is useful here. 
At that point of radical transformation of perspective, the boundary rule 
- whether it be contract, free exercise of religion, property or corpora­
tion law - becomes more than a rule: it becomes constitutive of a 
world . . . .  A world is turned inside out; a wall begins to form, and its 
shape differs depending upon which side of the wall our narrative places 
us on.1 12 
Cover associated this (metaphorical) process with the law-generating 
activities of (mainly) insular religious groups, but I want to use his de­
scription of the process of boundary creation to understand how local 
autonomy is constructed by norms operating in geographical space. 
This account shares with legal geographers the view that space itself is 
1 1 1 .  Cover, supra note 15, at 31.  
112. Id. 
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a social production, and that law is as constitutive of social geogra­
phies as it is of social institutions.1 13 The geography of the metropoli­
tan region is as much a product of legal rules as are the social relations 
of husband, citizen, and debtor the outcome of the legally constituted 
forms of family, state, and market.1 14 
This Part cautions that localism claims - claims that certain 
groups should be permitted to make law for themselves - must be 
understood as acts of legal and spatial construction.1 15 Community de­
scribes an act of demarcation, involving the complex social, legal, po­
litical, and psychological activities of joining, leaving, belonging, exil­
ing, excommunicating, embracing, defining - the whole range of 
social practices of inclusion and exclusion. The shape of localism is 
contingent on how the walls between neighborhoods are built and 
conceived. Shifting our lens to the origins of communities in space re­
veals the crucial horizontal relationship between competing concep­
tions of the local. 
The walls that form between neighborhoods are both legal and lit­
eral. This Part demonstrates how important conceptions of demar­
cated space - in the form of the zoned spaces of the metropolitan re­
gion - are to the creation and maintenance of the concept of 
community. I begin by describing the Gang Congregation Ordinance 
as a zoning device, and proceed to describe the function of boundary­
creating norms in delineating social spaces in the built environments 
of the city. The concept of zoned space then informs a critique of the 
contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts of community. This critique 
employs three very different cases, involving standing, the Establish­
ment Clause, and voting rights, respectively. Each case concerns a cen­
tral preoccupation of this Article: how the legal rules for incorporating 
1 13. The intersection of law and geography has been the focus of a group of scholars 
who have sought to look at the "spatiality of human life" through the lens of the law. See 
Edward Soja, Afterward, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1996) (describing the general "spatial 
turn" in critical thinking and the ways in which legal scholars have begun to engage in this 
critical spatial perspective). Legal geographers ask how geography shapes law and, more im­
portant, how law shapes geographies, both real and virtual. See id. at 1426-27; NICHOLAS K. 
BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER xi-xiv (1994). The recently 
published LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 14, collects some representative 
works. 
1 14. See David Delaney et al., Where is Law?, Preface to THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER, supra note 14, at xv. 
115. Cf BLOMLEY, supra note 1 13, at 43 (quoting Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the 
Politics of Space, ANTIPODE May 1976, at 31) ("Space is not a scientific object removed from 
ideology or politics; it has always been political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality 
and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be purely formal, the epitome 
of rational abstraction, it is precisely because it has already been occupied and used, and has 
already been the focus of past processes . . . .  Space has been shaped and moulded from his­
torical and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and 
ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies."). 
November 2001] Limits of Localism 405 
or excluding others generate a community's identity and the commu­
nity's claims to self-govern. 
The Gang Congregation Ordinance at issue in Morales can be un­
derstood as a mechanism for defining the space in which community 
takes place. The introduction of literal and legally demarcated space 
undermines any straightforward notion of local autonomy; indeed, it 
calls into question the idea of the "local" altogether and the rhetoric 
of community that is often used to describe and prescribe it. 
A. Zoning Deviance: Land Use and Social Control 
I begin with two claims - one descriptive, the other definitional. 
The descriptive claim is that the Gang Congregation Ordinance is a 
zoning regime. The definitional claim is that zoning regimes are 
boundary-creating norms, norms that demarcate physical and social 
space. Zoned space is the geographically describable reality of local 
government. For the local government scholar, community is not an 
abstraction but is instead the outcome of political and legal actions 
embedded in a particular geography, tied to a particular place. 1 1 6  
Zoning laws define and differentiate the built environment, sepa­
rating favored uses of land from disfavored uses. This differentiation 
of the built environment has profound effects on the way we live, but 
this power is often taken for granted, thought of as background rules 
relevant to builders and real estate agents and of little importance to 
our day-to-day experience. Yet zoning is one of the primary powers of 
local governments in this country; indeed, as Richard Briffault points 
out, towns have incorporated simply to gain the power to zone.1 17 This 
zoning power is a central mechanism for controlling entrance into a 
community, establishing norms of order there, and transmitting those 
norms to its residents. Though land use lawyers tend not to think of 
zoning as an instrument of policing and criminal law scholars often fail 
to make the explicit link between land use and deviance,1 18 it should 
1 16. Lea Vandervelde observes: 
One of the noteworthy characteristics about zoning law is that the social construction of lo­
cal governance is coupled with the physical construction of bricks and mortar. A city's physi­
cal structure provides graphic evidence of the effect, or lack of effect, of legal constraints. 
What a city or neighborhood is, or what it will become, depends to a significant degree on its 
physical structure. 
Lea S. Vandervelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV. 
1057, 1063 (1990) (emphasis added). 
1 17. See Briffault, supra note 32, at 39. 
1 18. James Lorenz, Planning for the City's Deviants, 1 PORTIA L.J. 143 (1965), is an ex­
ception. It asks how land use planning can or cannot serve as an "adjunct to the criminal 
law." Id. at 145. Neal Katya! has also drawn a direct link between the built environment and 
crime control in his recent article. See Neal Kumar Katya!, Architecture as Crime Control 
(draft 2001,  on file with author). 
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come as no surprise that land use regimes are important mechanisms 
for controlling and ordering social life through the spatial differentia­
tion of behaviors and persons. Land use regimes are powerful instru­
ments of social control. 
Consider Robert Ellickson's hypothetical proposal for public space 
urban zoning, which makes the link between social control and spatial 
differentiation explicit. 1 19 Professor Ellickson asks his readers to con­
sider a city that sincerely desires to create a welcoming environment 
for all its citizens but which is beset by marauding teenagers, aggres­
sive panhandlers, and other public disorders that make life on the 
street unpleasant and even untenable. The city decides to institute 
rules of conduct for different urban spaces divided into three color­
coded zones - Green, Yellow, and Red - in an effort to control and 
cabin these antisocial activities.120 These zones indicate the level of of­
ficial tolerance of various types of behavior on the public street and in 
public places. In Green Zones, the city strictly enforces anti­
panhandling ordinances, congregation ordinances, and other quality of 
life ordinances regulating a whole range of disruptive conduct. The 
Green Zone is a place of "refuge for the unusually sensitive," like 
children and the elderly .121 In Yell ow Zones, the city strikes a balance 
to create a "lively mixing bowl. " 122 In Yellow Zones, the police regu­
late aggressive panhandling and some forms of loitering and congrega­
tion, but perhaps not occasional panhandling, limited loitering, and 
other kinds of congregation. The idea would be to "curb street misbe­
havior enough to make the great majority of citizens willing to enter 
these spaces without hesitation."123 Finally, in Red Zones (consistent 
with the concept of Red Light Districts), the city tolerates more noise 
and rowdiness and does not regulate panhandling, loitering, or other 
deviant behaviors at all. Red Zones would be "safe harbors for people 
prone to engage in disorderly conduct."124 
Ellickson offers this hypothetical "public-space zoning" scheme to 
control what he calls "chronic misconduct in public spaces," which is 
defined with reference to "prevailing community standards of behav­
ior. " 125 His proposal specifically addresses "chronic street nuisances," 
1 19. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1219-22. 
120. See id. 




125. Id. at 1 185. Professor Ellickson's zoning proposal is meant to bring attention to 
what I think is his first priority: permitting police the discretion to force panhandlers and 
vagrants to "move along" specifically and allowing law-enforcement authorities in cities a 
great deal of leeway in controlling deviance in public spaces generally. See id. at 1185-89. 
Ellickson is decidedly opposed to what he sees as the Warren Court's unnecessary and im-
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like aggressive panhandling and bench squatting, but it could easily 
apply to the conduct outlawed in the Chicago ordinance, loitering as 
defined as "remaining in one place with no apparent purpose."  In­
deed, Ellickson would make all sorts of conduct that is currently legal 
- such as dog walking or playing a radio - illegal in Green Zones. 126 
Like the Gang Congregation Ordinance and other public order 
laws, Ellickson's proposal is thoroughly grounded in the new policing 
that emphasizes quality of life issues: the concern for the vitality of the 
street, the emphasis on the responsibilities of those who use the public 
ways, the sense that small disorders will aggregate into larger ones, 
and the belief that informal norms of civility enable urban life to 
flourish.127 His approach targets specific uses of public space in an ef­
fort to increase ones we like (walking/strolling) and to decrease ones 
we do not like (panhandling/loitering). Less delicately, the purpose of 
urban zoning is to force undesirable uses to go somewhere else (into 
Red Zones). Ellickson argues for the return to the days of Skid Rows, 
when the Bowery was an informal Red Zone for the "down" and 
"out" in New York City.128 His goal is to recreate such neighborhoods 
in our central cities. 1 29 Like ordinances that ban shopping carts from 
the streets, camping in public parks, sitting on the sidewalk, lingering 
on a highway median, or rummaging through trash, public space zon­
ing is intended to force the loiterer and the panhandler to " 'find 
someplace else to go' " on the theory that " 'if there's no good fishing 
in the lake, you find another lake. '  "130 
proper constitutionalization of street law. His proposal thus embodies a federalism concern 
as well. See id. 
126. See id. at 1222. 
127. See id. at 1177-78. 
128. See id. 1167, 1171-72. 
129. See id. De facto zones are already at work in certain cities. See MIKE DA VIS, CITY 
OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 232-33 (1990) (describing how 
Los Angeles "promotes the 'containment' (official term) of the homeless in Skid Row along 
Fifth Street east of the Broadway," a strategy that "by condensing the mass of the desperate 
and helpless together in such a small space, and denying adequate housing" has "trans­
formed Skid Row into probably the most dangerous ten square blocks in the world"). 
130. Evelyn Nieves, Growing Number of Homeless Defy Cities' Drives to Move Them, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al (quoting Mark Siemens, Marysville, Md., City Administra­
tor). In Santa Ana, California, it is illegal to sit in the civic center with belongings that oc­
cupy more than three cubic feet. See id. At the extreme, it has been reported that town offi­
cials in Sacramento give homeless people one-way tickets out of town. See id. Other tactics 
to rid downtowns of the homeless and panhandlers include designing street furniture such as 
the barrel-shaped bus bench and installing outdoor sprinklers and spikes on flat concrete 
surfaces to discourage sleeping on and around the street, and placing fences around garbage 
or locking up trash receptacles to prevent the homeless from accessing them. See DA VIS, su­
pra note 129, at 233-34. For a collection of urban policies designed to control public space, 
including laws against sleeping in public, sitting on sidewalks, and laws requiring the licens­
ing of panhandlers, see Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Im­
plications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER, supra note 14, at 6, 8-9. Jeremy Waldron has argued that such controls effectively 
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In this way, public-space zoning, like all zoning regimes, operates 
by discouraging and excluding undesirable uses of land and encour­
aging and attracting desirable uses. When combined with a criminol­
ogy emphasizing the effect of low-level disorder in promoting more 
serious criminal behavior, a land use approach to crime control 
emerges. This approach views deviance through the lens of space and 
place: land use regimes, broadly conceived, deter crime by deterring or 
isolating disorderly uses of public and private space. 
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance is a good example. As 
advocates argued, the ordinance's purpose was to prevent gang mem­
bers from gathering on sidewalks, corners, and parks before they en­
gaged in serious crimes, to create norms of order on the street in order 
to deter further criminal activity. The Chicago police did not patrol 
the entire city looking for loitering gang members. Instead, the police 
specifically targeted certain blocks and corners of the city and, essen­
tially, zoned them as no-gang loitering areas.131 The fact that the 
Chicago police implemented the ordinance in this manner was one of 
the city's defenses of its constitutionality.132 Echoing constitutional de­
fenses to the zoning of adult theaters and bookstores and other unde­
sirable venues, the city argued that the ordinance was a permissible 
regulation of the streets because the regulations implementing the or­
dinance provided adequate alternative areas in which gang members 
could gather "with no apparent purpose."133 Ellickson defends his ur­
ban zoning against constitutional attack on the same grounds, arguing 
that public-space zoning does not make particular behaviors illegal but 
only makes them the equivalent of "nonconforming uses" in certain 
deny homeless persons the only legal space in which they can exercise certain basic human 
freedoms, such as sleeping or washing. See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of 
Freedom, 39 UCLA L REV. 296, 315 (1991) 
131. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 27-28 ("Under General Order 92-4, the 
gang loitering ordinance is not enforced throughout Chicago, but only in those limited areas 
designated by police district commanders as 'areas in which the presence of gang members 
has a demonstrable effect on the activities of law abiding persons in the surrounding com­
munity. ' "). 
Similarly, Cincinnati's recently invalidated "drug exclusion zone" ordinance required 
that persons who had been arrested or taken into custody within any designated drug exclu­
sion zone for drug abuse or any drug abuse-related activities could not be present in the zone 
for ninety days following their arrest. See Ohio v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 858-60 (Ohio 
2001). Excluded persons were permitted to file for a variance from the chief of police for 
reasons related to their health, welfare, or well-being, or for drug abuse-related counseling 
services, if they were bona fide residents of the drug exclusion zones, or if they were bona 
fide owners or employees of places of lawful employment within the zones. Id. Transient 
occupants of hotels or motels were not bona fide residents under the ordinance. Id. 
132. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21, at 28. 
133. See id. ("[T]here remain many - indeed innumerable - opportunities available to 
gang members to express their ideas and associate with others."). Of course, for obvious rea­
sons, the areas selected for enforcement of the ordinance were only known to members of 
the police department's Gang Crime Section and other designated personnel and were not 
made known to the general public. See id. at 5-6. 
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areas of the city.134 In a Chicago with a functioning anti-gang loitering 
ordinance, congregating with gang members on certain specified 
blocks or corners is simply a nonconforming use subject first to a 
warning and then, if not corrected, to arrest. 
Though rarely applied so directly to specific types of disorder, this 
land use model of crime prevention is not a new one. The theory that 
the physical conditions in which people live can contribute to crimi­
nality was present at the inception of the discipline of urban plan­
ning.135 Indeed, in 1926, at the time the Supreme Court first addressed 
the constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning regime, it was ac­
cepted wisdom that "crime and vice increase in the blighted districts 
where general conditions are more promotive of sickness and delin­
quency."136 Thus, the Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 131 
could validate zoning as a means of protecting the "health, safety, and 
morals of the community; "138 Advocates of zoning, with its attendant 
building codes, tenement restrictions, sanitary regulations, and mixed 
use limitations, could refer to the "well documented facts that slum 
clearance and the provision of sanitary low-rent housing decrease 
danger of epidemics, raise general public health, reduce crime, cut ju­
venile delinquency, reduce immorality . . .  and prevent the cancerous 
spread of the slums to uninfected areas."139 As the President's Com­
mittee on Natural Resources stated in 1937: "[I]nadequate housing 
conditions are causally connected with . . .  [a] high incidence of delin­
quency. Likewise, there is a close coincidence between poor housing 
conditions and social disorganization."140 
Zoning was initially justified both as a means of rehabilitating and, 
in the case of the Village of Euclid, of preventing the formation of en-
134. See Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1232-39. For an 
extended critique of this defense and of Ellickson's proposal in general, see Steven R. 
Munzer, Ellickson on Chronic Misconduct in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squat­
ters, and Day Laborers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, passim (1997). 
135. See generally James G. Coke, Antecedents of Local Planning, in PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING 7 (William Goodman & Eric c. Freund eds., 4th ed. 1968). 
New York City enacted legislation regulating tenements in 1867. Larger cities followed with 
sanitation and building codes for new construction. In 1916, New York City adopted its first 
comprehensive zoning ordinance that addressed the type, location, and use of buildings. See 
James C. Nicolas, State and Regional Land Use Planning: The Evolving Role of the State, 73 
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1999). 
136. See Brief for Appellant at 66, Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (No. 31). 
137. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
138. Id. at 395. 
139. Myers S. McDougal & Addison A. Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An 
Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J. 42, 47-48 (1942). 
140. NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, OUR CITIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 67 (1937). 
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vironments that would foster delinquency and deviance.141 Land use 
regimes quickly took on the broader defensive role of preventing 
overcrowding, noise, pollution, and traffic: the harbingers of the fear­
ful urban blight characteristic of the decaying city.142 Justice 
Sutherland, writing for the Euclid Court, held that zoning "increase[s] 
the safety and security of home life; greatly tend[ s] to prevent traffic 
accidents, especially to children . . .  decrease[ s] noise and other condi­
tions which produce or intensify nervous disorders; [and] preserve[ s] a 
more favorable environment in which to rear children."143 As suburbia 
came to dominate America's social and cultural life, zoning took root 
as a mechanism protective of home and family, reinforcing the con­
trast between the "dangerous city" and the "bucolic suburb."144 
141. See Lorenz, supra note 1 18, at 169. It also had implicit racial overtones. See 
CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND LAND USE IN 
AMERICA 193-209 (1977) (describing how fear of immigrants are "in the fiber of zoning"); 
Richard H. Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 603-14 
(2001) (describing how the "polite" public health rhetoric of Euclid was a code for "ugly" 
racial imagery). 
142. See Peter L. Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 122, 127-29 (Charles M. Harr & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). 
143. 272 U.S. at 394. 
144. A host of factors are at play in the construction of this dichotomy. Professors Jerry 
Frug and Keith Aoki note the origin of suburbia in a sentimental pastoralism. See FRUG, 
CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 143-44. The anti-urban, Arcadian aesthetic of urban plan­
ners and architects of the nineteenth century and the utilitarian strand of urban planning 
that developed in the early to mid-twentieth century combined to produce a distribution of 
space "strictly segregated along economic, social cultural, and racial lines." Keith Aoki, 
Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, Post-Modernism, 
Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 700-01 (1993). 
Others have examined the role of the "cult of domesticity" in constructing suburban 
space. See NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: 'WOMAN'S SPHERE' IN NEW 
ENGLAND, 1780 - 1835, 199-203 (1977); DOLORES HAYDEN, THE GRAND DOMESTIC 
REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMINIST DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN HOMES, 
NEIGHBORHOODS, AND CITIES 28-29 ( 1981). A primary role of zoning is the spatial separa­
tion of home and work. The cordoning-off of a social space for the family emerged in part 
from the separate spheres ideology of the 1800s. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN 
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26-36 (1980); 
Cott, supra, at 5. 
Professor Cott argues that the "contradistinction of home to world had its roots in relig­
ious motives and rhetoric." Cott, supra, at 64. By creating a separate sphere protected from 
the contagion of money and the amorality of work, women's "self-renunciation remedied 
men's self-alienation." Id. at 64. Thus, the division of work from family arose from a con­
scious need to "save" virtue in an increasingly unmediated, stained public world. See id. This 
separation of male and female spheres was also reflected in the spatial design of the isolated 
family home, with whole rooms set aside for entertainment, living, sleeping, and eating. 
Dolores Hayden argues that some early feminists sought to define urban space to reflect not 
the isolation of the family, but its interdependence. See HAYDEN, supra, at 6, 33. Coming out 
of the material feminist tradition, these early utopians envisioned a collective urban residen­
tial space in which women could share housework, and collaborate on domestic chores. By 
the 1970s, however, Hayden argues, "both anti-feminists and feminists accepted the spatial 
design of the isolated home." Id. at 290. 
Racism also played a significant role. It is well-documented that suburban development 
was explicitly racialized not only by private actors but also by the federal government. See id. 
at 198-99; Abeles, supra note 142, at 132, 137; see also KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS 
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This is still the case. As Richard Briffault points out, local govern­
ment's power over land use is the central tool in an arsenal of local 
powers intended "to protect the home and family - enabling resi­
dents to raise their children in 'decent' surroundings, servicing home 
and family needs and insulating home and family from undesirable 
changes in the surrounding area."145 Almost fifty years after Euclid, 
Justice Douglas, writing in Village of Belle Terre v. Borass,146 affirmed 
that a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi­
cles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed 
to family needs." 147 
The contemporary version of the land use model of controlling de­
viance shares elements of the "dangerous city" ideology, though it has 
shifted slightly from an emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the 
city neighborhood (e.g., overcrowding) and its sociological implica­
tions for crime to a more direct emphasis on and recognition of the so­
ciological infrastructure of the city neighborhood itself. Instead of fo­
cusing primarily on the physical characteristics of dwellings and public 
spaces,148 the new criminal justice scholarship focuses on the quality of 
"community-level structures"149 that keep norms of order pointing 
away from criminality. Advocates argue that high-crime, urban neigh­
borhoods often lack the social networks and informal monitoring 
structures that can support the private norm enforcement necessary to 
deter crime by preventing the low-level disorders that can lead to 
crime.150 The lack of community-level structure - akin to the lack of 
sanitary facilities or the problems of overcrowding in the era of slum 
clearance - results in dangerous neighborhoods. 
From this vantage, public order norms can be understood as the 
next generation of land use planning targeted at specific behaviors. 
Zoning is employed to create and maintain the proper "environment" 
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (discussing how federal 
mortgage-backing agencies redlined black neighborhoods). For example, predominantly 
black Camden did not have a single FHA-backed mortgage in the 1950s and '60s, while sub­
urban, white Mount Laurel had hundreds. See DA YID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, 
HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 1-8, 16 (1995). In the suburban-shaping years between 
1930 and 1960, fewer than one percent of all mortgages in the nation were issued to African 
Americans. See id. at 7. 
145. Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II __:..._ _Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 346, 382 (1990); see ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF SUBURBIA 3-4 (1987). 
146. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
147. Id. at 9. 
148. I emphasize "primarily" because the "broken windows" thesis is also concerned 
with the physical characteristics of neighborhoods. 
149. See Meares, supra note 82, at 669-70 ("[T]he structure of the community in which 
an individual lives interacts in important ways to either facilitate or retard an individual's 
criminal or delinquent behavior."). · 
150. See id. at 669-77. 
412 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:371 
and "structures" for discouraging rather than encouraging law break­
ing, to shore up "weakly organized communities" and "structurally 
weak communities."151 The thread running through slum clearance, 
comprehensive zoning plans, the Gang Congregation Ordinance, and 
other forms of public-space zoning is the idea that deviance occurs at 
the intersection of norms and place: the built environment is both a 
source of norms and norm-enforcing. 
Thus, the direct connection drawn by the early advocates of zoning 
between physical disorder and social disorder has been further refined 
and specified. The zoning of particular property uses is employed as 
an instrument for policing particular behaviors. In turn, policing par­
ticular behaviors has consequences on the types of persons who will 
use the space.152 This sorting is couched in the language of Tieboutian 
preferences, but this rhetoric masks and reinforces existing spatially 
maintained barriers throughout the metropolitan region. 
Indeed, Ellickson's hypothetical public-space zoning is a micro­
cosm of the entire metropolitan region, with its informal but easily 
recognizable Green, Yellow, and Red Zones. Suburban "Green 
Zones" have limited meaningful public space and limited accessibility 
to public transportation. Suburban developments (increasingly struc­
tured as homeowners associations) are designed with cul-de-sacs and 
single entryways (accessible only by cars) that create an air and a real­
ity of exclusivity. Suburban zoning regimes ban or discourage mixed­
used developments, isolating residences from commercial and business 
districts. Isolating residential uses on large lots tends to limit the ven­
ues for denser foot traffic - for the spaces in which anyone, especially 
teenagers, might congregate. 153 The low density and differentiation of 
commercial and residential space forces residents to find other venues 
aside from the suburban street to congregate, such as the local shop­
ping mall. The traditional public spaces of the neighborhood are re-
151. Id. at 677-84, 693. Meares argues for a "roadmap" to "construct . . .  'norm high­
ways' " necessary for "social organization improvement." Id. at 695. It is not a surprise that 
the metaphors are infrastructure oriented. 
152. See J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761, 
763. 
153. Suburban design not only restricts the movement of children and teenagers, it iso­
lates the elderly and women as well. See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 155-61; 
Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 715-24 (1995). 
The "New Urbanists" - a group of planners, theorists, and architects who favor in­
creased density and the development of towns that reduce the reliance on the automobile -
have been vocal in criticizing the spatial separation of residence and work, and are the lead­
ing proponents of a new residential architecture promoting mixed uses. See ANDRES DUANY 
ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 187-92 (2000). The goal of creating the car-less city faces an uphill climb. See Alan 
Ehrenhalt, Suburbs with a Healthy Dose of Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at 15 (dis­
cussing America's car culture and the New Urbanists' attempts to create new mixed-use 
walking developments in the face of regional infrastructures that still depend on the car) . 
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placed by private commercial spaces, regulated by developers and po­
liced by private security guards. 
Homeowners associations assert even greater control over their in­
ternal environments. An association can ban children and establish 
proper uses of commonly held space, including limiting the number of 
persons permitted to congregate in one place.154 The association may 
enforce an "orderly" aesthetic by preventing residents from repairing 
automobiles in driveways, parking trucks on the street, putting signs 
on their lawns, or painting their houses or mailboxes an unapproved 
color.155 
These design elements are accompanied by more direct barriers to 
entry or access. For example, suburban neighborhoods often zone out 
affordable housing through minimum lot size regulations, square­
footage requirements, prohibitions on multifamily housing, bedroom 
restrictions, or prohibitions on mobile homes and the like. 156 These 
regulations bar high-density housing, in effect preventing poorer peo­
ple or large families from moving into the area, as well as the unem­
ployed or the transient. Not incidentally, these favorable uses are also 
protective of property values. A chief reason for exclusionary zoning 
in the suburbs is to maintain or increase property values, by excluding 
high-density residential uses that contribute to lower property values 
and higher costs of municipal services. Not surprisingly, the city of 
Chicago repeatedly cited the protection of property values as one of 
the chief purposes of the Gang Congregation Ordinance.157 
154. See, e.g. , White Egret Condominiums, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) 
(affirming validity of restrictive covenant prohibiting children under age of twelve from liv­
ing in condominium complex but holding that the covenant was unenforceable because the 
association had failed to enforce it in a uniform manner against all residents); Hidden Har­
bour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. App. 1975) (upholding validity of 
an association rule that prohibited the consumption of alcoholic beverages in common areas, 
and stating that "[i)t appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle 
that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners 
since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner 
must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in sepa­
rate, privately owned property," and that "[c)ondominium unit owners comprise a little 
democratic sub society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium 
property than may be existent outside the condominium organization"). 
155. See Gillette, supra note 13, 1384-85 (collecting cases). Regulations generally in­
clude rules regarding use of common areas, ownership and care of pets, posting of signs, dis­
posal of garbage, and parking of automobiles. See CURTIS C. SPROUL & KATHERINE N. 
ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 
609 (app. C) (1991). One student note has reported even more specific restrictive covenants. 
See Carl Kress, Note, Beyond Nahrstedt· Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Prop­
erty Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 883 n.12 (1998) (citing a restriction that 
"[n)o Barry Manilow records, tapes or CDs may be owned or played on the premises," a re­
striction banning pornography in owners' bedrooms, and a prohibition against carnivorous 
plants). 
156. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 35, at 18-20 (discussing barriers 
to entry that prevent mobility between localities). 
157. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 21,  at 10, 14, 27, 44. 
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The metropolitan region also has its Yellow and Red Zones. A 
yellow zone may be a shopping district - but not just any shopping 
district. The wealthy mall up the highway is a Green Zone; the poorer 
one downtown is a Yellow or Red Zone. Red Zones tend to be those 
inner-city neighborhoods and poor suburbs that people avoid. The 
shadings of class and race are remarkably refined. "Everyone knows 
which parts of the metropolitan area are nice and which are danger­
ous. Everyone knows where they don't belong."158 
Most significantly, the segregation of the built environment has 
been successful in segregating crime. Crime is not equally distributed 
throughout the city or the metropolitan region, but instead is concen­
trated in what one commentator has called "deviancy areas":159 neigh­
borhoods with high concentrations of poverty, unemployment, and so­
cial breakdown. As those "deviancy areas" threaten "normal areas," 
neighborhoods seek out more creative ways to wall them off and pre­
vent their spread. 160 Neighborhoods create speed bumps and close off 
through-streets to prevent access.161 Homeowners associations put up 
literal walls. Others hire private security forces.162 
In this way, the Gang Congregation Ordinance and other forms of 
public-space zoning borrow a central tool of a successful crime­
prevention strategy from the suburban playbook: boundary-creating 
158. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1996). 
159. Lorenz, supra note 1 18, at 146. These deviancy areas are also called "hot spots" by 
criminologists. See Philip B. Heyman, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 423-24 
(2000); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and 
the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989); cf Meares, supra note 82, at 695 
("[W]e must adopt a place-centered vision of law enforcement . . .  (that] keep(s] racial distri­
bution of law enforcement effects in mind . . .  within a spatial context."). 
160. Amy Mandelker notes that "[t]he very idea of city planning is axiologically con­
flicted: the utopian intentions of a rationally structured city are deconstructed in the un­
planned, dystopian shanty towns, mean streets, and back alleys . . . .  (W]hile the city is viable, 
it is characterized by the displacement of undesirable social elements to the periphery or to 
regions that Michel Foucault termed heterotopoi: the madhouse, the prison, the "red light" 
districts, the bowery." Amy Mandelker, Writing Urban Spaces: Street Graphics and the Law 
as Postmodern Design and Ordinance, 3 WASH. U. J. LAW AND POLICY 403, 407-08 (2000). 
161. See, e.g., Derek Ali & Jim Bebbington, Five Oaks May Hire Security - Neighbors 
at Odds over Need for Guards, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, April 22, 1999, at 1 (reporting debate 
over hiring of private security guards to patrol exclusive neighborhood that had already in­
stalled gates across its streets); Miles Corwin, Guns for Hire: A Growing Crop of Private 
Cops Is the First Line of Defense for Our Homes and Shops - But at a Price, L.A. TIMES 
MAG. ,  Nov. 28, 1993, at 24 (describing explosion of private security services in public and 
private developments); Matt Schwartz, HUD Labels Dian Street Gate Discriminatory, Asks 
Removal, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 15, 1998, at 25 (reporting five-year battle over gate placed 
in street that linked the predominantly white, middle-class Timbergrove Manor area of the 
city with the surrounding poor and minority neighborhood of Clark Pines). 
162. See generally DAVIS, supra note 129, at 221-64 (describing Los Angeles security 
apparatus); Trevor Boddy, Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City, in 
VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC 
SPACE 125-28 (Michael Sorkin ed., 1992) (describing how infrastructure improvements in 
cities are often designed for security purposes). 
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legal regimes that serve to limit access to, and the types of behaviors 
in, particular geographically defined spaces.163 Ellickson's hypothetical 
zones illustrate the dominant land use model of crime control that is 
already at work on a large scale throughout the metropolitan region. 
That defensive strategy - to separate out zones of deviance and zones 
of normalcy and then create legal and physical walls to prevent them 
from intermingling - continues to be the instrument of choice for in­
creasing numbers of metropolitan-area residents fearful of crime. 164 
B. Community in Zoned Space 
Ellickson's Red-Yellow-Green Zones make explicit the fact that 
communities operate in zoned space. Boundary-creating norms place 
us in social, legal, and physical space. The spatial quality of local 
norms helps reveal a tautology: If community standards are under­
stood as mechanisms for spatial differentiation (as a means for defin­
ing community in the first place), rather than as outcomes of commu­
nity self-determination (as a product of some existent entity known as 
community), then localism claims quickly become circular. Boundary­
creating norms are justified as exercises of local autonomy while cre­
ating the community that asserts autonomy in its name.165 
By drawing out the implications of a localism that is invariably de­
pendent on the erection of walls between "us" and "them," this sec-
163. Anti-panhandling and loitering laws are often specifically targeted at certain 
populations (gang members, teenagers, the homeless). Urban spaces may also bar entry and 
Cordone off undesirables through the design of the streetscape. See DA VIS, supra note 129, at 
ch.4 (describing how in "Fortress L.A." public space has been privatized or designed in such 
a way as to discourage its use by panhandlers and the homeless); see also Boddy, supra note 
162, at 125-53 (arguing that the development and construction of extensive networks of 
raised pedestrian bridges, people movers, and tunnels in major cities like Dallas, Montreal, 
Minneapolis, and Charlotte has closed off large portions of the city to lower socioeconomic 
classes); Maria Foscarinis et al., Out of Sight - Out of Mind? The Continuing Trend Toward 
the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145, 162-64 (1999) 
(discussing the criminalization of homelessness and order maintenance ordinances). 
164. See FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 34, at 196, 201 ("In America, the predomi­
nant strategy individuals employ to deal with crime is to isolate themselves from it," a strat­
egy that "in an important sense . . .  has worked."). The same was observed over forty years 
ago: "Today, the suburbs remain tight little islands, protected against the city. Unsuccessful 
and irrelevant at times to the problems of deviancy, zoning has been very relevant in one 
respect: it has kept poverty and crime exactly where it was situated fifty years ago, in the 
heart of the city." Lorenz, Planning, supra note 141, at 170. Of course, this strategy is already 
failing as suburbs begin to experience the same problems of deviance and crime as the cities 
and the amount of available land for further expansion and isolation decreases. See, e.g. , 
MYRON 0RFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY 124-25 (1997) (proposing a regional alliance between the inner city and the older 
inner-ring suburbs, many of which will - or are - facing the same social and economic 
problems that beset the urban core). 
165. Richard Ford makes a similar argument about the "tautology of community self­
definition." Richard Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1860 (1994). 
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tion critiques the contractarian, deep, and dualist accounts of commu­
nity. This localism is premised on some initial or ongoing act of exclu­
sion: the displacement of nonconforming uses to some other place, the 
excommunication of those who will not abide by the norms of the 
community, or the exiling and disenfranchisement of those who are 
politically disfavored. In each case, the possibility of an alternative lo­
calism is masked by the invocation of community standards. These 
standards do all the work necessary to define insiders and outsiders -
those individuals who are and who are not normatively entitled to 
make decisions on behalf of a community that now exists by function 
of the disputed norm. 
1 .  The Critique of the Contractarian Account: Warth v. Seldin 
and the Geographically Exclusive Conception 
of Local Government 
a. The Problem of Exclusion 
Recall that the contractarian account understands community as 
the outcome of individual acts of voluntary association. Localism is an 
instrument for efficient individual preference allocation; local auton­
omy vindicates individual associational choice. Community is a prod­
uct of voluntary association, which can take the form of either an ex­
plicit agreement setting the terms of membership or a tacit agreement 
to live by a community's practices. The immediate difficulty with this 
account is that it assumes that individuals are sufficiently mobile -
that they can readily join or leave neighborhoods if they so choose -
when the reality may be just the opposite. One might want to live in 
Beverly Hills (or, more important, one may desperately want not to 
live in Compton), but one may literally have no choice. 
That is not to say that individuals do not make choices about 
where to live - they do. Purchasing housing on the housing market, 
however, is quite different from joining a voluntary association. Thus, 
the term "community" as used to describe the residents of Chicago's 
poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods stumbles over an initial descriptive 
problem. Community implies an association of like minds, but the fact 
is that a residential neighborhood is generally an aggregate of strang­
ers who happen to live next door to one another. Though clearly some 
neighbors are friends and family, in general, neighborhood residents 
simply share a common geography, which they may not have chosen 
had they the means to go elsewhere. The voluntarist justification for 
deferring to local norms like the Gang Congregation Ordinance is cer­
tainly less powerful where residents' ability to exit the community 
(and enter a safer one) is restricted by life circumstances, in particular 
one's ability to afford housing elsewhere. We should be wary of as-
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suming that community norms are somehow a result of collective 
choice where individual residents have limited power over entry and 
exit, as might be the case in poor urban neighborhoods. As at least one 
commentator has asked: Can the desperate acts of crime-ridden 
neighborhoods to reduce constitutional rights really be considered a 
voluntary "choice" to balance liberty and order?166 
Questioning the voluntariness of a poor neighborhood's local 
norms, however, runs up against an uncomfortable paternalism: Does 
this mean that only the wealthy, who can choose to live in privatized 
enclaves or the suburban equivalent, are empowered to adjust consti­
tutional norms as they see fit? This seems objectionable. The fact of 
residential exclusion/segregation should not prevent the poor from 
contracting into a chosen form of governance by consenting to norms 
in the neighborhoods in which they happen to live. To deny local con­
trol to those with less means because they have been excluded from 
other neighborhoods only adds insult to injury. 
But how do we avoid the appearance, if not the reality, of coercion 
brought on by desperate circumstances? The answer, for those com­
mitted to a contractarian account, is to save localism by eliminating 
barriers to entry between communities. Efforts are directed to in­
creasing mobility by enforcing antidiscrirnination laws or other indi­
vidually targeted residential consumer legislation (such as prohibiting 
redlining), or by redistributing wealth to allow individuals a wider 
choice of where to live.167 The solution is to increase individual choice 
166. See Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 9, at 
49. A useful analogy is the plea bargain. Courts look to the state of mind of the defendant 
when he or she makes the choice to waive constitutional rights to ensure that such a waiver 
is "intelligent and voluntary." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Critics of plea 
bargaining argue that this inquiry is far too narrow and fails to take into account that deci­
sions to waive constitutional rights are "the product of a seriously flawed bargaining struc­
ture." Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1910 (1992). For critics of plea bargaining, consent is not enough to justify waiver of funda­
mental rights; a separate inquiry is necessary to ensure that the process itself is structured to 
protect the "dignity" and "autonomy" of the citizen. Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: 
Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 
84 YALE L.J. 683, 700 (1975). Cf Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role 
of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 384, 424-28 (1985) (challenging the idea that consent is sufficient to establish the 
morality of a legal regime or of the choices offered to individuals within that regime). 
167. I understand this to be the tact taken by Georgette Poindexter, who argues for a 
federative tier of government that would be responsible for region-wide wealth redistribu­
tion while promoting the autonomy of local neighborhoods as mechanisms for the realiza­
tion of individual choice. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at 658-64. The goal of "opening up" 
the suburbs by attacking suburban exclusionary zoning by forcing localities to take their 
"fair share" of lower income residents also represents this kind of approach. See, e.g. , John 
Charles Boger, Mount Laurel at 21 Years: Reflections on the Power of Courts and Legisla­
tures to Shape Social Change, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1450 (1997) (discussing New Jersey's 
attempt to institute a "fair share" regime after the seminal New Jersey Supreme Court's 
Mount Laurel decisions). Fair share regimes, however, have had limited success in creating 
low-income choices in the suburbs. See Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact 
of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 
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for everyone, ensuring that every neighborhood is based on a volun­
tarist model. This is both a moral imperative and a requirement for ef­
ficient preference formation.168 
These solutions to the problem of exclusion, however, do not solve 
the central conceptual defect with the voluntarist account of localism. 
No matter how robust the individual's mobility, an account of local 
autonomy based in voluntary association is conceptually flawed be­
cause it requires that neighborhoods be allowed to enforce boundary­
creating norms that themselves undermine the outsider's ability to 
contract in. On the contractarian account, exclusion is not simply a 
byproduct of local autonomy (that we can solve), but a condition of 
local autonomy. What may look like consent-based, voluntarist local 
governance is actually the result of legal and political choices favoring 
one kind of resident over another. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin169 amply illus­
trates this point. In Warth, low and moderate income residents of the 
city of Rochester (along with nonprofit organizations, developers, and 
Rochester taxpayers) sought to challenge the neighboring suburb of 
Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws.170 The Court assumed (for pur­
poses of the appeal) that the ordinance had the purpose and effect of 
excluding persons of low and moderate income (many of whom hap­
pened to be minorities) from residing in the town in violation of their 
constitutional and statutory rights.171 The Court noted that the zoning 
ordinance allocated 98% of Penfield's vacant land to single-family de­
tached housing on large lots and only 0.3 %  of Penfield's vacant land 
for multifamily structures, and that these limits, combined with set­
back restrictions and floor area and habitable space requirements, in­
creased the cost of single-family housing beyond the means of the peti­
tioners. 172 The Court held, however, that the petitioners did not have 
standing to challenge Penfield's zoning regime because they did not 
assert a present interest in "any Penfield property": " [N]one is himself 
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1304-06 (1997) (concluding that, while Mount Laurel did re­
sult in increasing the amount of low-income housing in urban areas, it failed to provide 
housing opportunities in the suburbs or to ameliorate racial and ethnic residential segrega­
tion) . Indeed, many conclude that New Jersey's efforts at opening up the suburbs have 
failed. See, e.g. , Florence Wagman Roisman, The Role of the State, the Necessity of Race­
Conscious Remedies, and Other Lessons From the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1386, 1387-89 (1997). This is not surprising. As I argue below, efforts to expand indi­
vidual "choice" do not challenge the spatial biases of local government law and therefore 
will only be minimally effective in fostering racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic integration. 
See infra text accompanying notes 194-200. 
168. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at 658-64. 
1 69. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
170. See id. at 493. 
171. See id. at 502. 
172. See id. at 495. 
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subject to the ordinance's strictures; and none has ever been denied a 
variance or permit by respondent officials."173 
The Court treated the boundary between Penfield and Rochester 
as immutable. Because petitioners did not live in Penfield or have a 
current interest in property in Penfield, they did not have the standing 
to challenge the zoning ordinance regardless of its effect on their abil­
ity to become future residents of Penfield. As Justice Brennan's dis­
sent pointed out, the Rochester petitioners found themselves in a 
Catch-22: if they could afford to become residents of Penfield, they 
would have standing to sue but no grievance; conversely, because they 
could not afford to become residents of Penfield - the gravamen of 
their complaint - they did not have standing to sue.174 
The Court did not recognize the impossibility of the situation of its 
own making. Instead, the majority appeared to reject the petitioners' 
entire theory of the case out-of-hand (despite formally accepting the 
petitioners' allegations as true), stating that "petitioners' descriptions 
of their individual financial situations and housing needs suggest . . .  
that their inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the eco­
nomics of the area housing market, rather than of respondents' assert­
edly illegal acts. "175 In effect, the Court presumed that the residents of 
Penfield and Rochester lived in their respective towns because they 
had made the choice to do so. The Rochester petitioners were ex­
pressing nothing more than a "preference" to live in Penfield, which, 
like all preferences (to own a Ferrari, to live in a big house), was sub­
ject to the limitations of petitioners' finances and not cognizable under 
Article III. 176 
In so doing, however, the Warth majority privileged the Penfield 
residents' preferences for large lots and single-family housing over the 
Rochester residents' preferences for living in Penfield, with its argua­
bly better schools and lower tax rates. The result was the exclusion of 
the Rochester petitioners, a result that the Penfield respondents would 
surely argue was necessary to maintain their particular pastoral way of 
life, their property values, and the health and welfare of their resi­
dents. 
The important point is not that the Court made a choice among 
competing preferences or that it did so without identifying the values 
173. Id. at 504. The Court denied standing to the nonprofit organizations and the devel­
opers on essentially the same grounds. See id. at 512 (nonprofits), 516 (developers). The 
Court also denied standing to the class of Rochester tax-paying plaintiffs whose claim was 
not that they were denied access to Penfield, but that Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws 
injured them as taxpayers because those laws had the effect of raising property tax rates in 
Rochester. See id. at 509-11 ;  infra text accompany notes 181-187. 
174. See id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
175. ld. at 506. 
176. See id. at 505. 
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underlying that choice - though both are true. What is important is 
that the contractarian account is unable to tell us which preference -
the Rochester petitioners' preference to be let in or the Penfield resi­
dents' preference to keep out - should receive priority. Both are as­
sertions of individual choice: the former, a choice to live in a particular 
town; the latter, a choice to live in a particular way. 
In other words, the mobility that is so central to the contractarian 
account is continuously undermined by the necessity for entrance con­
trols that maintain the character and nature of the community in the 
first instance. Because the Court had to choose one or the other pref­
erence, it could not possibly honor the contractarian requirement that 
neighborhoods be based on voluntary association for both: the indi­
vidual autonomy of either the Penfield residents or the Rochester 
residents had to be sacrificed. But instead of facing this stark alterna­
tive, the Court pretended that it was honoring everyone's "choices" 
(within the limits of their means), while granting no one's "prefer­
ences." 
b. The Geographically Exclusive Conception of Local 
Government 
Of course, the fact that the Warth Court privileged the preferences 
of Penfield's current residents over those of its potential residents 
(currently living in Rochester) was not surprising, given that local gov­
ernment law is structured to favor current residents over potential 
residents. Indeed, the residence-based franchise is the primary feature 
of a local government law regime that is structured in numerous ways 
to prefer residents over nonresidents. This strong identification of in­
terests with residence is taken for granted: we have come to accept 
that existing residents of a particular geographically defined area have 
a stronger claim to govern within a particular territory than do non­
residents. 177 
177. Warth is one of a series of Burger Court decisions that had the effect of constitu­
tionalizing current residents' preferences on the basis of local autonomy. See Williams, supra 
note 29, at 83-84, 105-15. Land use-related cases include Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (establishing rigorous standard in order for 
a plaintiff with standing to prove discriminatory intent in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from locality's adoption of exclusionary zoning ordinance); City of Eastlake v. 
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (holding that provision in city charter pro­
viding that land use changes must be approved by majority vote in a referendum does not 
violate Due Process Clause); Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding 
zoning ordinance excluding student households); and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) 
(upholding referendum requirement that permitted majority of residents to veto low-rent 
housing projects regardless of zoning requirements unless racial discrimination could be 
shown). Two school cases also reified the jurisdictional line between neighboring localities, 
enforcing in language and in deed that local amenities such as schools are for the use and 
enjoyment of local residents. Thus, in San Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the 
Court rejected a challenge to Texas's school financing system that was based on the local 
property tax and that resulted in significant inter-local inequalities in per-pupil expenditure. 
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Yet, this geographically exclusive conception of local governance 
has not gone unchallenged. Some local government scholars have 
charged that the privileging of residence in distributing voice - link­
ing residence and local governance - is flawed, both descriptively and 
conceptually.178 As a descriptive matter, residence-based local govern­
ance fails to recognize the complicated reality of life in metropolitan 
regions. People no longer live and work in one locality with which they 
identify entirely. Instead, people move multiple times over the course 
of their adult lives and conduct their lives across various political and 
social communities everyday, working in one, playing in another, go­
ing to school in another, sleeping in another, and voting in another. 
The geographically exclusive conception of local government assumes 
that individuals are more concerned, competent, and aware of issues 
that relate to their homes. Yet, a Stamford, Connecticut, resident 
without children who commutes to New York everyday may have a 
stronger interest in decisions made by the city of New York than in the 
decisions made by the Stamford school board. 
As a conceptual matter, then, this residence-based account of local 
governance is overdetermined. Why should a person's residence and 
not her interests decide her community? The linking of residence and 
franchise results in the identification of political issues in terms of 
where people buy or rent a home. Local governance is thus premised 
on a narrow sort of neighborhood identification, limited by territorial 
designations that mean little to contemporary persons living in metro­
politan areas with numerous overlapping jurisdictions.179 
More important, the geographically exclusive conception of local 
government effectively reinforces an exclusionary idea of community. 
In allowing prior-in-time residents to adopt norms that restrict access 
to "their" neighborhood, as Penfield's residents did, th� Court simul­
taneously affirmed Penfield residents' individual autonomy while 
denigrating the Rochester petitioners'. It thus adhered to a construc­
tion of localism that privileged insiders without ever questioning how 
those insiders got to be there. This only increases the irony of the 
Court's suggestion that the Rochester petitioners look to the "normal 
democratic process"180 in seeking to alter Penfield's exclusionary zon­
ing laws. The Court failed to recognize that in order even to partici­
pate in the making of Penfield's local zoning ordinances, the 
Rochester petitioners would have to become residents there. But then 
the match would be over: the outsiders would have become insiders, at 
And in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court reversed a district court order 
that required busing of inner-city children to suburban schools as part of a Detroit-area de­
segregation remedy. 
178. See Frug, supra note 17, at 320-35; Ford, supra note 165, at 1909-10. 
179. See Frug, supra note 17, at 316-17. 
180. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508 n.18. 
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which point the game is already won (for Rochester residents) or lost 
(for Penfield residents). 
The key here is that the geographically exclusive conception of lo­
cal government obscures the effects of local decisions on "outsiders" 
primarily by defining them as such. Once the border between Penfield 
and Rochester is assumed, the Rochester residents' lack of standing 
appears obvious, and any spillover effects can be easily discounted as 
"incidental," as the Warth majority claimed.181 But these spillover ef­
fects are not incidental, they are structural. The zoning regime serves 
as an entrance control; it is inherent in the concept of a jurisdictional 
border between Penfield and Rochester. Without such an entrance 
control, the border would itself be incidental. Indeed, if Penfield could 
not keep out the residents of Rochester, there would be no border, no 
Penfield and no Rochester. 
The relevant externality is exclusion, which is embedded in the 
structure of local government. Exclusionary zoning not only alters (or 
preserves) the environment for Penfield, it also causes the displace­
ment and concentration of less desirable (from a municipal finance 
perspective) persons into more limited localities. These limited locali­
ties, like Rochester, are beset by the combination of increasing costs of 
municipal services and an ever-shrinking tax base, while wealthy lo­
calities, like Penfield, use entrance controls to defend their tax base. 
"As a result, a locality with a more ample per capita tax base can pro­
vide better services at a lower tax rate without having to support serv­
ices in other localities, while poorer localities have to tax themselves at 
higher rates but generate revenues sufficient only to fund relatively in­
ferior local services."182 The poor get poorer: exclusionary zoning re­
gimes lead to the concentration of poor people in specific localities 
where they are afflicted by higher tax rates and receive inferior serv­
ices. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in waging its twenty­
five year battle to open the New Jersey suburbs, fiscal zoning "pre­
vent[ s] various categories of persons from living in the township be­
cause of the limited extent of their income and resources. "183 "Almost 
every [municipality] acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest 
and in effect builds a wall around itself to keep out those people or en­
tities not adding favorably to the tax base."184 
181. Id. at 509. 
182. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1 136. 
183. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 717 
(1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I]; see also S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel, 510 A.2d 621 (1986); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount 
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). For an historical account of the Mount Laurel litigation, see 
KIRP ET AL., supra note 144. 
184. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723. This includes competition for low-cost commer­
cial ratables. See Sheryll Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A 
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 758 (2001). 
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These concentration effects may be exacerbated by the perceived 
identification of costly municipal service users with race. As Richard 
Ford has pointed out, the existence of racially identified spaces in the 
metropolitan region is a product of the frequent correlation of race 
and income. 185 Even absent the existence of discriminatory motivation, 
claims Ford, wealthier (usually white) residents have strong incentives 
to avoid and exclude poorer and often black residents as a matter of 
local finance. Racially identified spaces become self-perpetuating as 
whites come to view blacks as placing increasing burdens on municipal 
finances. Whether blacks actually impose higher burdens becomes ir­
relevant as spaces become increasingly racially identified, with whites 
fleeing what they perceive to be costly blacks in an effort to maintain 
property values. This flight may itself lead to the depression of prop­
erty values regardless of the incomes of the blacks moving in. Ford de­
scribes the local government finance system based on boundaries as a 
" 'tax' on integration"186 - one that perpetuates a segregated metro­
politan geography even in the absence of overt discriminatory actions 
by municipalities.187 
The Warth Court may have been more sympathetic to these spatial 
spillover effects if it had understood them temporally. Once we begin 
to think of the Rochester petitioners as potential or future residents of 
Penfield instead of as residents of a neighboring municipality, our 
sense of which interests are entitled to normative respect shifts (be­
cause our sense of the relevant "community" shifts) .  Future residents 
of a locality are affected by any number of policies pursued by current 
residents, including those policies made in the recent and not-so­
recent past by residents who may no longer live in the jurisdiction but 
that have adversely affected newer entrants. This widespread temporal 
disjuncture is built into the ideology of American mobility and the 
close identification between where one lives and one's place in the so­
cial order. For millions of Americans, "making it" has meant moving 
("All localities in the fragmented American metropolis are in a vigorous horizontal competi­
tion with each other for a limited commercial tax base.") Cashin observes that white subur­
ban communities tend to out-compete not only predominantly black urban areas, but also 
suburbs with majority black populations. See id. 
185. Ford, supra note 165, at 1849-57. 
186. See id. at 1853-54. 
187. See id. at 1856-57. The segregation and concentration of African Americans in the 
inner city not only harms African Americans as a matter of municipal finance, but it also has 
a measurable impact on individual access to employment and overall social mobility. See 
generally Bruce Wienberg, Black Residential Centralization and the Spatial Mismatch Hy­
pothesis, 48 J. URBAN ECON. 1 10-34 (2000); David Cutler & Edward Glaeser, Are Ghettos 
Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. OF ECON. 827 (August 1997). Concentration effects are significant 
factors in exacerbating black poverty. See generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); 
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS 
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996). 
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up and out. Current residents buy "up" (and move up the social lad­
der) by moving out of the city to the suburbs and out of the inner sub­
urbs to more distant suburbs as the older suburbs become less desir­
able, leaving those who cannot move up to grapple with the results of 
past local decisions. 188 Many current residents of a locality may not 
have to live with the consequences of local government decisions be­
cause of the ready availability of new localities in which to reconstruct 
the American dream after they have cashed in or gotten out. 
These temporal spillover effects of local decisionmaking are often 
overlooked. What does local autonomy mean in a mobile society 
where changes in the make-up of local populations occur over the 
span of years as opposed to decades or longer?189 Who exactly is the 
accountable local decisionmaker? Potential residents, like the 
Rochester petitioners, bear the economic and social brunt of exclu­
sionary land use policies that contribute to increased property values 
for all Penfield residents, including current residents whose properties 
were less valuable before the exclusionary regime was put into place. 
Being in the mobility market, the potential resident will feel the im­
pact of certain local policies, particularly those that affect the cost of 
housing, more strongly than nonresidents or even current residents. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the one group of plaintiffs that was most af­
fected by Penfield's exclusionary zoning regime was the Rochester 
home-seeking petitioners. When thought of as an injury across time, 
the class of potential residents incurs the most devastating harm. 
c. Internalizing Displacement 
The contractarian account of community can attempt to take these 
extra-territorial and extra-temporal effects into account by adopting a 
limiting principle that demands that localities internalize the spillover 
effects of their acts of self-government, particularly acts of exclusion. 
In fact, numerous local government law scholars have argued over the 
years that the only way to internalize the extraterritorial effects of lo­
cal government policies is by extending the locality's boundaries to in­
clude all affected persons.190 Local government scholars and policy-
188. The realization that this process is becoming untenable has resulted in the recent 
unprecedented popular concern with the problems of sprawl, though this concern has gener­
ated few effective antisprawl measures. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, 
and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 136 (1999) (conclud­
ing that "key sprawl decisions are likely to continue to be made by largely unaccountable 
local, state, and federal officials" and therefore "sustained and effective anti-sprawl meas­
ures . . .  have been and are likely to remain a rarity"). 
189. The average American moves every six years. See DUANY ET AL., supra note 153, 
at 44 (citing U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 Report on Geographical Mobility). 
190. See, e.g. , VICTOR JONES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT (1942) (urging creation 
of general purpose local governments at the metropolitan level); Briffault, supra note 12, at 
1 164-71 (advocating metropolitan-wide regional government with significant powers over 
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makers have offered various formulations of regional ·government, ne­
cessitated by the parochial actions of neighboring localities.191 In ma­
nipulating jurisdictional boundaries by expanding them outward, ad­
vocates of these proposals have given up on local governance in i:nany 
instances altogether, basically acknowledging that any limiting princi­
ple on local autonomy eventually swallows local government alto­
gether.192 
land use, revenue collection, and regional infrastructure); Robert L. Lineberry, Reforming 
Metropolitan Governance: Requiem or Reality?, 58 GEO. L.J. 675, 697-71 1  (1970) (discussing 
problem of externalities and advocating various forms of metropolitan-area government). 
191.  For the more recent literature on this subject, see ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW 
VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A 
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY (1997); NEAL R. PIERCE, 
CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); 
DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); and DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME, 
OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999). See also 
Briffault, supra note 12, at 1 164-71; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyr­
anny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 
2046-47 (2000) (advocating a regionalist system of local governance); Lineberry, supra note 
190, at 697-711 ;  Poindexter, supra note 53, at 660-63 (advocating a redistributive tier at the 
regional level to effect region-wide wealth redistribution). 
In the 1960s, some metropolitan areas experimented with a "federative" structure (such 
as Miami-Dade County) or with city-county consolidation (such as Indianapolis-Marion 
County, Nashville-Davidson County, and Jackson-Duvall County). See Lineberry, supra 
note 190, at 698-706. More recent moves towards regionalism have been spurred by the 
problems of suburban sprawl and the traffic congestion, air pollution, and loss of open space 
that accompanies it. For example, in Atlanta, a new metropolitan authority, the Georgia Re­
gional Transportation Authority, has the power to build or veto roads and transit systems 
and to control growth by denying permits to tie into the road system. The purpose is to con­
trol the massive sprawl in the Atlanta region that has resulted in average commuting times 
of eighty minutes. See David Firestone, Suburban Comforts Thwart Atlanta's Plans to Limit 
Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at 22. For a discussion of the institutional politics of 
sprawl, see Buzbee, supra note 188, at 136. 
192. See, e.g. , Briffault, supra note 12, at 1164-71; John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and 
the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1685, 1711 (1998) (advocating that states "reclaim the 
delegated zoning power from the gaggle of fragmented, parochial municipalities and either 
exercise the power itself, redelegate it to new state or regional planning agencies, or redele­
gate it to municipalities subject to tighter standards"). But see Clayton P. Gillette, Regionali­
zation and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190,190-97 (2001) (advocating decentral­
ized governments and suggesting inter-local bargaining as an alternative to regionalism); 
Edward A. Zelinksy, Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 
(1998) (reviewing DA YID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); NEAL R. PEIRCE, 
CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1993); & 
DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)) 
(rejecting calls for regional or metropolitan-wide government as unworkable and unlikely to 
alter the current racial, economic, and spatial distribution of metropolitan areas). 
Another possible mechanism for forcing localities to internalize the costs of their deci­
sionmaking is to allow the affected local government legal standing to challenge the deci­
sions of a neighboring or adjacent local government unit. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. City 
of Shaker Heights, 507 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio 1987) (holding that Cleveland had standing to 
challenge neighboring Shaker Heights' decision to close and barricade certain streets which 
diverted traffic and inconvenienced residents of the city but sustaining Shaker Heights' deci­
sion); cf Robert C. Ellickson, Public Property Rights: A Government's Rights and Duties 
When Its Landowners Come into Conflict with Outsiders, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1627-30 
(1979) (advocating creation of public intergovernmental rights and duties to internalize 
spillovers of local and state governmental decisions). 
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Efforts to prevent spillovers without expanding boundaries are dif­
ficult, however. Any proposed limiting principle on local power must 
differentiate between local decisions to exclude and local choices to 
instantiate a way of life, which are often one and the same. The ques­
tion "Why don't we trust them to decide for themselves?" can be 
asked of the resident of Park Avenue who is tired of aggressive pan­
handlers, the resident of Penfield who wants to protect her pastoral 
lifestyle by banning low-income housing, and the business owner who 
has joined other business owners to create a business improvement 
district downtown that enforces a curfew for teenagers. Any proposed 
anti-exclusionary limiting principle becomes untenable in the face of 
the powerful thrust of local autonomy based on the consent of the 
residents of an already territorially defined locality. 
Indeed, like Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, zoning re­
gimes are almost always portrayed as defensive measures intended to 
protect existing residents, who, it is again assumed, have a particular 
normative entitlement to that protection. Residents use terms like 
"community character" and "way of life" to defend mechanisms that 
exclude or discourage undesirable uses in their neighborhood. The 
rhetoric of community is thus employed to defend norms that con­
struct the community in their image as they are simultaneously justi­
fied as emanating from that community. 
Consider again Ellickson's proposal for Red-Yellow-Green Zones. 
Ellickson begins with public order norms, deployed to create definable 
and defensible perimeters between neighborhoods, newly conceived 
of as "zones" for certain specified behavior. The Green, Yellow, and 
Red Zones do not exist prior to defining the uses of land that are ap­
propriate in each. Indeed, the whole purpose of Ellickson's regime is 
to create standards of behavior and impose them on a grid of the city, 
allocating certain percentages of land to the various norm zones with 
an eye toward a proper distribution of functions to create an overall 
attractive city. Thus, Ellickson suggests that Green Zones would con­
stitute approximately 5% of the city's public space, while Yellow 
Zones would constitute 90%,  and Red Zones the remaining 5%.193 
Yet, at the same time, Ellickson defends his newly constructed 
public space zones by invoking "prevailing standards of community 
behavior," as if such prevailing standards exist prior to the construc­
tion of the Red, Yellow, and Green Zones - prior to the imposition 
of nonconforming uses. Thus, he argues that a zoning regime that 
permits adoption of neighborhood-specific street norms allows the 
various neighborhoods within the city to decide what kind of street life 
they wish to have.194 Mirroring claims made by proponents of the 
193. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 1221-22. 
194. See id. at 1220. 
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Gang Congregation Ordinance, Ellickson argues that communities 
should be permitted to experiment with norms that may be important 
to preserving a way of life or a particular community character. In 
other words, zoning public space "adds to the richness and diversity of 
urban life"195 by increasing the variety of options available to the city 
dweller, who can pick and choose among those options by voting with 
his or her feet. Under Ellickson's proposal, panhandling, bench squat­
ting, and other forms of "chronic street nuisance" are activities one 
can choose. If I want to panhandle or bench squat, I can choose the 
particular zone where that activity is permitted by "voting" with my 
feet. In the same way, I can also choose whether I want to associate 
with people who engage in these activities. 
Of course, this is the same kind of "choice" that the Warth Court 
asserted was being exercised by the Rochester residents - indeed, no 
real choice at all. And yet, as in Warth, the community looks like a 
product of choice because it is spatially defined. First, the norms serve 
as entrance controls that encourage desirable uses and outlaw unde­
sirable ones, thereby defining the perimeters of the relevant commu­
nity. The particular behaviors and persons targeted by quality of life 
or exclusionary zoning ordinances will not disappear; they will just go 
somewhere else, to increasingly marginalized, coerced, and isolated 
spaces. In the case of public order norms, panhandling and other 
"chronic street nuisances" are almost universally considered undesir­
able uses except by panhandlers or bench squatters themselves. The 
result, of course, is that all the undesirable uses are displaced into the 
Bowery. These undesirable uses are excluded from a community that 
now exists by function of that act of exclusion. 
Second, the formal boundaries of regimented zoned space - the 
Green, Yellow, and Red Zones - disappear from the picture, be­
coming invisible as the norms take hold in the space, enforced through 
informal means of monitoring, and, most important, because violators 
of the norms are weeded out. "Space does the initial work of defining 
the community or association and imbues the latter with an air of ob­
jectivity, and indeed, of primordiality."196 
Displacement is thus the central birth act of community. How does 
a community "internalize" the initial and ongoing displacement of in­
dividuals to other communities? How does one recognize the differ­
ence between facially exclusionary policies and polices intended to en­
able a particular neighborhood to flourish when these policies are 
invoked by everyone?197 Rather than asking how much mobility par-
195. Id. 
196. Ford, supra note 165, at 1860. 
197. Consider again the arguments for devolving constitutional norms to the neighbor­
hood level. Advocates recognize that not all neighborhood norms are valid; an anti­
exclusionary limiting principle or "hypernorm" is required. See Poindexter, supra note 53, at 
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ticular individuals need in order to create truly consenting neighbor­
hoods across all our cities and suburbs, we might ask how much exclu­
sion we will countenance in order to have truly consenting neighbor­
hoods anywhere. The real question is not whether the inner-city 
neighborhoods of Chicago are voluntary associations, but whether any 
of our neighborhoods are really voluntary associations. 
It bears repeating - returning again to Warth - that Penfield 
does not exist unless it can exclude the residents of Rochester. Indeed, 
Penfield's ability to exclude the residents of Rochester is its defining 
feature. Our intuition that Penfield should be entitled to govern itself 
is less plausible when this displacement role of entrance controls is 
made explicit - when we realize that entrance controls in Green 
Zones also coerce others (by default or purposefully) into particular 
Red Zones. When combined with the residence-based franchise, 
which restricts formal political governance to individuals who reside in 
the jurisdiction, these boundary-creating norms are constitutive of 
neighborhoods that assert self-government in their defense, defended 
as associations of like minds, allegedly made up of individuals "freely 
choosing" where - or, if not where, how - to live.198 
636-38. Professor Livingston, for example, notes that that courts should invalidate public or­
der laws if they are "facially aimed at rendering some people, like racial minorities, tran­
sients, and the poor, outsiders to the community." Livingston, supra note 8, at 594. Echoing 
Livingston's call for a limiting principle, Professors Meares and Kahan claim that a public 
order law is not likely to constitute an attempt at excluding certain groups from public life 
(and the political process) if the community as a whole has "internalized" the "coercive inci­
dence of a particular policy." Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 
9, at 209; see also Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, at 251, 254-55. By 
shouldering the burdens of the policy, crime-ridden minority neighborhoods could be said to 
have sufficiently taken responsibility for their acts of self-government. 
Livingston, like Kahan and Meares, acknowledges that application of her version of the 
anti-exclusion principle is context-specific - that it depends in part on how the average citi­
zen is affected by the law and whether that citizen's support of the law is entitled to moral 
respect. See Livingston, supra note 8, at 667-71 ;  Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, 
supra note 9, at 258-59. Even taking context into consideration, however, it is not at all clear 
what a public order law "facially aimed at rendering some people . . .  outsiders to the com­
munity" looks like. An ordinance banning gang members from collecting on the street looks 
like a facial ban on gang members participating in community life. Nor is it clear what the 
community has to do to internalize a particular coercive policy. Simply being subject to the 
same standard as a gang member - or, in the case of a zoning regulation, all the other resi­
dents of a town - does not mean the members of the community have internalized the coer­
cive impact of the law. The Gang Congregation Ordinance is particularly asymmetrical in 
that it does not even require non-gang members to meet the same standards of conduct: 
there are no constraints on non-gang member loitering. Presumably, the anti-exclusion limi­
tation prevents the community from passing laws explicitly motivated by racial discrimina­
tion, or by the desire to rid the community of particular types of persons (panhandlers or 
gang members), though, in truth, the limitation cannot prevent localities from using proxies 
for that purpose. 
198. This rhetoric of choice is deeply resonant despite its conceptual flaws because it 
clothes itself in the vocabulary of individual freedom and community identification. Thus, 
for example, the Nixon administration's opposition to busing (a position that helped Nixon 
win a second term and that was vindicated by the Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974)) was premised on a voluntarist argument that emphasized individual mobility and the 
benefits of pluralism. Nixon argued: 
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But minority residents of high crime neighborhoods do not benefit 
from a localism based in the language of consent. As an initial matter, 
the power to zone enables the neighborhood to displace further an 
unwanted group (gang members) to a neighboring community, a 
probably limited and short-lived success.199 More important, by rein­
forcing the notion of community as a voluntary association, the con­
tractarian account justifies the policies that led to the creation of ra­
cially identified Red Zones in the first place. The result is to reinforce 
the isolation of inner-city, minority neighborhoods in their particular 
geography - a geography of diluted rights and racially identified 
space200 - and to mask the reality that those spaces are the product of 
an existing regime of community self-definition. The outcome is some­
thing that we may already recognize: a metropolitan region of spatially 
differentiated individuals, segregated into racial and socioeconomic 
enclaves that are justified as th,e product of individual choice and 
community self-determination. Indeed, proponents of localism struc­
ture their arguments as a quest for community autonomy in the pur­
suit of individual conceptions of the good life. According to this argu­
ment, such autonomy, though often stymied by federal judges, may be 
required by liberalism. By implying that inner-city neighborhoods are 
associations of like minds, the language of community transforms a 
less-than-ideal housing option into a conscious commitment to a 
neighborhood and an unconstitutional standard into a choice of a 
"way of life." 
"We cannot be free and at the same time be required to fit our lives into prescribed places 
on a racial grid - whether . . .  by some mathematical formula or by automatic assign­
ment. . . .  An open society does not have to be homogeneous, or even fully integrated. There 
is room within it for communities . . . .  [I]t is natural and right that members of those commu­
nities feel a sense of group identity and group pride. In terms of an open society, what mat­
ters is mobility: the right and the ability of each person to decide for himself where and how 
he wants to live, whether as part of the ethnic enclave or as part of the larger society - or, as 
many do, share the life of both." 
THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 334-35 (1975) 
(quoting a 1970 Nixon state paper). · 
199. Often the result of targeted policing efforts is to displace crime from one neighbor­
hood to another. See Geoffrey Barnes, Defining and Optimizing Displacement, in CRIME 
AND PLACE 95 (David Weisburd ed., 1995). Robert Helsley and William Strange have con­
structed an economic model that supports their argument that gated communities always 
divert crime to other communities, and may actually increase overall crime rates under cer­
tain circumstances. Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Gated Communities and the 
Economic Geography of Crime, 46 J. URBAN ECON. 80 (1999). 
200. These neighborhoods would be true "anomalous zones," Gerald Neuman's term 
for "a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying fun­
damental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended." Gerald L. Neuman, 
Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1 197, 1201 (1996). Neuman offers an additional argu­
ment against permitting local deviations from background constitutional norms. He argues 
that such deviations threaten a "broader subversion of fundamental norms" because they 
can easily jump barriers, or leak into the broader legal and political culture and increase the 
acceptability of more significant exceptions to those norms. Id. Neuman thus highlights a 
different kind of spillover effect that cannot be easily internalized by neighborhoods that 
depart downward from existing constitutional standards. 
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2. The Critique of the Deep Account: The Cartography of Normative 
Entitlement and Smith v. Community Board No. 14 
a. Essentializing the Neighborhood 
The voluntarist premise of the contractarian account can never be 
fully realized; the spillover effect of exclusion cannot be internalized 
without undermining localism altogether. Yet, it may be that we are 
willing to tolerate the spillover effects of local decisions if those deci­
sions are made on behalf of communities that we value highly or that 
are highly valued by their members because they are intrinsic to indi­
vidual identity. The deep account of community is not based in volun­
tary association and therefore does not fail because some affected in­
dividuals cannot consent or because they fall outside the ambit of 
consent. Instead, community is defined by a web of reciprocal and re­
inforcing social, familial, and cultural ties. Communities are constitu­
tive of the individual; in the case of the Gang Congregation Ordi­
nance, proponents argue that the poor, minority neighborhoods of 
Chicago's inner city are bound by "linked fate," the ties of sociability 
that make their lawmaking particularly w�rthy of deference by those 
who do not share those ties.201 This lawmaking is more than a mere 
choice to live a certain lifestyle; it is essential to the identity and sur­
vival of a unique community. 
The descriptive difficulty with the deep account is determining the 
contours of such a community. The debates surrounding the extent of 
the inner city's political support of the antigang ordinance illustrate 
the difficulty of determining the relevant membership of a community 
of linked fate formed out of a neighborhood.202 Amici in favor of the 
ordinance were described as twenty "civic, religious, and other com­
munity associations from throughout Chicago . . .  [who] played a criti­
cal role in the design of the gang-loitering ordinance. "203 These amici, 
asserted their brief, are the "mothers and fathers, the sisters and 
brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject to the 
law."204 Amici opposing the ordinance were self-described as "grass­
roots membership groups, and other Chicago and national organiza-
201. See text accompanying notes 75-96, supra. 
202. On one side were those who argued that Chicago's African-American community 
and its representatives widely supported the ordinance. On the other side were those who 
argued that the ordinance was railroaded through the Chicago City Council despite African­
American opposition. Compare Meares & Kahan, Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra 
note 9, and Meares & Kahan, Black, White and Gray, supra note 9, with Alschuler & 
Shulhofer, supra note 9, and Roberts, supra note 28. 
203. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 1 .  
204. Id. at  2. 
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tions dedicated to serving the needs of inner-city residents."205 These 
amid, asserted their brief, consist of the "representatives from [all of] 
Chicago's major neighborhood-safety organizations"206 except one. 
The perception of these two groups of the same ordinance could 
not have been more different. Amici in favor argued that the ordi­
nance protected their community as a "form of policing that secures 
order without destroying the lives of community youth who find them­
selves enmeshed in the complex social and economic forces that fuel 
gang criminality."207 Amici on the other side disputed this characteri­
zation. Asserting that twelve of the eighteen African-American al­
derman on the city counsel opposed the ordinance, these amid argued 
that the ordinance would be "divisive of communities along racial and 
generational lines."208 The opponents of the ordinance quoted one 
African-American alderman opposed to the ordinance who alleged 
that the law was " 'drafted to protect the downtown area and the white 
community' at the expense of innocent blacks."209 Moreover, both sets 
of amid disagreed about who they were representing. At times, they 
seemed to be speaking on behalf of the neighborhoods or the city. Still 
at other times, the amid invoked the entire African-American com­
munity as the relevant "we" entitled to a say in the ordinance's opera­
tion. 
The fact of disagreement among the residents of Chicago's inner­
city African-American communities is not surprising. The "black 
community's" ambivalence toward black criminal behavior and the 
dominant ("white") justice system has been well documented. As 
Regina Austin writes: 
[T]here is typically no unanimity within 'the community' on these issues. 
For example, some blacks contend that in general the criminal justice 
system is working too well (putting too many folks in prison) , while oth­
ers maintain that it is not working well enough (leaving too many dan­
gerous folks out on the street).210 
This ambivalence is reflected in recent polls showing that many 
African Americans are highly skeptical of police and concerned about 
police brutality yet would welcome more effective police action to 
combat crime in their neighborhoods. "It is like straddling a fence," 
205. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety et al., 
at 1,  Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Opposition] . 
206. Id. at 1 n.4. 
207. Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 2. 
208. Amicus Brief in Opposition, supra note 205, at 1 .  
209. Id. at  4-5. 
210. Regina Austin, The "Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and the Politics of Iden­
tification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992) (citation omitted). Randall Kennedy is one 
respected scholar who believes that the police are not doing enough to protect black com­
munities. See KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 29-76. 
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said one Bronx resident in a recent interview. "I am worried about the 
police on one side and the criminals on the other. "21 1  
This is not to say that disagreement among members alone is suffi­
cient to undermine a "deep" community's claim to be permitted to 
self-govern. Recall that on the deep account, the neighborhood is enti­
tled to deference for internal decisions however they are made. The 
proper inquiry is the nature of the community and the moral authority 
of its membership, not the process by which the community comes to a 
decision. A neighborhood of family and friends, linked by bonds of 
mutual affection or shared experience, is something more than a po­
litical community defined by jurisdictional lines. A community of 
linked fate deserves deference not because individual members are 
politically entitled to a say in a particular jurisdiction, but because they 
are (collectively) normatively entitled to make decisions for each 
other. Such a neighborhood does not engage in lawmaking exclusively 
(or at all) through the standard majoritarian political processes, but 
also, in part or in whole, through the transmission of communal, non­
positivistic, and often nondemocratic norms.212 For amici, the neigh­
borhood is an extension of the family, and the gang loitering ordi­
nance is a form of tough love dispensed by parents and neighbors; it is 
therefore on the private side of the private/public line.213 
Mapping the normative concept of "community" onto the descrip­
tive and territorial concept of neighborhood, however, exposes one to 
the perils of essentialism that come with any invocation of the "black 
community," the "inner-city community," the "minority, high-crime 
community," or, for that matter, the "white, suburban community."214 
211 .  Blaine Harden, On Edge but Optimistic, Blacks Offer Complex Views in Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2000, at Bl (reporting that 89.3% of New York City blacks polled reported 
that police brutality is a serious problem and that 45% rate the police as excellent or good in 
being helpful and friendly). Richard Brooks has analyzed survey data concerning minority 
perceptions of policing and criminal justice. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in 
the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1219 (2000). He found that the majority of African Americans believe that the 
American legal system treats blacks unfairly, but that, compared to their wealthier counter­
parts, poor blacks are more likely to view the American legal system as fair. See id. at 1223-
24. He concludes, however, that the data "do not suggest that poor urban blacks are pre­
pared to waive constitutional rights in order to reduce crime." Id. at 1227 
212. For example, civility and respect may be enforced through shaming penalties, not 
through formal sanctions. See Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Pri­
vate Norm Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860-71 (1999). 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. In other words, mere disagreement 
among "family" is not enough to justify state intervention. 
214. Of course, like residents of any neighborhood, residents of minority, high-crime 
neighborhoods may share a particular set of overlapping interests and concerns. In our met­
ropolitan regions, race, residence, and crime tend to overlap. These interests, as well as con­
venience of administrability, may justify identifying residents of these neighborhoods as an 
appropriate unit of political decisionmaking in a hierarchy of units. Indeed, this might justify 
obscuring the fact that residents of minority, high-crime neighborhoods (or any neighbor­
hood) are individuals with overlapping but oftentimes competing interests. Though linking 
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As with all essentializing terms, "community" is both over- and un­
derinclusive. This is certainly so where - in place of a person-by­
person assessment of the decisionmaker's normative authority - one 
uses proxies for membership in the community. In the case of the 
Gang Congregation Ordinance, this proxy is residence and, by exten­
sion, race and socioeconomic status. 
Membership in the community is, in turn, a proxy for individual 
moral worth. The assertion that certain neighborhoods have a norma­
tive entitlement to govern requires a determination of the relevant 
membership of the community, which in turn requires an assessment 
of individual claims of belonging. Those claims of belonging involve 
determining who does not belong. This is the notion that some who 
may live among us do not count, and that those who do not live among 
us are not part of "our" community. 
Recall that linked fate turns on a normative judgment concerning 
whether an individual is sufficiently connected to the community so as 
to be able to speak on its behalf. The implication is that the white 
business owner who is losing business because minority youth are con­
gregating outside her store and intimidating shoppers does not have a 
respectable normative claim for redress. Even though she may live 
with the consequences of gang activity everyday, she cannot properly 
balance liberty and order because she does not (it is assumed) happen 
to be a neighbor or a friend of any gang members. She is therefore not 
entitled to speak on their behalf. The African-American resident of 
the wealthy suburb who wants to defend his neighborhood from rov­
ing gangs also cannot properly balance liberty and order because he 
does not share in the connection that comes with living in a poor, 
inner-city neighborhood and is not a neighbor of those for whom he 
government and race/residence may erase important differences in individual opinion, it may 
still be in each individual's interest to be defined for political purposes with reference to a 
larger community. This is a reason for creating minority-majority electoral districts. It is also 
the argument that animates movements by predominantly African-American neighborhoods 
to incorporate as separate, self-reliant municipalities. See Ankur J. Goel et al., Black Neigh­
borhoods Becoming Black Cities: Group Empowerment, Local Control and the Implications 
of Being Darker Than Brown, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 417-18 (1998) (arguing that 
African Americans should pursue incorporation of predominantly African-American neigh­
borhoods as a means of empowering minority neighborhoods); Russel M. Lazega & Charles 
R. Fletcher, The Politics of Municipal Incorporation in South Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 215, 227-29 (1997) (discussing strategy of incorporation used by the predomi­
nantly African-American community of Destiny in Dade County in response to dissatisfac­
tion with inequitable municipal service provision). 
The deep account of community, however, turns on a stronger argument than represen­
tation. The argument is not that it is a good idea for residents of high-crime, minority neigh­
borhoods (or any neighborhood) to be defined as a political entity because residents share 
similar interests, understandings, or competencies, and those interests are not addressed by 
the larger community because of a lack of interest or a lack of political clout. Instead, the 
argument is that residents of high-crime, minority neighborhoods (or any neighborhood) 
have a right to self-govern if (normatively) they constitute communities, a group of individu­
als with overlapping moral authority to speak for each other. 
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arguably speaks. And the resident of a predominantly white, lower­
class neighborhood who wants to stop loitering drug dealers (of what­
ever race) in her neighborhood has no right to adopt constitutionally 
suspect norms in her community, because she does not have the requi­
site standing. She, too, does not share a particular proxy that makes 
her "part of the community," linked by the social ties that would make 
her lawmaking worthy of deference. 
How do we recognize the difference between neighborhoods that 
are deeply constitutive of their residents and thus entitled to deference 
for norms that contribute to their survival and neighborhoods that 
simply provide amenities for a particular lifestyle and whose norms 
are masks for convenience or exclusion? How do we distinguish be­
tween exclusionary zoning employed to defend a suburban community 
and the gang loitering ordinance employed to defend an inner-city 
community? 
It is not that arguments cannot be made to distinguish these kinds 
of norms; indeed, it would be difficult to contend that the values un­
derlying fiscal zoning in the suburbs are no different than the values 
underlying gang zoning in the inner city. The problem is determining 
in advance which communities are "deserving"215 of deference and 
which are not, and why. The deep account of community requires 
making sociological determinations about the depth of communal at­
tachments to a particular territorially defined space.216 These accounts 
tend to devolve into competing and unverifiable claims about the 
benefits to residents of living in particular neighborhoods among par­
ticular neighbors.211 Indeed, there is little to constrain localism - if it 
215. MANDELBAUM (2000), supra note 75, 18-19. 
216. Indeed, the deep account of community counsels against limiting the normative 
entitlement to balance liberty and order to those within a territorially-defined neighborhood 
or region, unless that community has isolated itself to such a degree and with such concen­
tration that its territorial definition and social definition are coterminous, as may be the case 
with the Amish of Yoder or the Satmars of Kiryas Joel. Regina Austin argues persuasively 
that the "black community" as a whole should engage in the ongoing conversation about 
black lawlessness, and that the community as a whole has a stake in a politics of identifica­
tion that rejects a strict lawless/law-abiding dichotomy when it comes to the black law­
breaker. See Austin, supra note 210, at 1815-17. The concept of linked fate, at least as de­
scribed by Tracey Meares, also indicates that African Americans outside of Chicago's inner­
city communities should have a say in the norms that that community adopts because they 
also share a linked fate with those residents. See Meares, supra note 82, at 682-83. 
217. For example, the question of whether homeowners associations should enjoy ample 
autonomy to govern often seems to turn on whether we believe that such associations are 
"thick" communal enterprises, that is, whether they represent a valuable form of "deep" as­
sociation to those on the inside or just a particular amenity package. See Gillette, supra note 
13, at 1379-81 (observing that often liberals and communitarians are less tolerant of home­
owners associations, which tend to provide particular amenities, than they are of "highly dis­
tinct subcultures" like the Amish or Orthodox Jews, when the assertions of self-government 
by both can be understood as crucial to their respective pursuits of a particular version of the 
good life). 
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is to have any force at all - if the test of the legitimacy of a norm is 
its contribution to a unique community's preservation. 
b. Reinforcing the Cartography of Normative Entitlement 
The kinds of distinctions drawn between entitled and nonentitled 
persons are a result of conflating the normative concept of community 
with the descriptive concept of neighborhood. The melding of the 
normative and descriptive has far-reaching implications. First, such a 
conception serves to reinforce the walls of separation between neigh­
borhoods. When membership in the deep community is determined 
primarily by residence, where one lives takes on a transformative sig­
nificance. Simply by moving into a neighborhood (or choosing to re­
main there) a resident becomes a person entitled to balance order and 
liberty and becomes subject to norms that other equally entitled per­
sons may invoke on behalf of the community. The stakes if the neigh­
borhood (conceived of as a deep community) becomes too permeable 
are always very high. At risk (from the members' perspective) are the 
very connections between its members essential to the survival of its 
way of life. 
When the stakes are that high, the walls between neighborhoods 
must be even higher. Consider the vehemence of suburban defenses of 
exclusionary zoning regimes.218 The tenacity of such regimes cannot 
merely be attributed to the fact that suburban residents are defending 
a preference. The contractarian account of community would predict 
that some residents would sell out if the price was right and find other 
a.cceptable forms of association, and that others who were indifferent 
would stay instead of fleeing in the face of lower-income arrivals. A 
better explanation is that the walls that suburbs build constitute a de­
fense of a perceived holistic order - a perception of itself as a deep 
community - that is itself premised on spatial differentiation.219 
This brings us to the second consequence of conceiving of neigh­
borhoods as deep communities and justifying deference to local norms 
on that basis: attaching normative weight to where one resides rein­
forces a social order that already marks the inner-city neighborhood as 
normatively suspect. The moral mapping of the metropolitan region 
reinforces rather than subverts a social order that is spatially main­
tained. This is a social order that places a high cultural value on single-
218. The narrative account of the Mount Laurel litigation aptly recounts the intensity of 
an entire state's opposition to low-income housing. See, KIRP ET AL., supra note 144, at 1-10. 
This vehemence extended not just to lower-income arrivals, but to residents who had lived in 
Mount Laurel all their lives. As Bill Haines, the former mayor of Mount Laurel, once told a 
church full of poor, African-American residents of the town, "If you people . . .  can't afford to 
live in our town, then you'll just have to leave." Id. at 2. 
219. See infra text accompanying notes 223-229. 
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family-detached homeownership, on suburban as opposed to urban 
life.220 As the Court's defense of suburban zoning reveals,221 these 
spaces have moral valences even before they are inhabited. The sub­
urb signals stability, family, privacy, children, and community; the city 
signals transience, work, publicity, danger, strangeness, and foreign­
ness.222 The city/suburb dichotomy is a function of a localism invested 
in rigorous boundary maintenance between the safe and the danger­
ous, the familiar and the foreign, the family and the outside world.223 
Thus, the metropolitan region already represents a cartography of 
normative entitlement that divides suburbs and cities, white space 
from black space, rich space from poor space. Ellickson's Red-Yellow­
Green Zones make explicit what sociologists and anthropologists have 
long understood: that social order is maintained spatially. The zones of 
the metropolitan region are crucially important cultural signs used to 
evaluate one's wealth, progress, intelligence, morals, children and 
educational attainments. We talk about "good," "bad," and "transi­
tional" neighborhoods and understand exactly what that neighbor­
hood says about the person who lives there. As Constance Perin writes 
in her anthropological account of American land use law, Everything 
in its Place: Social Order and Land Use in America, land use regimes 
reflect and reinforce cultural conceptions of "transition, citizenship, 
honor, marginality, success, and self-esteem."224 
The technicalities of defining zoning districts in terms of their permitted 
and forbidden buildings and activities, classifying parts of cities and sub-
220. See PERIN, supra note 141. 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 135-147. 
222. These moral valences have been amply mined by sociologists and other theorists. 
See, e.g. , FISHMAN, supra note 145, at 3-17 (arguing that suburban residents' conception of 
themselves rests in large part on their perception of cities as violent, anarchic, and corrupt 
and of the suburbs as a haven from the city's corruption); JOHN R. STILGOE, BORDERLAND: 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB, 1820-1939 (1988) (discussing the cultural distinction 
between the "sinful" urban life and the "virtuous" rural life that underlies the development 
of the suburbs); ROBERT C. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICS (1958) 
(arguing that the suburbs were constructed on an ideal of small town life and on a rejection 
of "turmoil" and the corrupt politics of the city, and noting that privacy and fraternity are 
two of suburbia's animating values); see a/so M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF 
A SUBURB 30-36 (1988) (noting that social conflict in the suburbs is muted, externalized and 
medicalized); HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND POLITICS IN A 
NEW SUBURBAN COMMUNITY 33, 39 (1967) (observing that the foremost concern of buyers 
of Levittown was "more space," "comfort and roominess," and "privacy and in owned 
home"); JOHN R. SEELEY ET AL., CRESTWOOD HEIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE CULTURE OF 
SUBURBAN LIFE (1956) (observing that suburban communities are built around schools and 
children). 
223. See PERIN, supra note 141, at 108-28. Whether these typologies reflect the reality of 
suburban life, which is increasingly beset by the ills of overcrowding, congestion, sprawl, 
drugs, and crime, home ownership in a suburban setting remains the dominant cultural ex­
pression of American mobility. The distinction between city and suburb remains a primary 
cultural artifact despite the fudging of those borders in real space. 
224. PERIN, supra note 141, at ix. 
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urbs by housing types and levels of population density, arranging the lay­
outs of subdivisions: these also express our taken-for-granted under­
standings of what f,•)cial order is and how it is best obtained. Whatever 
governs relationships among land uses I take to be as well organizing 
principles for relationships among land users.225 
Perin observes how our placement in social space reflects our at­
tainments in social time and how those social categories result in 
marking us normatively by where we happen to live. One of Perin's 
central insights is that the "correct chronology of life is one major or­
ganizing principle in the system of land use."226 A deeply ingrained cul­
tural assumption is that as individuals move into adulthood they will 
progress towards maturity, stability, and financial security. A leading 
indicator of this progress is the move from renting to homeownership, 
a singularly important event in American cultural consciousness. For 
many Americans, being a renter is a transitional state, a step on the 
way to adulthood and homeownership. The transitional figure is a 
threat to social order: "What matters is that transitional social catego­
ries are defined, and then they are subject to a subsidiary axiom: that 
all transitional categories should be collected together, for spreading 
such anomalies in space (and in social time) will be disturbing to social 
safety. "227 
Land use regimes thus demarcate the boundaries between the 
transitional and the stable both in time and in space. Many suburbs' 
resistance to mixed use developments, to apartments, and to low­
income housing can be explained in part by the central role of spatial 
differentiation in cultural conceptions of the self. Not only are the 
people who will live in such developments often of a different race228 
than "we" are (which creates fear and anxiety in and of itself), they 
are - if permitted to move into the neighborhood - now members of 
the community ("one of us") - requiring a radical redefinition of who 
"we" are, as progressing or transitioning, as marginal or successful 
persons along the "ladder of life."229 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 109. 
227. Id. at 114. 
228. The lack of multifamily housing impacts African Americans disproportionately be­
cause blacks are more likely to be renters than whites. The 1999 American Housing Survey 
for the United States shows that approximately 26% of white (non-Hispanic) households are 
renters, compared to nearly 54% of blacks. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF 
Haus. AND URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES (1999), 
at 42. 
229. Perin, supra note 141 at 32-80. 
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c. The Problem of Insularity 
This is the danger of an account of local autonomy that turns on 
claims of normative entitlement based on "belonging." In such a 
world, where the cost to the community of not being able to protect 
itself by adopting norms for its defense is so high (as proponents of the 
Gang Congregation Ordinance assert), battles over demarcated space 
are battles over social meaning. Thresholds become crucially impor­
tant markers of normative entitlement. Jurisdictional lines are more 
than neutral mechanisms for distributing local preferences; they be­
come normatively electrified fences between "us" and "them" that are 
often impossible to cross.230 The vocabulary of threshold is meant to 
invoke the idea of an entrance control with normative power, a mark 
that defines insiders and outsiders, and to conjure up the threats, risks, 
and rewards of crossing. 
Take for example, Smith v. Community Board No. 14.231 In Smith, 
neighborhood residents challenged local officials' granting of a permit 
to Orthodox Jews to construct an eruv in the neighborhood.232 An eruv 
is a defined space, the boundaries of which are demarcated by existing 
man-made or natural barriers (such as fences or hedgerows) or by 
stringing a barely visible wire normally across existing telephone or 
other poles to create an enclosed area, sometimes a few blocks wide, 
other times town-wide.233 Under Jewish law, the eruv serves as a sym­
bolic and physical extension of the "private domain" and thus enables 
religiously observant Jews to do acts that would normally be only 
permitted inside such a domain, like carrying or pushing, without vio­
lating the proscription against doing work on the Sabbath.234 By cre­
ating "the fiction of a communal 'private' domain,"235 the eruv draws a 
new public/private line that has religious legal significance: carrying is 
forbidden in the public domain, but is not forbidden in the private 
230. Belonging is expressed in spatial terms. Consider what happens when one enters 
(usually accidentally) the "wrong" neighborhood, moving across an invisible threshold from 
a place where one belongs to a place where one emphatically does not belong. See David M. 
Engel, Law in the Domains of Everyday Life: The Construction of Community and Differ­
ence, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 123 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993). Not 
knowing where those spatial boundaries are can be life threatening. At the extreme are lit­
eral fences manned by guns and guards. See Renato Rosaldo, Foreword, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1037, 1037-39 (1996) (discussing, in Foreword to symposium entitled Surveying Law and 
Borders, the U.S.-Mexico border and the social construction of the identities of those on ei­
ther side). 
231 .  491 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985); see also ACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F.Supp. 1293 
(1987). 
232. See Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85. 
233. See id. ; see also Eyal Weisman & Manuel Herz, Between City and Desert, AA Files 
#34 (Autumn 1997) (on file with author) (defining and describing eruvs). 
234. See Smith, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85. 
235. Id. 
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domain. The eruv primarily makes it possible to carry books or push 
baby carriages between home and synagogue or between homes, and 
thereby enables observant Jews more easily to visit one another and 
attend synagogue on Friday nights and Saturdays.236 
In Smith, non-Orthodox residents challenged the construction of 
the eruv on First Amendment grounds, charging that, even though the 
eruv was almost invisible (consisting as it did of existing fences and 
virtually invisible alterations to existing structures), it had a "meta­
physical impact on the area" that violated the claimants' First 
Amendment rights.237 The court rejected this claim, holding that the 
eruv was not a violation of the First Amendment.238 
Consider the competing claims to community made in Smith by the 
two sets of residents living in the same town. It is easy to question the 
depth of the non-Orthodox residents' "metaphysical" objections to the 
eruv, especially in light of the fact that the town was not asked to 
spend any money for its construction. The Jewish community paid for 
the eruv, mostly by repairing existing structures. The claim of commu­
nity on behalf of the Orthodox seems particularly strong here; relig­
iously based groups are presumed to have a certain linked fate. In con­
trast, the claim of community on behalf of the non-Orthodox residents 
looks fairly shallow. The eruv did nothing to alter how non-Orthodox 
residents used the public spaces in the town, nor did it demonstrably 
alter how observant Jews used the public spaces. (The eruv did not 
create an explicitly religious space, just a space in which to do nor­
mally mundane activities like walking and carrying bags, activities that 
all residents of the town undertook every day of the week.) The oppo­
sition to the eruv can easily be seen as an excuse for exclusion, the as­
serted metaphysical injury as a way for non-Orthodox residents to ex­
press a fear that the town was becoming "too Jewish" or would, 
because of the eruv, "attract more Jews" to the area.239 
But as Glen Robinson points out, the residents' complaint can also 
be couched in more sympathetic, less exclusionary, and more deeply 
constitutive terms: "The undeniable effect of creating the eruv was not 
simply to make it more convenient for Orthodox Jews to observe the 
Sabbath; it was also to give the neighborhood an identity as a Jewish 
community."240 The demarcation - even figuratively - of the neigh-
236. See id. 
237. Id. at 585. 
238. See id. at 585-88. 
239. The fear of a neighborhood becoming "too Jewish" is the subject of an article by 
Samuel G. Freedman aptly entitled The Jewish Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 13, 
2000, at 42-47. Opponents often worry that an eruv will attract additional Orthodox resi­
dents who will change the nature of the community in other ways. For example, in neighbor­
hoods dominated by Orthodox Jews, stores are often closed on Friday evenings and 
Saturdays during the Jewish Sabbath. 
240. Robinson, supra note 13, at 298. 
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borhood's public spaces as Jewish communal space could lead non­
Orthodox residents (taking their metaphysical claim at face value) to 
"the perception that they could no longer enjoy a collective identifica­
tion with the neighborhood because it has been 'taken over' by an ex­
clusive group, a 'community' to which they cannot belong."241 Whether 
or not this is a cognizable injury in First Amendment terms (the court 
found it was not), we should not underestimate the social meaning of 
the eruv's marked boundaries. The eruv is a literal boundary regime 
that requires (on the deep account) the redefinition of the commu­
nity's insiders and outsiders, a redefinition of who the residents of the 
town "are."242 The space within the eruv takes on social meaning: it 
becomes religiously identified, normatively "restricted" space.243 
Smith highlights the conflicting impulses of belonging and exclu­
sion inherent in community and the difficulty of sorting out competing 
claims of deep community. In an America in which residence is so 
powerful a cultural signal, controlling one's border is a central mecha­
nism for controlling one's identity and the identity of others. Indeed, 
Smith is a literal example of how the meaning of community happens 
at borders between communities, not solely (or even primarily) inside 
them. The eruv literally attaches normative weight to jurisdictional 
lines; it represents the rare situation in which the normative commu­
nity is coextensive with the descriptive neighborhood (as defined by 
the limits of the eruv). The boundaries of the normative community 
are physical. Thus, an act of pushing or carrying something outside the 
eruv's demarcated lines (by a member of the Orthodox community) in 
241. Id. at 298-99. 
242. One opponent to the building of an eruv in a North London neighborhood report­
edly argued that "(a] ghetto atmosphere would be imposed where integration of different 
cultures would no longer occur." Another claimed that "(t]he proposal would implant on all 
people in the area pronouncements going back some three to four thousand years." A third 
argued that "[a] varied harmonious community would break down into selfish, embittered, 
fragmented portions with strong suspicion, bitterness and hatred." Weisman & Herz, supra 
note 233. For additional discussion of the North London eruv and an argument about how its 
construction threatened the underlying territorial monopoly of the nation-state, see Davina 
Cooper, Out of Place: Symbolic Domains, Religious Rights, and the Cultural Contract, in THE 
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 14, at 42-51 .  
The turf battles that erupt over eruvs are similar to those that erupt over other signs that 
a particular religious group is "taking over." In the case of eruvs and other religious institu­
tions, these battles sometimes pitch secular Jews against Orthodox Jews. See, e.g. , SAMUEL 
G. FREEDMAN, JEW VS. JEW: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN JEWRY (2000) 
(describing the opposition to construction of an elaborate Orthodox religious campus in a 
Cleveland suburb whose residents were eight-three percent Jewish, and relating how all six 
members of the town's Planning and Zoning Commission - all of whom were Jewish -
voted against the project). 
243. Indeed, that is the eruv's primary purpose. For Orthodox Jews the eruv is a "port­
able, dynamic, private space." Weisman & Herz, supra note 233. "The city . . .  is transformed 
by the eruv on the Sabbath into a representation of the Temple and thus from the public into 
the private domain." Thus, "entering the eruv becomes a holy act." Id. "By redefining the 
space, the eruv redefines the behavior which is permissible within it, earning it the nickname 
of the 'magic schlepping circle.' " Id. 
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violation of the proscription against working on the . Sabbath has the 
effect of putting the transgressor "outside" the limits of the commu­
nity in two senses: the transgression that puts her figuratively outside 
the community (because she is a lawbreaker) also puts her literally be­
yond the zone of community protection. 
Smith illustrates how boundaries serve as easy means of defining 
insiders and outsiders and, by extension, law-abiders and lawbreakers. 
Zoning gang members is, on the deep account of community, a neces­
sary exiling or excommunication, because gang members are literally 
and figuratively not "who we (the inner-city neighborhoods of 
Chicago) are" because they have transgressed the rules of the com­
munity. This serves a definitional purpose, linking obedience to the 
norms of the community with membership in it. The Gang Congrega­
tion Ordinance, like the eruv, is a literal threshold; crossing the 
boundary is crossing into a different normative zone. 
Indeed, an implicit argument made by proponents of the Gang 
Congregation Ordinance was essentially an argument about who con­
trols the definition of the black lawbreaker.244 The argument asserts 
that the dominant (white) society has defined these (mostly) black 
young men as ultraviolent and unredeemable arch-criminals through a 
culture of fear reinforced by draconian criminal penalties imposed on 
primarily black lawbreakers. To the "black community," these "arch­
criminals" are nothing of the sort; they are instead the community's 
sons and brothers and neighbors. The benefit of the Gang Congrega­
tion Ordinance is that it gives the black lawbreaker an opportunity to 
be saved. An arrest and conviction for loitering does not result in long­
term incarceration for the young black offender, but may get him off 
the street before he is injured in a gang-related incident or before he 
commits a more serious offense that will result in extensive jail time.245 
The ordinance also gives the "black community" and the legal system 
a middle way to define gang members as deviant without accepting the 
portrait of the criminal black male imposed by society - a choice 
somewhere between arch-criminal and law-abiding citizen.246 This 
middle way provides an escape from the law-abiding/lawbreaking di­
chotomy that forces minority communities to choose either solidarity 
with their youth against an often oppressive legal regime or agreement 
244. See Austin, supra note 210, at 1774-75 (discussing different versions of the black 
Jawbreaker and how the "black community" identifies or ostracizes him or her). 
245. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 2 (arguing that the "mothers and fathers, the 
sisters and brothers, and the neighbors and friends of the youths subject to the Jaw . . .  sup­
port the Ordinance because it is a form of policing that secures order without destroying the 
lives of community youth who find themselves enmeshed in the complex social and eco­
nomic forces that fuel gang criminality"). 
246. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 16 ("Indeed, residents who supported the Or­
dinance did so precisely because they saw it as an acceptably moderate way to steer their 
children and their neighbors' children away from the gang life."). 
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with their youths' outright criminalization by that regime.247 This al­
lows the "black community" to indicate the limits of community pro­
tection, but to be able to choose something less than excommunication 
for every transgression, to allow for the possibility of the black law­
breaker's redemption.248 
Of course, many commentators and community members dispute 
this characterization of the Gang Congregation Ordinance as a "mid­
dle way," seeing it as more of the same white oppressiveness and as 
reinforcing the same old black criminal portraits.249 Perhaps a better 
understanding is that the ordinance (assuming it is supported by an 
identifiable "black community") serves both as a mechanism for com­
munity self-definition and as a further instrument of oppression. 
Consider how a localism premised on the deep account of commu­
nity derives its force from what Cover calls "a narrative of insular­
ity,"250 a story about how the community is uniquely situated in rela­
tion to the wider world. Linked fate is such a story. This assertion of 
difference also contains the obvious seeds of isolation; it both empow­
ers those on the inside and isolates them from those on the outside.251 
As Smith illustrates, difference can be a means of estrangement from 
one's neighbors. This is the separatist, anti-integrationist, parochialist 
edge of a localism premised on a deep account of community, a local­
ism that rests upon a concept of normatively restricted space. As 
Cover writes: "communities whose members believe themselves to 
have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their com­
mon lives [must] maintain their coherence . . .  by expulsion and ex­
ile. "252 The community of linked fate cannot simply regulate its mem-
247. Cf Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide, 
26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877, 886 (discussing the "difference/deviance divide," which puts 
black women into the position of distinguishing themselves by participating in "the broader 
societal put down of other black women"). 
248. See Amicus Brief, supra note 45, at 18 ("In sum, the residents of poor, minority 
communities favor 'middle ground' solutions to crime - ones that furnish a reasonable 
prospect of relief from crime without severely disrupting their communities."). The vocabu­
lary of redemption itself implies a deep community. Compare Austin, supra note 210, at 
1815-17 (advocating a politics of identification that increases the black lawbreakers chances 
for redemption), with Cover, supra note 15, at 34-35 (describing a "redemptive constitution­
alism" as connoting the "saving or freeing of persons"). 
249. See, e.g. , Roberts, supra note 28, at 779-81, 834-35. 
250. Cover, supra note 15, at 34-35. 
251. Cf Ford, supra note 14, at 909, 926 (arguing that "often the subordinate group un­
wittingly conspires in its own continued subordination and participates in its own quaran­
tine" and warning against the "compulsory provincialism" that accompanies an "empow­
ered" minority whose territorial autonomy is both "a haven and a prison for its residents"). 
252. Cover, supra note 15, at 15-16; see id. at 16 n.41 (citing the expulsion of Roger 
Williams and Anne Hutchinson from the Massachusetts Bay Colony as an example). "The 
other side of membership is, of course, exclusion and difference. A community that does not 
distinguish between members and strangers cannot construct or sustain a moral order and 
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bers' conduct; it must, at a certain point, turn its face away from mem­
bers who disobey. 
Thus, in considering the public housing apartment search policy 
invalidated by the district court in Pratt v. Chicago Housing Author­
ity,253 we can accept both that the court's allowance of such a policy 
would have affirmed the residents' power to define the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment and that it would further estrange those residents 
from the wider political community by demarcating public housing as 
someplace where "other" people live and where baseline constitu­
tional rules do not apply. Like Smith, Pratt entailed an attempt by 
residents to redefine public and private space. In Pratt, the public 
housing residents invited the police into their homes by adopting a 
regulation that allowed police to enter apartments without warrants 
and absent exigent circumstances.254 In essence, residents sought to de­
fine their normally private space as public for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. In Smith, the Orthodox Jewish residents did the opposite, 
literally demarcating a public space that would, for purposes of Jewish 
law, essentially be treated as an extension of the private, religious do­
main. Both manipulations of the private/public line created boundary 
regimes that defined the internal membership of the community, but 
also estranged that newly defined community from its neighbors. 
This brings us back to the moral mapping of the metropolitan re­
gion. The estrangement of the inner city is already demarcated in the 
social space of the inner city, in what outsiders perceive as the "no-go" 
(Red) zones of the metropolitan region. Deviance from constitut.ional 
norms reinforces the public housing residents' normative and social 
isolation in the context of a metropolitan region that deems them to 
be normatively suspect anyway. This suspicion is itself a product of 
envisioning residential neighborhoods as deeply constitutive of the self 
and of grounding the autonomy of the neighborhood in such a concep­
tion. The deep account of community used to justify the exercise of 
will on the part of inner-city residents reinforces the normative zones 
of entitlement that are already spatially, temporally, and culturally dic­
tated. In attempting to assert control over its own meanings by waiv­
ing constitutional rights, the inner-city neighborhood invariably reaf­
firms its place in the social order. 
loses its identity. Its borders are dissolved, its discipline ended." MANDELBAUM (2000), su­
pra note 75, at 10. 
253. 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
254. See id. 
444 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:371 
3. The Critique of the Dualist Account: 
Kessler v. Grand Central Management Association, Inc., 
and the Construction of the Public 
a. Problematizing Participation 
The deep account of community reinforces the moral mapping of 
the metropolitan region, with its corresponding suspicion and spatial 
isolation of inner-city residents. The goal of the dualist account is to 
decrease estrangement. On the dualist account, community is the 
name we give to a process of civic engagement. On this account, com­
munity occurs in appropriately scaled settings for face-to-face partici­
patory governance. These settings can be entirely artificial - unat­
tached to any claims of communal experience, history, or identity. 
Indeed, small-scale democratic participation is intended to transcend 
parochial communal (sectarian) attachments; a goal of participatory 
democracy is to create a political community of citizens out of indi­
viduals who would otherwise be strangers. 
The neighborhood, it is argued, is the ideal scale for the face-to­
face interactions necessary for true democratic dialogue. These inter­
actions constitute a genuine form of democratic governance, one 
missing from the highly centralized and impersonal forms of govern­
ment most living in metropolitan regions currently experience. By 
characterizing the Gang Congregation Ordinance as a neighborhood 
initiative, proponents lay claim to a powerful image of local decision­
making. The neighborhood is infused with democratic possibilities that 
the state should allow to develop. These arguments can apply to a 
whole range of emerging sublocal institutions that may hold out the 
promise of a renewed civic empowerment.255 These small-scale repub­
lics are touted as forms of government that energize the citizen both in 
his or her immediate neighborhood and in the larger expanses of 
American society. 
Yet, the participatory defense of localism presents two difficulties. 
First, the spillover effects of neighborhood decisions (for example, the 
forcing of gang members into other - perhaps less politically power­
ful - neighborhoods) undermine the premise of the participatory ac­
count: that individuals will have a voice in the decisions that affect 
them. The difficulty is getting all the stakeholders (neighbors and ad­
jacent neighborhoods) together in one place without losing the scale 
that is necessary for true dialogue. The spillover effects of local deci­
sions undermine localism not because those outsiders who are affected 
255. See, e.g., Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 84 (discussing advantage of 
proposed block improvement districts (BLIDs) in fostering skills of collective governance). 
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have not contracted into the norms (as on the contractarian account), 
but because those outsiders who are affected have not been included 
in the democratic process that preceded adoption of those norms.256 
Second, decisions about who should be counted as a decisionmaker 
are often based on arguments about who has the most to lose. These 
kinds of arguments rarely favor the disenfranchised or the marginal; 
indeed, the disenfranchised and marginal are almost never considered 
members of any community. They are, by definition, "nonvoters" -
often literally so because they are transient or have no home or are 
not of voting age. The already marginal are also often considered in­
eligible to vote because they are not imagined as stakeholders in the 
political community. Creating smaller sites for participatory democ­
racy will do little to alter the contours of the current moral mapping of 
the metropolitan region unless that site creation crosses more tradi­
tional neighborhood, socioeconomic, and racial lines. An emphasis on 
participation may in fact reinforce the current link between residence 
and political power, further entrenching the deep suspicion of outsid­
ers borne of protecting one's turf. 
Thus, the notion that little republics at the sublocal level can pro­
vide new arenas for public life is theoretically attractive but politically 
unstable. Indeed, enforcing a public, democratic form of sublocal gov­
ernance requires forceful intervention on the part of the state. Other­
wise, sublocal institutions can easily become instruments for the pri­
vate management of civic life, captured by powerful interest groups 
who enforce a particular conception of public life to the exclusion of 
other competing conceptions. 
Consider, for example, Kessler v. Grand Central District Manage­
ment Association, Inc. 257 In Kessler, the Second Circuit considered an 
equal protection challenge by tenant-shareholders residing within the 
territorial limits of the Grand Central Business Improvement District 
("BID"), a semi-autonomous sublocal government encompassing 337 
properties over seventy-five blocks in midtown Manhattan.258 The 
Grand Central BID is one of over forty business improvement districts 
established in New York City pursuant to New York State's business 
improvement district act.259 BIDs increase the level of services pro­
vided in particular city areas in an effort to promote and spur in-
256. Carol Gould writes: " 'Who has a right to participate not only in deliberation but in 
the decisionmaking itself?' The answer 'everyone affected by the decision' will not work for 
any practical or real-world context." Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing 
Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 58, at 177. 
257. 158 F.3d 92 (1998). 
258. See id. at 95. 
259. See Richard Briffault, A Government For Our Time? Business Improvement Dis­
tricts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366-67 & n.l (1999) (hereinafter 
Briffault, Government]. Briffault notes that estimates of the number of BIDs operating in 
the United States range from between 1000 and 2000. Id. at 336 n.l. 
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creased commercial and economic development, and are typically 
funded through an assessment on real property within the BID that 
goes towards improving the public property within the district. 
The tenants charged that the composition of the Grand Central 
BID's governing board violated the "one-person, one-vote" require­
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.260 Of 
the fifty-two members of the challenged governing board, at the time 
of the lawsuit, thirty-one were elected by the 242 owners of real prop­
erty in the district, sixteen were elected by commercial tenants, and 
one each was appointed by the mayor, the city comptroller, the Man­
hattan Borough president, and the city council member of the relevant 
council district. Only one representative was elected by the approxi­
mately 930 residential tenants of the BID.261 
The Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the district court's de­
termination that the equal protection requirement of one-person, one­
vote did not apply to the Grand Central BID. Analogizing the BID to 
the water districts that the Supreme Court held in Salyer Land Co. v. 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Districf62 and Ball v. James263 did not 
have to comply with one-person, one-vote, the Second Circuit found 
that the Grand Central BID's limited purposes and powers made it a 
"special purpose district" that disproportionately affected property 
owners.264 The majority held that the BID had a limited purpose (de­
voted to promoting business and commercial activity in the district), 
that its role and responsibilities in providing sanitation, security, and 
social services were secondary to the City's (and over which the City 
had significant control), and that the BID could not impose income or 
sales taxes or enforce laws "governing the conduct of persons present 
in the district," and thus lacked the kinds of sovereign powers a mu­
nicipal corporation might exercise.265 
The court also held that, because the mandatory assessment was 
paid by property owners "and only property owners,"266 the weighted 
voting system favoring property owners bore a reasonable relationship 
to the purposes of the BID: 
260. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 93-94; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-67 
(1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968). 
261. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 1 16-17 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
262. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
263. 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
264. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104-07. The court applied the two-prong test of Salyer and 
Ball for determining whether a local government is exempt from the one-person, one-vote 
requirement: Does the government serve a "special limited purpose," and does it "dispro­
portionately affect" those who are enfranchised? See id. 
265. See id. at 104. 
266. Id. at 107. 
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Projects such as the improvements to land in the district, the sweeping of 
streets, and the provision of additional security personnel are projects 
that redound to the benefit of many property owners; but for that very 
reason, these are projects that no owner would likely undertake indi­
vidually. The [)BID allows property owners to pool their resources to ac­
complish mutually beneficial projects to increase the attractiveness of 
district property for commercial purposes.267 
Of course, each of the projects mentioned by the court are classi­
cally governmental. Indeed, government is often justified and de­
scribed in these very terms as a mechanism for undertaking projects 
that individuals would not otherwise undertake on their own, that is, 
as an institution for solving collective action problems. Moreover, the 
court's description of the BID as nongovernmental - as just another, 
in the words of the appellee's brief, "private, non-profit entity"268 -
rings hollow in light of the BID's authority. For example, the BID was 
authorized to construct capital improvements that "included the reno­
vation of sidewalks and crosswalks, the planting of trees, the installa­
tion of new lighting, street signs, bus shelters, news kiosks, and trash 
receptacles," and the renovation of Grand Central terminal.269 The 
BID also had the power to "include any services required for the en­
joyment and protection of the public and the promotion and en­
hancement of the District" including security, sanitation, tourist in­
formation, social services for homeless persons, special maintenance 
and repair, public events, and retail improvements.270 In fiscal year 
1994-95, the Grand Central BID expended twelve million dollars 
raised from assessments on real property owners. As of 1995, it em­
ployed more than sixty security guards and three dozen sanitation 
workers, and it financed capital improvements by issuing over thirty­
two million dollars of bonds.271 
In short, as Judge Weinstein's dissent pointed out, the Grand Cen­
tral BID engages in a full range of " 'municipal' services" funded by a 
special "municipal ' tax' " collected by the city of New York for that 
purpose.272 In both actions and description, the Grand Central BID 
constitutes a government.273 
267. Id. at 108. 
268. Id. at 127 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
269. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 95. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 1 13-14 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
272. See id. 
273. See also Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at 437 ("BIDs engage in . . .  the 
classic activities of urban government."). 
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Thus, Ke�sler shows how the line between private (special district) 
and public (municipality) can be easily manipulated.274 More signifi­
cantly, Kessler shows how that line is manipulated in the service of a 
propertied conception of citizenship. As in Smith, Kessler involved 
adjudicating competing conceptions of community. And, as in Warth, 
the Kessler court rejected appellants' claims for inclusion in favor of 
appellee's assertions of autonomy. The. court justified favoring the in­
terests of property owners (who constituted less than one-third of the 
number of residential tenants) over tenants because only landowners 
were required to contribute the mandatory assessment for the upkeep 
of the BID. This rigorous application of the inverse taxation­
representation principle (no representation without taxation) dis­
counted the fact that tenants would pay the price of increased assess­
ments in their rents.275 Yet, like the increase in the cost of the housing 
for nonresidents that the Supreme Court discounted in considering 
Penfield's exclusionary zoning laws in Warth, the Second Circuit 
treated the increased rental cost passed onto the tenant as an inciden­
tal burden, more tied to "factors such as rental market conditions, the 
terms of individual leases, or City and State rent control and rent sta­
bilization regulations" than to the assessment.276 
Even if the tenants' rents were not affected by BID assessments, 
their lives surely were. Certainly the BID's construction of sidewalks 
and other public accommodations and its provision of private security 
forces, social outreach services, and sanitation services altered the 
daily lives of the people who lived there, arguably more so than the 
daily lives of the often-absentee property owners. The court's privi­
leging of the property owners' investments over the quality of life of 
the residents, who may live, work, and sleep within BID limits, can 
only be justified if we accept that BID activities actually had a de 
minimis impact on residents compared to overall city service provi­
sion. 
This may also explain why the court did not even consider the pos­
sibility that residents of New York City who lived or owned property 
outside the BID's territorial lines should have a say in BID govern­
ance, even though, as the dissent pointed out, BID polices could have 
274. See id. at 437 ("[T]he very attempt to classify governments along a publidprivate 
continuum according to the nature of the services they provide lacks analytical rigor and 
leads to arbitrary results."). 
275. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., 158 .F.3d 92, 123 (1998) (Wein­
stein, J., dissenting); cf Blaine Harden, Summer Owner Wants a Vote in Both Houses, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Bl (describing Hampton voting rights lawsuit by summer resident of 
East); Blaine Harden, Summer Residents Want Year-Round Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2000, at Al (describing how property tax-paying, nonresident property owners of seasonal 
vacation homes are agitating for the right to vote on local matters, arguing that because 
"they foot the bills" they should have a say in how the money is used). 
276. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 107. 
November 2001) Limits of Localism 449 
a demonstrable effect on the provision of municipal services elsewhere 
in the city. Nor did the court consider that those disenfranchised users 
of the streets, such as the homeless, street vendors, and panhandlers 
- the very target of BID policies - should be entitled to representa­
tion. 
In fact, one direct result of BID activities that affected both con­
stituencies was the displacement of panhandling and other undesirable 
uses to neighboring areas of the city through aggressive private secu­
rity enforcement - the creation of a BID-enforced "Green Zone." 
The Grand Central BID engaged in aggressive "outreach" to panhan­
dlers and the homeless within BID limits, which housing advocates 
charged was simply a means to force the homeless to go somewhere 
else.277 
More troubling to the dissent was the possibility that the prolifera­
tion of BIDs, particularly on the scale of the Grand Central BID, 
would make the provision of city services dependent on where one 
lived, with BID residents receiving increased city services because of 
their political clout and ability to pay.278 This would not only have the 
consequence of increasing city services for those with means, but 
would lead to a decrease in city services for those without means. 
BIDs may increase the pressure on the city to reduce city-wide tax 
rates and to delegate service provisions to private "special purpose" 
governments. The idea of a city-wide government in which tax reve­
nues are redistributed throughout a large territory comes under strain 
as BID members demand that their tax assessments stay in the BID's 
particular geographical area and that those assessments go to pay for 
services that benefit them.279 
277. See Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at 402 (noting that BID programs deal­
ing with the homeless grow out of a desire to maintain public order "rather than a desire to 
provide social services per se," and that BIDs "aim to prevent panhandling and the sense of 
'social disturbance' attributable to the presence of the homeless"). Critics charged that the 
Grand Central BID employed "goon squads" that assaulted the homeless in order to force 
them out of BID-controlled areas. An investigation did not find "credible evidence" of this 
claim but did find that the BID's homeless outreach was "flawed in its design." Id. at 402-03; 
see also Foscarinis et al., supra note 163, at 162-64 (suggesting alternative strategies BIDs 
can undertake that will address the economic conditions of homelessness as opposed to re­
stricting access to public space by "sweeping" the homeless with targeted removal strate­
gies); Nieves, supra note 130, at Al (quoting head of the Downtown Sacramento Partner­
ship, which represents 550 businesses and employs twenty "guides" to patrol sixty-five city 
blocks, as saying: "we need to continue to make clear that downtown is not going to be a 
place where panhandling and other negative activity is tolerated"). 
278. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 131-32 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
279. See id.; see also David J. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the Power of Business Im­
provement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 
283, 324-25 (1996) (discussing the concern that BIDs exacerbate existing social divisions and 
encourage the flight of the successful into enclaves of privilege protected territorially). In 
response to this assertion, Clayton Gillette acknowledges that "[l]egal doctrine may exacer­
bate the problem by giving those with the capacity to opt for higher levels of service incen­
tives to constrain governmentally provided services at artificially low levels," though he ar­
gues that there "exist countervailing incentives that might deter both officials and those who 
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The Kessler majority did not address these internal or city-wide ef­
fects. The court instead redescribed the BID's powers as essentially 
aesthetic; in short, it justified the limited franchise by imagining the 
BID as an organization that picks up the trash, paints a few store­
fronts, and cleans-up graffiti. Drained of any substantive norm gener­
ating powers280 and with a scope of activities "quantitatively dwarfed 
by those [performed by] the City,"281 the BID was rendered - like wa­
ter districts - harmless by the court.282 By rendering the BID harmless 
at least in theory, however, the Second Circuit missed an opportunity 
to imagine the Grand Central BID as a forum for more substantive lo­
cal governance and to develop an account of local democracy to go 
along with it. 
b. Reinforcing Propertied Power 
Although the Second Circuit evaded the question about represen­
tation by portraying the BID's activities as virtually insignificant in the 
lives of New Yorkers, it adopted a default norm of a property-based 
franchise that has a long pedigree. The presumption that property 
owners are more invested in a community than are non-property own­
ers is ongoing theme in the American political order.283 The New York 
could opt out from artificially limiting the scope of public services." Clayton P. Gillette, 
Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 1 185, 1209-10 (1996). Among these 
incentives are the interests of budget-maximizing bureaucrats and residents' desires to avoid 
reductions in property values. See id. at 1 210-11. Gillette also argues that allowing some to 
opt-out of public provision could reduce costs for those who remain by limiting congestion 
and overcrowding. See id. 
280. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104-05 (stating that the BID "performs no inspections in 
matters of health and safety . . .  [has no] power to issue citations for violations of City build­
ing or zoning codes . . .  in short, [it] cannot meaningfully alter the conduct of persons present 
in the district"). The court's finding that the BID "cannot meaningfully alter the conduct of 
persons" is belied by the fact that the BID clearly does "discourage" (and even polices) pan­
handling and other street conduct, such as street vending. See also infra text accompanying 
notes 291 -302. 
281. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 105. 
282. The dissent pointed out that even water districts are not so harmless, noting that 
the disproportionate voting scheme upheld in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973), allowed "[o]ne corporation [to] cast a majority of the 
· votes as a result of its huge landholdings," which allowed it to "disadvantage . . . .  smaller 
landholders and residents by preventing flood control measures that might interfere with its 
activities outside the water district." Kessler, 158 F.3d at 126 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
283. For example, though acknowledging that arguments in favor of property and poll­
tax qualifications for voting "ring hollow on most contemporary ears," and "are not in ac­
cord with current egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized," 
Justice Harlan nevertheless dissented in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966), which struck down Virginia's poll tax as unconstitutional. Harlan contended that 
states should be permitted to establish qualifications for the franchise, including property 
qualifications and poll taxes, arguing that they "have been a traditional part of our political 
structure": 
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statute requiring property owners to select a majority of the BID 
board is consistent with most state homeowner association statutes, 
which normally do not allow voting rights to be allocated on the basis 
of residence but only on the basis of property share.284 Recall the posi­
tive moral valence exerted by property ownership and the spatial dif­
ferentiation in our metropolitan regions between (stable) homeowners 
and (transient) renters. Indeed, civic republicanism draws on a tradi­
tion that holds that property ownership is a prerequisite for citizen­
ship, providing the needed independence and stability for the pursuit 
of civic virtue.285 An assumption of classical republican thought was 
that non-property owners would either be irresponsible with the af­
fairs of the state or would be easily corrupted or both.286 These as­
sumptions are implicit in the majority's holding, which appears to ac­
cept the appellee's premise that tenants will be irresponsible with 
other people's money. The assumption is that the kinds of physical 
improvements to a neighborhood that BIDs often undertake (such as 
repairing sidewalks, painting over graffiti, removing junked cars, and 
Most of the early Colonies had them; many of the States have had them during much of their 
histories; and, whether one agrees or not, arguments have been and still can be made in fa­
vor of them. For example, it is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal 
poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about pub­
lic affairs to pay $1.50 or thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise. It is also argu­
able, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of 
Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a deeper stake 
in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowl­
edgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the community 
and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens. 
Id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
284. See Ellickson, Cities, supra note 31,  at 1543 (discussing this limitation on possible 
voting regimes and arguing that associations should be able to select among voting regimes 
(including the residence-based franchise) and that cities also should be able to select among 
voting regimes (including the property-based franchise)). 
285. See, e.g., James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL 
WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 170 (J. Pocock ed. 1977) (advocating the wide distribution 
of property in order to increase opportunities for citizenship). For a current proposal based 
in this tradition, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 
12 (1999) (proposing that Americans receive an $80,000.00 "stake" when they reach adult­
hood, and stating that "[t]his is the time to make economic citizenship a central part of the 
American agenda . . .  to enable all Americans to enjoy the promise of economic freedom 
that our existing property system now offers to an increasingly concentrated elite"). 
286. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN 
VISION OF THE 1790s 1-20 (1984). There were some at the Constitutional Convention who 
favored a freehold qualification for federal elections. The proposed amendment was de­
feated, however, in part because it was thought voting qualifications were best left to the 
states. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 201-10 (Farrand ed., 
1911). Madison's views are described at follows: 
Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend 
much on the probable reception such change would meet with in States where the right was 
now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the 
qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would 
be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. 
Id. at 203. 
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planting flowers) will not be supported by non-property owning ten­
ants, who will instead redirect BID funds to lowering their rents or 
throwing block parties.287 Only landowners, who will pay for and reap 
the long-term benefits of higher property values, will have the correct 
incentives to spend BID monies on truly "community-directed" proj­
ects. 
I have my doubts that a nonresident property owner's ownership 
interest in his or her "fungible" (in Professor Radin's terms) real es­
tate investment creates better incentives to improve upon it than does 
a resident's nonownership interest in his or her "personal" home.288 
Nor is it obvious that the franchise should turn on such a test. Re­
gardless of where the incentives lie, however, the lesson here is that 
there is a strong chance that sublocal institutions will disenfranchise 
the unpopular or less politically powerful. Thus, the dualist account 
requires a higher-level authority that can aggressively umpire internal 
decisionmakers to ensure a baseline of equal rights of participation. 
Dualism therefore points away from the kind of local autonomy that 
287. See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 31, at 93-95 (defending property-based 
franchise for BLIDs on grounds that tenants will tend to favor short-term (and wasteful) 
projects that do not add value to property in the BLID). But cf Los Angeles City Charter 
§ 906 (July 7, 2000) (requiring that neighborhood council membership be open to all 
"stakeholders" - everyone that "lives, works, or owns property in the area"). For an at­
tempt to explicate a link between homeownership and citizenship values empirically, see 
Denise DiPasquale & Edward Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Bet­
ter Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON . 354-84 (1999) (finding that the relationship between home­
ownership and investment in social capital "may be causal," but that there is evidence that 
any connection may be attributable to lower mobility rates for homeowners as opposed to 
homeownership per se ). 
288. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 988-89, 
991-96 (1982) (proposing a property rights regime that links the degree of property rights 
protection to the relationship of the object to the person on a continuum from "fungible" to 
"personal," and arguing that the residential tenancy is a "personal" property right and there­
fore should receive enhanced property rights protection). If Radin's personality theory of 
property is correct, then non-property owning residents of a neighborhood have a strong 
incentive to undertake long-term neighborhood improvements because their homes and the 
immediate environment are, in part, constitutive of their person. But even putting aside 
Radin, Ellickson's assumption that residential tenants normally have short-term interests 
and that property owners normally have long-term interests - even if true in terms of length 
of tenure - begs the question of whose interests (in time) should take precedence. Non­
resident property owners may not share an interest in community-directed projects because 
their interest is in obtaining the maximum return on their investment. Landlords will thus 
use BLID funds to favor potential (higher rent-paying) residents over current residents. In 
the absence of rent-control mechanisms, landlords will favor those "improvements" that lead 
to increased property values that will, in turn, lead to the ouster of current lower-income 
tenants. Thus, the landlord's "long-term" interest in the value of his property is in direct con­
flict with the tenant's "short-term" interest in staying in his home. In the presence of rent 
control, landlords may have little incentive to make any improvements considering that any 
monies that they expend may not be recouped. On the other hand, landlords who believe 
that any further investment in a residential neighborhood would be wasted (i.e., those who 
are "milking" current dilapidated housing by failing to invest in it) might instead simply re­
distribute the monies from the BLID back to themselves or to other kinds of development 
projects - for example, projects that seek to replace residential tenants with commercial 
tenants. 
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mandates that the federal government defer to local deviations from 
constitutional norms. In fact, as Kessler shows, dualism requires a 
more rigorous and far-reaching enforcement of federal norms than 
current doctrine anticipates (at least as interpreted by the Second Cir­
cuit) and requires special vigilance where unpopular groups seem to 
be placed outside the political process. 
Such vigilance is precisely what proponents of the Gang Congrega­
tion Ordinance oppose in the name of fostering civic values. Yet, the 
Gang Congregation Ordinance can be seen as a positive act of civic 
engagement only by leaving out a particularly crucial constituency: the 
individual gang members who are targeted by the ordinance. While 
not literally disenfranchised, gang members are excluded from being 
full participants in the community; they are nonpersons in the infor­
mal, everyday public and civic life of the neighborhood.289 Of course, 
community standards are always enforced by some majority against a 
noncomplying minority - in this instance, gang members. The dualist 
account thus always begs the important question: How do we define 
the citizens whose voices are entitled to respect? 
c. The Contraction of Public Space and the Rise of the Managed 
Public Sphere 
Local control in small-scale settings does not, in and of itself, lead 
to increased civic engagement on the part of neighborhood residents. 
Indeed, a reduction in the territorial scale of government may actually 
result in an overall contraction of the public sphere. Kessler illustrates 
how the proliferation of neighborhood-scaled institutions like BIDs 
can result in the disenfranchisement of significant portions of the ur­
ban population. Not only might these institutions literally restrict indi­
vidual citizens' participation in a political process, but they might also 
reduce the willingness of the individuals that live inside them to con­
sider themselves part of a larger polity. Neighborhood governance 
may be accompanied by neighborhood myopia, a reduction in the citi­
zen's scope of interests down to his or her immediate concerns for who 
moves in next door.290 The risk is that small-scale territorial units at 
289. The police in Denver, Colorado, compiled a list of suspected gang members that 
contained the names of two out of three African-American youths in the entire city between 
the ages of twelve and twenty-four. See STEVEN DONZIGER, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: 
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 110 (1996). Consider the 
impact on the public life of Denver neighborhoods if two-thirds of African-American youth 
were subject to an antiloitering ordinance. 
290. The Not In My Backyard ("NIMBY") attitude taken by many neighborhoods when 
it comes to siting regional infrastructure needs, landfills, waste plants, low-income housing, 
halfway houses, or other unpopular but regionally necessary services already shifts such un­
popular services to poorer and less politically powerful neighborhoods. See, e.g. , Michael 
Weeler, Negotiating NIMBY: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 1 1  
YALE J .  ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the failure o f  Massachusetts's "innovative new land 
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the neighborhood level will actually narrow the public sphere, both in 
terms of who is included and how it is used. 
Recall that public order norms (like the Gang Congregation Ordi­
nance) are often defended on the ground that they enable community 
life to flourish by securing the public arenas in which neighborhood 
residents gather, interact, and converse. The primary services under­
taken by BIDs - sanitation, street maintenance, and public security 
- share the same goals, though with a more commercial focus. BID 
projects are often intended to make the street more inviting, to en­
courage the use of urban public spaces by making them cleaner, more 
user friendly, and more pleasant.291 Thus, BIDs share the same con­
cern for the quality of the public street and for enforcing norms of ci­
vility as does the order maintenance approach to policing and 
Ellickson's Red-Yellow-Green Zones. This approach adheres to a 
rigid public/private line that emphasizes regulation of public decorum 
over control of private lawbreaking. Order maintenance policing tar­
gets street crime and the indications of street crime - unruliness in 
public, loitering, graffiti, abandoned cars. It is less concerned with 
lawbreaking in private spaces, and thus, by definition, it is less con­
cerned with those places in which street disorder is controlled by other 
means, such as in suburban neighborhoods.292 
Yet the emphasis on street disorder reflects a particular cultural 
conception of public and private space and the role of order in public 
spaces. Order maintenance policing is itself invested in maintaining a 
rigid public/private line. Deviant behavior is often behavior that seems 
to cross or fudge this line. Camping, sleeping, or urinating on the 
street are the most dramatic examples,293 but fixing one's car in the 
street or putting living room furniture on one's porch294 are also signs 
of disorder. Moreover, deviance from accepted standards of private 
and public behavior is itself disorderly. Thus, talking loudly out-of-
use law to end costly NIMBY deadlocks over siting hazardous waste treatment plants"). This 
same problem of NIMBY attitudes at the neighborhood level led Professor Chemerinsky to 
oppose granting neighborhood councils power over local land use decisions in the proposed 
Los Angeles City Charter. See Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 142-44. 
291. Ellickson includes BIDs as an important mechanism for enforcing "street deco­
rum," noting that " [a]lthough BIDs also engage in sanitation and business promotion, the 
control of disorderly street people has emerged as one of their central functions." Ellickson, 
Controlling Chronic Misconduct, supra note 8, at 11 99. 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 160-164. 
293. Localities are particularly keen about preventing these kinds of activities. See 
DAVIS, supra note 129, at 221-65. 
294. See, e.g., Charles Osgood, North Carolina Town Looks to Clean up Porches, CBS 
NEWS: SUNDAY MORNING, 1999 WL 16204113, (June 20, 1999) (reporting how town of 
Wilson, N.C., has outlawed the use of non-outdoor furniture on front porches); Alan D. 
Miller, Athens Jumps on Couches: Housing Code Overhaul Would Ban Porch Sofas, THE 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 1 998, at 1A (describing a college town's attempt to ban the 
use of living room furniture on front porches, a ban aimed primarily at students). 
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doors or at the movies,295 using one's stoop as an extension of one's 
living room, or playing in the fire hydrant on the street on a hot day 
can all be signs of public and private normative decay. 
Disorder in public spaces is seen as threatening. Professor Austin 
has described how efforts at maintaining an ordered public sphere 
with well-defined lines between private and public activities have af­
fected black leisure and commercial activity by defining those leisure 
and commercial activities as disordered, and then regulating them.296 
Austin notes that black leisure, which often finds expression in com­
munal gatherings in publicly accessible venues, is regularly associated 
with threats to public health, safety, and welfare.297 Common re­
sponses to the perceived threat of black gatherings range from privat­
izing public spaces, to enforcing curfews, to shutting down venues that 
attract predominantly black patrons. Black entrepreneurial commer­
cial activity in the form of street vending or scavenging is also associ­
ated with the breakdown of public order.298 The broken windows the­
sis is often utilized to justify shutting down such activities. In effect, 
the public street is regulated to cabin black "disorder" and enforce a 
"privatized" and, in Austin's words, "white" conception of leisure and 
economic activity.299 
295. See Re&ina Austin, "Not Just for the Fun of It!": Governmental Restraints on Black 
Leisure, Social Inequality, and the Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 702 
(1998) [hereinafter Austin, Restraints] (describing African-American cultural tolerance of 
speaking in movie theaters and white dismay at the practice); cf JACOBS, supra note 25, at 
41 (expressing concern about the formalized management of public space and public lei­
sure). 
296. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 695-712; Regina Austin, "An Honest Liv­
ing": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 
2125 (1994) [hereinafter Austin, Vendors]. 
297. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 707-12. 
298. See Austin, Vendors, supra note 296, at 2125. Austin's thesis finds support in 
Mitchell Duneier's recent ethnographic study of street vendors, panhandlers, and scavengers 
on Sixth Avenue in New York City. See MITCHELL DUNEIER, SIDEWALK (1999). Duneier 
describes how the Grand Central BID's influence was crucial in the city's passage of an or­
dinance that restricted sidewalk vending in the district, seriously limiting the ability of black 
street vendors operating on the lines between the formal and informal economy to make a 
living. See id. at 231-52. He notes that BIDs have erected planters and other sidewalk furni­
ture intended to prevent vendors from setting up their tables on the street. Id. at 317. In ad­
dition, BID security guards, in cooperation with police, often harass vendors, panhandlers, 
and the homeless by destroying their merchandise or possessions. See id. at 231-54. 
299. Another term might be "suburban." In fact, BIDs are explicitly modeled on the 
suburban shopping mall and the theme park, both of which create a managed environment 
that is supposed to be clean, safe, and orderly. See Briffault, Government, supra note 259, at 
424-29. The BID reflects an attempt to create "urban centers suffused with suburban val­
ues." Id. at 428. BIDs are part of an overall "suburbanization of downtown," one of the 
"most important urban processes of the 1990s," which includes BIDs, the creation of pedes­
trian malls in downtown streets, and skyways and tunnels that link shopping with work with 
transportation in controlled environments. Boddy, supra note 162, at 150. Referring to the 
"malling of America," William Kowinski wonders, "What happens . . .  when the chief com­
munity centers of our time are such willfully artificial distortions of reality?" WILLIAM 
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What makes public life possible for one neighborhood, however, is 
different from what makes public life possible for another. The em­
phasis on cleanliness, order, and security that is implicit in the Gang 
Congregation Ordinance and other order enforcing laws (such as cur­
fews, anti-cruising, and anti-vending laws), reflects a particular ac­
count of public life, which may be foreign and even destructive to the 
way minority neighborhoods experience public life.300 Instead of 
making public life possible in these neighborhoods, the Gang Congre­
gation Ordinance and other public order norms may actually disable it 
by limiting associations in the only public venues available to urban 
dwellers without providing real alternatives.301 Opponents of the ordi­
nance would not be surprised at this outcome; they claim that this was 
the very intention of an ordinance designed to protect white property 
owners from black youth.302 
It is also not a surprise that the Kessler court would restrict the 
franchise to landowners in the Grand Central BID, considering that 
the BID's primary purpose was to control, clean up, and secure the 
sidewalks and other public spaces within BID territory. Ordered pub­
lic space favors landowners much more than other kinds of residents, 
who may need to use public places because they have nowhere else to 
go. Thus, the court is correct in fearing that the BID's mission would 
change if residents or other interested constituencies were permitted a 
greater voice in its governance. The court is incorrect, however, when 
it minimizes the political and social effects of public street mainte­
nance "BID-style."  The Grand Central BID, through its control of the 
KOWINSKI, THE MALLING OF AMERICA: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE GREAT CONSUMER 
PARADISE 204 (1985). 
300. Here I am echoing critiques (by feminist theorists and others) of the theoretical 
concept of a unitary public sphere as a place of deliberative, rational, logical, and reasoned 
debate. As one commentator states: 
It follows that public life in egalitarian, multicultural societies cannot consist exclusively in a 
single, comprehensive public sphere. That would be tantamount to filtering diverse rhetori­
cal and stylistic norms through a single, overarching lens. Moreover, since there can be no 
such lens that is genuinely culturally neutral, it would effectively privilege the expressive 
norms of one cultural group over others, thereby making discursive assimilation a condition 
for participation in public debate. 
Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Ex­
isting Democracy, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 17 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993). 
301. See Austin, Restraints, supra note 295, at 692. Indeed, order maintenance policing 
and public order policies tend not to distinguish among different kinds of "disorder." For 
example, Duneier argues that there is little empirical support for expanding the broken win­
dows thesis from the control of physical disorder (such as abandoned cars) to the control of 
social disorder in general (loitering, vending). DUNEIER, supra note 298, at 288-89. He finds 
that the Sixth Avenue venders, scavengers, and panhandlers have developed economic roles, 
complex work, and mentors who have given the normally "down-and-out" encouragement 
to try to "live better lives." Id. at 312-17. This order-enforcing aspect of black street vending 
is often overlooked by proponents of broken windows, particularly by police,•who often as­
sociate disorder with blackness. See id. ; see also Roberts, supra note 28, at 790-811 .  
302. See Amicus Brief in Opposition, supra note 205, at 4-5. 
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public street, is engaged in defining and delineating the contours of 
public space itself. This is far from being engaged in a mere aesthetic 
enterprise. 
Consider if Chicago, instead of drafting the Gang Congregation 
Ordinance, had created Green Zones in which certain normally legal 
activities would not be permitted, including congregating with two or 
more persons with no apparent purpose; or alternatively if Chicago 
allowed particular neighborhoods to create neighborhood associations 
whose members could hire private security guards to patrol the streets 
or to close them altogether in the evening.303 These proposals, even 
more than the Gang Congregation Ordinance, would devolve stan­
dards of street behavior down to the neighborhood level. They also 
present in stark relief the question of what constitutes public space 
and, by extension, what kind of public life and public norms the built 
environment should foster. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court's treatment of the Gang Congregation 
Ordinance may have had more to do with its conception of the public 
character of Chicago city streets than with any individual rights to loi­
ter or travel the public way, which, as a practical matter, do not exist in 
the vast majority of places that make up the metropolitan region. 
Justice Stevens cited a number of urban activities that could be 
reached by the ordinance, such as standing on the street comer talking 
to friends, hailing a taxi, waiting for a telephone call, or waiting out­
side the ballpark for an autograph.304 These activities are rarely seen 
on suburban streets where there are few cabs, no public telephones, 
and certainly no ballparks (except those surrounded by a vast sea of 
parking lots). In metropolitan regions in which homeowners associa­
tions are the most popular new form of development (decidedly 
Green Zones), it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify spaces 
anywhere outside of the central cities that are publicly accessible or 
utilized in the way that the streets of Chicago are.305 
303. See supra text accompanying notes 159-162. Under current Supreme Court doc­
trine, neighboring residents would not be able to challenge street closings except by showing 
racially discriminatory intent. See City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (holding 
that absent discriminatory intent, African-American residents of city were foreclosed from 
challenging street closings as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). In City of 
Memphis, the residents of an all-white enclave, Hein Park, sought to close a street to traffic 
heading toward a predominantly African-American neighborhood. The city argued that the 
street closing would reduce traffic flow, increase safety to children, and diminish "traffic 
pollution." One thousand citizens presented a petition to the city council in opposition to the 
street-closing proposal. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality 
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 306 (1997). 
304. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-60 (1999). 
305. One commentator has described as an "attack" on downtown streets the networks 
of raised pedestrian bridges, people movers, and tunnels that allow individuals to avoid the 
city street altogether when moving from their car to their office to the mall and back to their 
cars. See Boddy, supra note 162, at 150. Boddy observes that these skyways and tunnels have 
created an "analogous city" that allows predominantly middle-class whites to avoid "the last 
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Green Zones, like BIDs and other controlled spaces, are not pub­
lic, if public means something more than who owns the street. Public 
space implies access, a sense that the streets and sidewalks are, as 
Carol Rose writes, places in which the people can assert "collective 
public rights."306 Streets and sidewalks are valuable because they are 
used by "indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons - by the public 
at large"307 and are not managed (as Green, Yellow, and Red Zones 
would be) by the government, or (as BIDs and private streets are) by 
a nongovernmental or quasi-governmental association. Inherently 
public space is space that "lends itself to activities that are somehow 
sociable or socializing - activities . that allow us to get along with each 
other. "308 A democratic, pluralist city needs these loci of interaction, 
the places for bumping up against people that are different from us. In 
contrast, the Red-Yellow-Green Zoned city - where we all live 
among people who agree with us - does not. In that associational 
city, we do not need to get along with each other because we already 
live in neighborhoods of like minds, sorted by invisible boundary lines 
that create and define the spaces in which we live. 
It is difficult to call these zoned spaces a success for participatory 
self-government, to hold them up as exemplars of civic-minded local­
ism. There is an increased distance between neighbors and between 
neighborhoods, as is illustrated by the popularity of gated communi­
ties, homeowners associations governed in every detail by prearranged 
contracts, and BIDs that take over city services and ensure territorial 
security. These institutions indicate an alienation from, as opposed to 
an enabling of, civic life. The well-defined lines between "us" and 
"them" in zoned space indicate the failure of old-fashioned local gov­
ernance, the inability for individuals to solve disputes or govern each 
other at close quarters, and the atrophying of the social competencies 
of the neighbor. 
The dualist account of community welcomes the construction of lit­
tle republics. The vitality of these little republics as true. loci for par­
ticipatory governance, however, requires robust state intervention of 
zone of physical contact" between people of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds - the 
public street. Id. at 150-51. Boddy further states: 
Precisely because downtown streets are the last preserve· of something approaching a mixing 
of all sectors of society, their replacement by the sealed realm overhead and the under­
ground has enormous implications for all aspects of political life. Constitutional guarantees 
of free speech and of freedom of association and assembly mean much less if there is literally 
no peopled public place to serve as a forum in which to act out these rights. 
Id. at 125. 
306. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,  774 (1986). 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 776. 
November 2001] Limits of Localism 459 
the kind that is unlikely to materialize and that, if it did materialize, 
would undermine the very localism that it seeks to foster. 
Ill. ALTERNATIVE LOCALISMS 
We conceive of localism in vertical terms, as describing a set of 
progressively nested authorities and the relationships between them. 
Yet, as this Article has argued, the definitional work of "community" 
is accomplished intersticially - at the borders between places. The le­
gal rules for incorporating or excluding others generate both a com­
munity's identity and its claims to self-govern. From this vantage, lo­
calism describes the formation of neighboring communities and the 
horizontal relationships between them. If it is the case that community 
(as a normative concept) and communities (as a descriptive one) are 
products of contested boundary-creating norms in demarcated space, 
then the choice for courts and policy-makers is not between respect 
for the local or the force of the universal, but between the competing 
force of alternative localisms. 
The local is an entrance control, a threshold that may or may not 
require a normative ticket to be crossed. How the issue is framed is 
quite important. The vertical question - "In which forum should this 
decision be made?" - is vastly different from the horizontal question 
- "What kinds of entrance controls are appropriately employed to 
create a community?" The current doctrine asks the first question, 
which produces answers that depend on the vertically defined unit of 
government one happens to trust at a given historical time. A coherent 
answer to the latter question requires a new vocabulary, one that ex­
plicitly recognizes law's role in constituting social space and the recip­
rocal relationship between space and community. 
Here I offer some conceptual guideposts in thinking about this new 
vocabulary. First, I argue that the language of individual rights is an 
inadequate means of addressing the problems of exclusion and com­
munity formation. The contest over the boundaries of community is 
obscured when claims of belonging are translated into individualized 
assertions of constitutional right. Second, I suggest a prominent role 
for an anti-exclusion principle that is attentive to the spatial effects of 
local entrance controls. This principle looks back to a time when it was 
possible for a court to strike down the types of zoning regimes we now 
take for granted because they served "to classify the population and 
segregate them according to their income or situation in life,"309 and it 
309. Ambler Realty Co. v. Viii. of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (D.C. Ohio 1924). 
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looks forward to the formation of new doctrinal tools that can begin to 
dismantle the superstructure of segregated space.310 
A. From Rights to Belonging 
The dichotomy of respect/force, deference/paternalism is a product 
of a vertical conception of localism. There are only two possible exer­
cises of centralized power in relation to a locality conceived of as an 
inferior rung on a ladder of authorities. The central power can either 
defer to local norms or override them. Proponents of the Gang Con­
gregation Ordinance demanded the first exercise of federal power, 
charging that the federal courts should not have interfered with the 
norms adopted by the residents of Chicago's inner-city neighborhoods, 
but instead should have deferred to the neighborhoods' lawmaking. 
Perhaps surprisingly, localism arguments are not federalism argu­
ments, though the themes sounded by those in favor of broader state's 
rights are often articulated as a general suspicion of centralized power. 
Neighborhood constitutionalism does not look primarily to the Consti­
tution's structure for support, but instead draws upon substantive 
theories of the benefits of decentralized authority, local autonomy, 
and community self-determination. Indeed, the substantive defense of 
localism strongly implies not only that federal power should not inter­
fere with local norms, but also that federal power should be used to 
prevent other centralized governments from interfering as well. De­
spite the fact that local governments do not have any official constitu­
tional status,31 1  a substantive localism requires that federal power be 
employed to prevent states from overriding municipal norms or even 
to prevent cities from overriding neighborhood norms.312 The logic of 
310. For a post-integrationist theory based on the concept of racially identified spaces, 
see Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segre­
gation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1388-92 (1997). 
311 .  The standard view is that municipal corporations are "instrumentalities of the 
state," see EUGENE MCQUJLLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1 .58 (3d ed. 
rev. 1987), and have no sovereign status independent of the state. Thus, the state legislature 
could alter or eliminate municipalities at any time, like any other agency of the state. The 
view that local governments are instruments of the state is traced to John F. Dillon's 1872 
Treatise on Municipal Corporations, in which Dillon asserted that " [a]ll corporations, public 
and private, exist and can exist only by virtue of express legislative enactment, creating or 
authorizing the creating of the corporate body." JOHN F. DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 52 (1872). "Municipal corporations are created by legisla­
tive act." Id. at 95. What has become known as "Dillon's Rule" - that state enabling stat­
utes are to be strictly construed, see id. at 101-03 - is the accepted wisdom today. 
312. David Barron has recently made a related argument in the context of state-city re­
lations. See Barron, supra note 34, at passim. Barron suggests that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1990), which struck down a Colorado constitutional referendum that prevented the 
state's localities from enacting antidiscrimination ordinances protecting gays and lesbians, 
can be read in the context of a line of cases in which the Court has struck down state at­
tempts to control the political discretion of towns and cities in the service of enforcing con­
stitutional norms. See id. at 492-93. 
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neighborhood constitutionalism requires that states defer to city 
norms, that cities defer to neighborhood norms, and that neighbor­
hoods defer to block-level norms as long as the criteria for deference 
are met.313 
The standard counter to the assertion of local autonomy is the 
"rights response." Federal and state power should be used to override 
local laws when they conflict with constitutional rights. Thus, oppo­
nents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance repeatedly argued that 
"bedrock" constitutional rights cannot be waived by majorities at any 
level of government.314 Rights, guaranteed and enforced by a vertically 
higher unit of government, protect the individual from oppressive lo­
cal regimes. The state should defend individuals from local majorities 
that have turned tyrannical. The archetypal image of the rights re­
sponse to the assertion of localism is of the African-American child 
attending a Little Rock high school flanked by United States marshals 
and federal troops. 
Proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance have reversed 
this image, arguing that because the normally oppressed minority 
community is now the local community, federal power in Morales is on 
the wrong side. In this instance, localism is being used as what Joan 
Williams calls a "forum shifting" strategy.315 The proponents of the or­
dinance argue for increased deference to local decisionmaking, shift­
ing the forum for regulation of the public street to the neighborhood 
and away from federal courts because the federal government can no 
longer be trusted to protect minority neighborhoods. 
The rights response presupposes a localism conceived of as the re­
lationship between nested vertical authorities. The debate is joined at 
a point of conflict, between deference to local norms and the force of a 
universalized right. But this response already concedes too much. By 
asserting the individualist trump, the rights response has in fact al­
ready accepted the challenge of working out the terms of deference to 
the community even if it ultimately results in no deference at all. If we 
take a step back, prior to this conflict between community and indi­
vidual, we see that the initial forceful legal act is not the overriding of 
local norms by a federal power protecting individual rights, but the 
313. Thus, proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance do not invoke principles of 
federalism, but something closer to the opposite of federalism: the Supreme Court should 
have reversed the Illinois Supreme Court (which had held that the ordinance was unconsti­
tutional) because the constitutional dictates of the federal polity require that certain kinds of 
local communities be granted autonomy to adopt norms that differ from the state at what­
ever level. Mark Rosen's argument that "liberalism demands that certain communities be 
given powers to self-govern of the sort that would require some constitutional nonunifor­
mity," Rosen, supra note 43, at 1190, certainly implies this position. 
314. See Alschuler & Shulhofer, supra note 9. 
315. Williams, supra note 29, at 87-90 (describing "forum shifting" in the local govern­
ment context as shifting political power among different levels of government). 
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adoption of a particular localism to the exclusion of other possible al­
ternative localisms. The hardest questions are not vertical - choosing 
between respect of the local or the force of the national (or universal) 
- but rather horizontal - choosing between one iteration of the 
community and numerous other possible iterations of the community. 
Warth is a good example both of this choice of localisms and the 
limits of the rights response as a counter to the assertion of local 
autonomy. The Court's holding that Rochester residents did not have 
standing to contest Penfield's adoption of an exclusionary zoning re­
gime relied on the conclusion that the Rochester petitioners had no 
interest in Penfield because as nonresidents they were not subject to 
or affected by Penfield's zoning laws. By extension, they also had no 
say in the adoption of Penfield's zoning laws. By rejecting the 
Rochester petitioners' standing claims, the Court was not simply em­
bracing an existing status quo; it was defining the appropriate commu­
nity of normatively entitled persons. It was engaging in the forceful act 
of privileging one localism among many, a localism predicated on 
naturalized jurisdictional boundaries. 
But what if the Court conceived of the relevant community as 
more than just the territorially defined residents of Penfield? What if 
the Court imagined a localism that was not defined in terms of a geo­
graphically defined territory but in terms of substantive interests, in 
this instance in terms of a temporally defined space? In granting 
standing to potential residents of Penfield (who now live in 
Rochester), the Court could have created a jurisdiction across time 
(encompassing current and future residents of Penfield) instead of rei­
fying the jurisdiction that it presumed existed across a particular space 
(residents of Penfield). 
This temporal conception of what constitutes the relevant locality 
for standing purposes is one possible version of an interest-based lo­
calism that is actually more "local" in light of the cross-border and 
cross-temporal impact of Penfield's exclusionary policies. That is, it 
more accurately reflects local interests - the interests of those indi­
viduals most directly affected by the particular regulation. The Court 
need only have reconceived the relevant standing community as 
slightly more encompassing than the existent territorially defined 
community. 
This conception of a localism of interests is one of the animating 
ideas behind proposals for cross-border voting in local elections.316 
Under a cross-border voting regime, residents of each locality in a re­
gion have a number of votes that they can cast cumulatively in any lo­
cal election in a metropolitan region.317 The purpose of cross-border 
316. Professors Frug and Ford are the leading advocates of such proposals. See Frug, 
supra note 17, at 324-25; Ford, supra note 165, at 1909-10. 
317. See Frug, supra note 17, at 324-25. 
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voting is to reorient the local around interests, to make local govern­
ment boundaries less rigid and more "permeable."318 For example, a 
cross-border voting regime would allow potential residents of Penfield 
who want to move to Penfield to allocate their votes to Penfield office 
seekers who promise to eliminate exclusionary zoning laws. If exclu­
sionary zoning in Penfield is not an important issue to Rochester resi­
dents, then they might allocate only one vote to a Penfield office 
seeker and their remaining votes to a Rochester office seeker who 
might be promising, for example, better schools in Rochester. Each 
individual in the region would have a say not only in what norms 
should have priority, but also to which locality of interests each 
wanted to belong. 
Cross-border voting is problematic for a variety of reasons and 
likely a political nonstarter.319 But the proposal highlights an intriguing 
alternative to the current assumptions about the relevant local politi­
cal community, a thorny issue that the Warth Court avoided by as­
suming it away. By including the potential residents of Penfield in its 
conception of who counted as a member of the relevant political 
community, the Court had an opportunity to define a localism of in­
terests. The relevant local jurisdiction could be termed "Penfield plus 
those who want to live in Penfield" or "Penfield and Rochester minus 
those who do not want to live in Penfield." Again, because the impact 
of local exclusionary zoning regimes fall most heavily on those in the 
mobility market,320 this alternative localism would actually better re­
flect the values of local control by affirming the power that those most 
affected by norms should have to adopt, challenge, and change those 
norms. 
I am not suggesting that we manipulate borders to give all inter­
ested persons in a region the franchise, nor that we restructure local 
governments on a regional scale by moving geographical boundaries 
outward. What I am arguing is that the current vertical conception of 
localism structures the choice for courts as one between the "local" 
and the "central," when in fact the relevant community is always an 
318. See Ford, supra note 165, at 1909. 
319. There are obvious problems implementing cross-border voting regimes, not least of 
which is the resistance of voters and candidates to think in cross-border terms. A further 
drawback is the possibility that cross-border voting will merely move the relevant battles 
over the distribution of local entitlements to the regional level. There is little evidence that 
regional bodies will be more responsive to the distributive consequences of local government 
entitlements. See Zelinsky, supra note 192, at 665-68 (arguing that regional and state institu­
tions have shown little willingness to alter the distribution of local government entitlements). 
Indeed, even fundamental shifts of local entitlements top-down by courts or state legisla­
tures may have little effect on resistant local governments. See, e.g. , Boger, supra note 167, at 
1450 (discussing suburban localities' resistance to the New Jersey Supreme Court's Mount 
Laurel decision invalidating local exclusionary zoning laws); Roisman, supra note 167, at 
1387-89 (same). 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 187-189. 
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explicit political choice that exists in relation to (and to the exclusion 
of) other equally plausible alternative communities. I am therefore 
suggesting that when courts are faced with a choice among alternative 
localisms they do not accept the default of jurisdictional boundaries, as 
if those boundaries are neutral. Rather, courts should recognize that 
the boundary-creating norm at issue creates the relevant local com­
munity. It is not enough to say that one favors the local; all the work is 
still to be done in defining which local. In a world in which the local is 
based on interests rather than on territory, the Rochester plaintiffs in 
Warth would be allowed at least to state a claim that they are part of 
the relevant community, if not make it to a jury on that question. 
Obviously, the Warth Court did not approach the case through a 
localism lens. The Rochester petitioners did not assert what could be 
called a horizontal claim - a claim that they belonged to the relevant 
community and thus should have a say in the norms that the commu­
nity adopted. Rather, they asserted a vertical claim - that their rights 
as members of a more encompassing political community trumped the 
local norm. This was the best they could do to make their claims le­
gally cognizable, but it put the Court in the position (as all rights re­
sponses do) of choosing between respect for local laws or the force of 
federal rights. 
Because the rights response does not contest the assertion of 
community - it simply asserts a superior normative claim backed by a 
more powerful political authority - it is seriously limited as a re­
sponse to assertions of local autonomy. It cannot articulate harms that 
inhere in the definition of the community itself, that is, harms that spill 
over the boundaries of a neighborhood but that are caused by norms 
that technically do not apply outside the jurisdiction's lines. And the 
rights response is easily defeated, as it was in Warth, with the simplest 
of standing questions: How can an individual's rights be violated if 
that individual is not subject to the laws of the jurisdiction? The prob­
lem for the Rochester petitioners is that they could never articulate a 
specific individual harm sufficient to override the local norm embed­
ded in a local government geography that put them on the wrong side 
of the jurisdictional line. That is because the injury complained of was 
that the boundary-creating norm itself - exclusionary zoning - put 
them there in the first place. 
A "claim to belong" is not readily cognizable. Yet, the language of 
belonging is meant to focus attention on the formation and definition 
of community in the first instance. In contrast to the rights response, 
which conceives of rights as trumps deployed on behalf of the individ­
ual from a place conceptually "outside" the community, a claim of 
belonging challenges the implicit opposition between community and 
individual - and between inside and outside - by redescribing the 
community. A claim to belong challenges the contours of the relevant 
political community and the entrance controls used to define it. 
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Warth nicely illustrates how a claim to belong is incoherent when 
translated into the language of rights as trumps, and how demands for 
inclusion in the relevant political community look like "mere" prefer­
ences to join. The lesson can be applied to Kessler and Smith as well. 
In Kessler, the Second Circuit faced an explicit choice between alter­
native localisms in the form of a voting rights claim brought by the 
non-property owning residents of the Grand Central BID. As in 
Warth, the issue for the court was framed in terms of a choice between 
deference to a local rule and the force of federal power employed in 
the vindication of individual rights. The real choice, however, was be­
tween alternative localisms, the simplest being a localism in which the 
non-property owning residents were included by being granted equal 
voting rights. Other alternative localisms might grant the franchise 
(and thus membership status) to employees who work full-time in the 
BID zone, regardless of where they live, or to all New Yorkers who 
have an interest in the BID. These localisms are equally as plausible as 
the one the Second Circuit panel chose. 
By restricting the franchise to property owners, the court chose a 
localism that required it to interpret the BID's powers as insubstantial, 
unobtrusive, and inconsequential to practically anyone, inside or out­
side BID lines. The court adopted this emaciated version of sublocal 
governance as a way of cabining the effects on outsiders of the draw­
ing of BID territorial lines - "outsiders" who would, if affected 
enough by BID policies, become "insiders." The court's decision was 
therefore informed by a privatized, managerial model of the BID that 
masked any alternative localism that would include these heretofore 
outsiders. These alternative localisms are only visible if the BID is 
viewed as a potential site for genuine collective governance, and if 
BID activities are understood as not just occurring in public but as 
creating the public. 
Again, the harm done to the non-property owning residents in 
Kessler cannot be sufficiently expressed in terms of individual rights; 
the claim to belong is a collective harm, an assertion of a .counter­
community. In contrast to the right to vote, a right to belong is inco­
herent. Such assertions of belonging are, as the Warth Court found, 
mere preferences to be included, not rights that a court can vindicate. 
The same can be said of the "metaphysical" harm asserted by the 
plaintiffs in Smith from the construction of an eruv in their neighbor­
hood. The eruv harmed the plaintiffs by demarcating social space in 
such a way as arguably to eliminate or overwhelm an alternative 
community with which the plaintiffs identified and belonged, one 
without a religious "aura" or "designation." Of course, the two emer­
gent alternative localisms - non-religiously identified and religiously 
identified - did not come into view until the Orthodox Jewish com­
munity attempted to define a social space for themselves. The choice 
between alternative localisms was not even apparent to residents of 
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the neighborhood until the boundary-creating norm literally and figu­
ratively demarcated the social space in which they lived. Indeed, the 
demarcated space of the eruv comes into view only if one shares in the 
normative commitments of the observant Jewish community. 
The eruv is an invisible space, but no more invisible than jurisdic­
tional lines defined territorially through zoning or conceptually 
through limitations on the franchise. Like the exclusionary zoning re­
gime in Warth and the property qualification in Kessler, the eruv cre­
ates a wall - a jurisdictional boundary where territorial defense and 
community definition are perceived of as coextensive. The eruv terri­
torializes by defining a particular geography as normatively significant. 
It emphatically constitutes an act - albeit small - of jurisdictional ar­
rogation.321 Of course, the eruv is much more permeable than the 
boundaries in Warth and Kessler. In fact, it can be said in Smith that 
two boundary regimes coexist in one space: an Orthodox Jewish, re­
ligiously identified regime demarcated by the eruv, and a secular, non­
religiously identified regime demarcated by the jurisdictional bounda­
ries of the town.322 
Which brings us back to Morales. The battles over turf in the 
inner-city neighborhoods of Chicago are equally battles over authority 
and conflicts over space.323 In Smith, the non-Orthodox residents' fear 
of being crowded out is real, just as in Morales, the nongang residents' 
fear of being crowded out is being realized. And, in both cases, there 
are valid claims on the part of the minority that its use of the same 
space is entitled to respect. Once again, assertions of individual rights 
fail to capture the nature of the conflict. In Morales, competing claims 
to belong cannot be resolved with reference to one or the other's 
321. Davina Cooper notes that the North London eruv was destabilizing to area resi­
dents in part because "it resituated religious law within public decision making, and consti­
tuted religious law as a legitimate basis for public action." Cooper, supra note 242, at 50. But 
cf Weizman & Herz, Between City and Desert, supra note 233 ("It would be wrong to sug­
gest that the eruv constitutes a form of signifactory imperialism, for, paradoxically, it is only 
imperialism which insists that an object can mean only one thing, and that a boundary must 
be observed by everyone. In the polyglot, multicultural city, readings of space and place do 
not have to be linked to territory and urban organization; the act of communal interpreta­
tion brings to the urban fabric an increase of meaning, rather than a reduction. At the heart 
of this problem is not the question of imposing upon urban space an obscure religious prac­
tice, but rather the willingness of city authorities to sanction the city as the site of multiple 
readings."). 
322. Cf Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil/. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
(striking down on Establishment Clause grounds a statute creating special school district for 
religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of strict form of Judaism). In Kiryas Joel, 
unlike in Smith, the school district boundary and the religiously infused boundary were coex­
tensive, not merely overlapping. Perhaps that accounts for their differing legal treatment 
under the Establishment Clause. 
323. For an interesting account of an analogous conflict over space and territory be­
tween college students and nonstudents in Boulder, Colorado, see Lynn A. Staeheli & 
Albert Thompson, Citizenship, Community, and Struggles for Public Space, PROF. 
GEOGRAPHER, Feb. 1997, at 28-38. 
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claim to be legitimate. Yet, our current localism, so strongly tied to a 
defensible territory, is preoccupied with the drawing of jurisdictional 
and literal boundaries that define "us" on one side of the geographical 
line and "them" on the other side. The individual rights framework 
and its corresponding doctrine ultimately fails to capture what is at 
stake.324 
B.  Toward a Doctrine of Local Citizenship 
The capacity to imagine alternative localisms is hampered by the 
absence of a doctrinal framework for analyzing entrance controls on 
the one hand and claims to belong on the other. What does a doctrine 
of local citizenship look like? A hint can be found in another opinion 
authored by Justice Stevens and handed down one month before 
Morales. In Saenz v. Roe,325 the Court, in a 7-2 decision, struck down a 
California statute that limited the amount of welfare benefits newly 
arrived families in the state could receive. For one year after his or her 
relocation to California, a newcomer's benefits would be limited to the 
amount he or she would have received in the state of prior residence. 
The Court held that the statute violated the respondents' constitution­
ally protected right to travel by creating an impermissible discrimina­
tory classification based on length of residence in the state. Holding 
that the right to travel "embraces the citizen's right to be treated 
equally in her new State of residence," the Court forcefully affirmed 
the right of " [c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor . . .  to 
choose to be citizens of the State wherein they reside."326 
Saenz holds that states cannot erect entrance controls that serve as 
barriers to entry for certain kinds of residents, namely poor newcom­
ers. The right to travel, wrote Justice Stevens, 
embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a 
citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be 
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when tempo­
rarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to 
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like any other citi­
zens of that State.327 
324. In Morales, this doctrine is a vagueness analysis that appears to be both unrealisti­
cally expansive and yet easily circumvented. Indeed, despite the seemingly powerful reach of 
the plurality's vagueness analysis and the expansive rhetoric of Stevens's opinion, Justice 
O'Connor seemed to have little trouble drafting revised language that could - at least for 
her purposes - avoid any future vagueness concerns. As indicated above, O'Connor's lan­
guage was adopted by the city council in a subsequent version of the ordinance. See supra 
note 7. 
325. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
326. Id. at 505, 510-11 (internal quotations omitted). 
327. Id. at 500. 
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Reinvigorating the long-dormant Privileges and Immunities Clauses of 
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that those 
clauses were the source for a citizen's right to "go to and reside in any 
State he chooses" and to enjoy the full privileges of citizenship af­
forded to all residents.328 The Privileges and Immunities Clause " 'does 
not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based 
on length of residence. '  "329 
Contrast Saenz's articulation of the right of the citizens of the 
United States to choose their state of residence with Warth's holding 
that the citizens of the several states do not have standing to assert a 
right to choose their locality of residence. In Saenz, the choice to move 
from one state to another is not merely a preference, but a right that 
cannot be burdened even by a slight differential in welfare benefits for 
a period of one year. In Warth, however, the Rochester residents' as­
sertion of a right to be able to choose to live in Penfield is consigned to 
the pile of mere "preference;" the complete absence of a choice (let 
· alone a minimal burden on that choice) is not a cognizable injury un- . 
der Article III. 
What is quite stunning is the radical disjuncture between Saenz's 
rigorous attack on a statute that would make it marginally less attrac­
tive for poor residents from other states to move to California and 
Warth's equally rigorous defense of an exclusionary zoning regime 
that makes it virtually impossible for poor residents from a nearby 
town to move into Penfield. Both California's "waiting period" wel­
fare statute and Penfield's fiscal zoning operate as entrance controls 
that deter poorer newcomers from entering the jurisdiction. In both 
cases the boundary regime favors current residents over potential 
residents. Yet in Saenz the Court articulates a powerful right on behalf 
of potential citizens to choose to enter - to be included - while in 
Warth the Court articulates an equally powerful right on behalf of cur­
rent residents to eliminate the possibility of entrance - to exclude.330 
Doctrinally, Saenz and Warth can coexist because local govern­
ments do not have any articulated constitutional status, let alone the 
kind of status that states have in the federal system. Whereas the new­
comer welfare recipients in Saenz can invoke a constitutional relation-
328. Id. at 502 (internal quotations omitted). 
329. Id. at 506 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)). 
330. Roderick Hills might argue that the difference between Saenz and Warth can be 
explained by the Court's unease with allowing states to act like "affective communities." See 
Hills, supra note 77, at 312-14 (arguing that it is appropriate for the Court to reject state dis­
criminatory policies against newcomers if those policies are intended "to perpetuate the 
state's current demographic composition for the sake of social or cultural cohesion"). On 
Hills's theory, the concept of national citizenship is threatened if the states are allowed to 
behave as affective communities, though not if neighborhoods or local govern'ments are. See 
id. Hills does not explain, however, what happens if a state is entirely constituted of affective 
communities that enforce entrance controls up to the state's borders. 
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ship between the states and the federal government that arguably re­
quires a right to entry for citizens of the United States into each of the 
several states, the Rochester petitioners in Warth have no such rela­
tionship to invoke and thus must wedge their claims to be included 
into the poorly fitting framework of the Equal Protection Clause, with 
its rigorous intent requirement.331 The default of local entrance con­
trols can be taken for granted by the Warth Court because there is no 
constitutional doctrine of local citizenship. Localities are all but invisi­
ble to the Constitution;332 the irony is that this very invisibility provides 
them with a power to exclude that even states - at whose sufferance 
localities are said to exist - cannot exercise. 
The Court's treatment of California's state-wide entrance control 
provides one possible model for local citizenship. Indeed, the Saenz 
Court's suspicion of entrance controls at the state level should also 
hold for those entrance controls that operate at the local level. Saenz 
is animated in part by an objection to the creation of multiple levels of 
citizenship tied to one's status as a newcomer, a system that turns both 
on one's relative level of poverty and on one's length of stay in a place. 
The vocabulary of caste infuses the opinion, as does the counter­
vocabulary of citizenship.333 That counter-vocabulary emphasizes that 
331. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); City of 
Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
332. This argument shares Professor Williams's view that local government is "constitu­
tional[ly] vulnerable." Williams, supra note 29, at 87-90. Williams argues that local govern­
ment is "vulnerable" because there has never been a "thoughtful discussion in American law 
about the role of cities qua cities [in my terms: "localities qua localities"] within the federal 
structure." Id. at 152. Because our constitutional doctrine has failed to articulate the role of 
localities in the federal system, the contours of local power are defined by which other power 
in the federal system - municipal, state, or federal - we want or do not want to constrain. 
Thus, Williams argues that judges and commentators have used the status of local govern­
ment throughout history as a kind of cipher to express their beliefs about government power 
in general. For example, Williams argues that the competing views of municipal power of­
fered in the nineteenth century - Thomas Cooley's "inherent local government sover­
eignty" and John Dillon's "local government as creature of the state" - reflected those 
thinkers' distrust of state power (Cooley) and municipal power (Dillon). See id. at 87-100. 
Williams also argues that the Burger Court's "quasi-constitutional" doctrine of local auton­
omy articulated in Warth (which, like Cooley's, embodies an idea of local sovereignty) re­
flected that Court's distrust of federal power, and that Justice Brennan's doctrine of munici­
pal liability reflected Brennan's fears of government power in general. See id. at 121-38. 
Similarly, it could be argued that the proponents of the Gang Congregation Ordinance have 
adopted a form of localism that sees neighborhoods as autonomous entities in order to con­
strain federal and state power because that power is preventing realization of certain policy 
goals, namely the development of street-level norm enforcing policing. 
333. See 526 U.S. at 503-04 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 
(1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting)) (" 'The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to 
restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States has a perfect 
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses . . . .  He is not bound to cringe 
to any superior, or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.' "); id. at 506-07 (stating that the Privileges and Immuni­
ties Clause does "not tolerate a hierarchy of 45 subclasses of similarly situated citizens based 
on the location of their prior residence."); id. at 507 (stating that "the State's legitimate in­
terest in saving money provides no justification for its decision to discriminate among 
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one's status as belonging to a community should not turn on whether 
one's family has been here for generations or for only a day. It is a de­
cidedly immigrant-friendly and integrationist vocabulary that rejects 
the idea that jurisdictional lines defining prior-in-time residents should 
be accompanied by entitlements to exclude. In short, Saenz rejects the 
idea that there is - or should be - an "us" and a "them" defined by 
state jurisdictional boundaries. 
Of course, the right to travel is an unsatisfying articulation of this 
more general geographical anticaste principle.334 The injury in Saenz 
- like all boundary-created injuries - is insufficiently captured by 
the rights response. Instead, the injury can be described as the injury 
of outsider status - as a claim to belong. This injury should be a fa­
miliar one. It has been at the center of this country's struggle with 
slavery, a basis for the challenge to Jim Crow, and a foundation for 
civil rights. 
Yet, despite these advances, the problem of the color line has not 
been solved; it has instead recoalesced as the problem of differentiated 
space.335 Invisible jurisdictional lines now do the work of de jure segre­
gation.336 Indeed, outsider status is the central achievement of the suc­
cessfully zoned metropolitan region. The Red-Yellow-Green Zones of . 
the metropolitan area are a literal manifestation of how boundary­
creating norms invariably define community in opposition to some 
other place where "they" do not share "our values" or "our way of 
life." 
The process of imagining alternative localisms must begin with the 
recognition that what is called "local" is always "interlocal." The 
norms of community are a result of a complex social, political, legal, 
and spatial dynamic between localities and one's placement in social 
equally eligible citizens."); id. at 511  ("The States . . .  do not have any right to select their 
citizens."). 
334. Cf Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT 
257, 258 (1996) (grounding the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1990), in 
an anticaste principle). The rhetoric of Romer is similar to the rhetoric of Saenz, particularly 
the notion that a state "cannot . . .  deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws," nor "make 
them unequal to everyone else." It is "not within our constitutional tradition' to enact laws 
"declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all oth­
ers to seek aid from the government." Romer, 517 U.S. at 625. Justice O'Connor's "en­
dorsement test" in the Establishment Clause context also embodies what Farber and Sherry 
call the "Pariah Principle." See Farber & Sherry, supra, at 258. In Justice O'Connor's view, 
the government can neither "send a message to nonadherents [to a particular religion] that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community," nor "mak[e] adherence to 
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community." See Wallace v. Jaffree, 
472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
335. See John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a 
Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair, " 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1233-40 (1995); Ford, 
supra note 165, at 1844; Ford, supra note 310, at 1388-92. 
336. See Ford, supra note 310, at 1392. 
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space indicates one's status as an insider or outsider, stakeholder or 
nonstakeholder, citizen or noncitizen. We should be skeptical of local 
autonomy when it is asserted in defense of exclusion and backed by 
state power, and when it serves the purposes of metropolitan area­
wide segregation. Thus, a doctrine of local citizenship would assess all 
entrance controls for their caste-creating and -enforcing propensities. 
As in Saenz, territorial discriminations that function to create degrees 
of citizenship should receive careful judicial scrutiny. Enforcing a sub­
stantive claim not to be excluded from vast parts of the metropolitan 
region would go a long way toward dismantling the existing spatial or­
der. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to place the Gang Congregation Ordinance 
in the context of that spatial order and to challenge it. Morales is a 
provocative case because it defies the usual assumptions about who 
benefits from decentralized government. It is also a hard case: there is 
no question that gang violence requires a powerful response from the 
state. 
The wise response to the complex social problems afflicting our 
inner-cities, however, is not to mimic and reinforce the zoned spaces 
of the metropolitan region by adopting the same version of local 
autonomy that allows these spaces to flourish. The answer to the 
problem of gang violence in the inner city is not "more localism," but 
rather a rethinking of how that localism has already been deployed to 
reinforce existing distributions of crime, municipal resources, and so­
cial, economic, and symbolic capitol. The neighborhoods of inner-city 
Chicago have already lost the metropolitan-area spatialist game, and 
they will continue to do so as long as localism is equated with territo­
rial defense. 
We live in a society that relies heavily on boundaries. The Gang 
Congregation Ordinance is the unfortunate outcome of - and is 
modeled on - this boundary-creating impulse. Instead of an inclu­
sionary concept, community has become a mechanism for building 
high normative and literal walls in legal, social, and physical space. 
The rhetoric of community has been employed to defend the current 
allocation of resources, and for the most part that rhetoric has been 
extremely successful for those who live in the vast Green Zones out­
side the inner city. Indeed, the arguments for local power to depart 
from constitutional norms merely serve to reinforce the separation 
and isolation of the inner-city community and to stigmatize it - an ac­
tual undermining of the rule of law which, as Robin West writes, oper-
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ates as a "bulwark against our human tendency" to claim that "some 
but not others are members of our community of equals. "337 
That is not to say that the problem of the "local" in society has an 
easy solution. Local government theorists, like many legal and politi­
cal theorists, have sought ways to reconcile our need for existing 
within groups of our own making with our obligations to a wider citi­
zenship, to reconcile the requirements for maintaining community in 
the "little platoons"338 to which we belong and the requirements for 
maintaining community within the larger society. This project is not 
likely to be completed soon. Indeed, the boundary problem of local 
government law - the problem of pluralism - has no ready answer. 
The purpose of this Article has been to try to imagine something 
other than the current platoons to which we are attached in a particu­
lar spatial and temporal place - the metropolitan areas of the post­
millennial United States. Existing assumptions about the foundations 
of local government prevent us from imagining ourselves on the other 
side of the normative wall, from understanding that "our" community 
could be otherwise. A lack of imagination characterizes the apparent 
opposition between the city and suburb in Warth, between religious 
and nonreligious residents of the same town in Smith, and between 
property owners and non-property owners in Kessler. This same lack 
of imagination characterizes the oppositions between all neighbor­
hoods, however defined, in a city that would require one particular 
neighborhood to waive (or contemplate waiving) its constitutional 
rights because it has no alternative. By examining the thresholds be­
tween these communities and by beginning to debate the doctrinal cri­
teria for assessing them, the law can better approach a solution to the 
troubling harms of the lines we draw around us. 
337. Robin West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 Q.L.R. 259, 276 (2000). 
338. Robinson, supra note 13, at 269, 343 (quoting Edmund Burke). 
